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INTRODUCTION 
 
0.1: The Problem with Nietzsche and Nihilism 
 
When Nietzsche declared the death of God his words fell on deaf ears. Dying penniless and 
insane, it was not until some years later that his writing found a popular audience. Much of 
Nietzsche’s focus was on the concept of nihilism, a literal understanding of a universe 
devoid of meaning. Nietzsche's declaration of the death of god was to precede 200 years of 
nihilism, after which the rise of ubermensch, a unique and abstracted figure capable of 
overcoming nihilism, was predicted. However, Nietzsche’s writings on ubermensch were 
slim at best, with only 40 entries for the word appearing throughout his work: 10 in Thus 
Spoke Zarathustra, 1 in The Antichrist, and a further 25 scattered throughout unpublished 
note and journals (Cybulska, 2015: p.2).  
 
A general understanding sees ubermensch as a type of post-human figure capable of 
creating meaning and value, that separates itself from the human by going above and 
beyond. 1 However, beyond the brief passage below, Nietzsche never really expands upon 
the concept. We have no solid idea what ubermensch might be. 2 The concept has been 
variably explored and ignored as it has fallen in and out of favour over the years, and as we 
                                                          
1 In Issue 93 of Philosophy Now, E. Cybulska notes “RJ Hollingdale (in Nietzsche) saw in Übermensch a man 
who had organised the chaos within; Kaufmann (Nietzsche) a symbol of a man that created his own values, 
and Carl Jung (Zarathustra’s Seminars) a new ‘God’. For Heidegger it represented humanity that surpassed 
itself, whilst for the Nazis it became an emblem of the master race.” 
2 In Beyond Good & Evil, Nietzsche refers to Alcibiades, Julius Caesar, Hohenstaufen Friedrich II, and da 
Vinci as “marvellous in-comprehensible and unfathomable men destined for victory and the seduction of 
others,” a clear sign that he believes there are men capable of greatness (Nietzsche, 1973: p.122). However, 
whilst he expresses admiration for these types of victorious human, they remain entirely that – human. For 
this reason we accept them as sources of inspiration, but not as examples of figures being close to attaining 
ubermensch. 
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will see, some current interpretations weigh heavily on developments of technology. In 
order for us to develop our own contemporary understanding of what ubermensch could 
be, we must turn to Nietzsche’s initial writing on the subject.  
 
We are first introduced to the idea of the ubermensch early in Nietzsche's 1883 novel, Thus 
Spoke Zarathustra, where the eponymous character addresses a town crowd upon his 
arrival: 
 
     “I teach you the Superman. Man is something that should be overcome. What 
have you done to overcome him? 
     All creatures hitherto have created something beyond themselves; and do you 
want to be the ebb of this great tide, and return to the animals rather than overcome 
man? 
     What is the ape to men? A laughing-stock or a painful embarrassment. And just 
so shall man be to the Superman: a laughing-stock or a painful embarrassment.” 
 
(Nietzsche, 2003: pp. 41-42) 
 
Viewing the ubermensch contextually we may see it as Nietzsche's most important 
response to nihilism, so much so that it is “the meaning of the earth” (Nietzsche, 2003, p. 
42). In using the word 'meaning', Nietzsche is bravely suggesting an ultimate answer. This 
is a concept we must treat with some scrutiny. 
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For Nietzsche, to overcome nihilism we must move forwards and create ourselves again. In 
drawing comparisons to apes and animals, Nietzsche casts an unfavourable view of 
humanity as something inferior. In fact, creatures are capable of creation, but that is not to 
say that in creating, creatures have moved beyond their own shortcomings. It is a 
backhanded remark aimed at knocking modern man from his pedestal. Even as an atheist 
Nietzsche is not holding mankind as an answer, but as a problem to be overcome.  
 
As such the ubermensch would be the ultimate existent form – one that surpasses 
everything to crown itself. It would quite literally be the most unnatural of things, yet for 
Nietzsche it would still be of the earth. The onlookers are begged to “remain true to the 
earth” (Nietzsche, 2003: p.42), suggesting that even if the ubermensch is ultimately wildly 
unnatural, nature is of importance because it is our operational sphere. This is not a nod 
towards a science of the earth, but rather an understanding that we are confined to the 
space that we occupy, thus transcendence is not possible in as much as we do not move 
beyond our worldly parameters, merely our human ones. 3 By escaping both Christianity 
and what Nietzsche viewed as the near-dogmatic and fideistic basis for science, the 
ubermensch would thrust forwards as something entirely new, with even the nihilist's 
approach to the facts of science nullified under their own weight. 
 
We are now more than two-thirds of the way through Nietzsche's proposed two-hundred 
years of nihilism, and the question of resolution still persists, with no real agreement to 
                                                          
3 In fact, Nietzsche dismisses the rise of scientific understanding based upon interpretations of the world as 
an organism, an idea which he wishes to hastily move away from due to its closeness to that of a spiritual 
understanding of things (Nietzsche in Safranski, 2003: p. 226). 
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what ubermensch might be. 4 In recent years, developments in science and technology have 
made the fantasies of yesteryear a reality. Transhumanism is currently hotly debated across 
many spheres, including Nietzsche scholarship. 5 However, it has been rightly dismissed as 
a viable interpretation of ubermensch. Whilst thinkers such as Loeb argue for the 
development of a transhuman ubermensch, the control of capitalism and its drive towards a 
theological salvation narrative are problematic. However, by interrogating the truly 
transhuman in the development of superintelligent AI, we find the potential for 
ubermensch to be achieved and exist external to the all-pervading and dominant eye of 
capitalism. It is here that we align our focus. Understanding the potential of 
superintelligent AI as ubermensch is an area yet to be explored, and given the popularity 
and reality of both the transhuman debate, and the reignition of focus on the works of 
Friedrich Nietzsche, framing AI as potential ubermensch provides new grounds for 
philosophers, technologists and members of the academic and transhuman communities to 
engage with old problems in a new light.  
 
0.2: Key Notes and Reasons to Study 
 
                                                          
4 As Bogerts points out, the concept of ubermensch have been tightly linked to folk culture, particularly in 
superhero comic books. Whilst Superman himself might on surface level appear as a reading of ubermensch, 
the reality is quite different. However, many of the comic book writers of the postmodern era have worked 
more traditional Nietzschean elements into their stories (with Grant Morrison going so far as to include 
Nietzsche himself in an issue of All-Star Superman (Bogarts, 2013: p.48-53). It is perhaps of no coincidence 
that culture feeds into understandings of ubermensch, whether they be superheroic interpretations (which in 
turn feedback to historical myth), future fixation based on augmentation), or something other, the fact 
remains that in the overcoming of man there is an element of holding humanity as the triumphant part of this. 
Rather than looking at the overman, modern interpretation opts instead for the weaker and misinterpreted 
superman.  
5 Refer to chapter 4 for a list of key texts. 
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Key to this thesis are the following focal points, which we consider problematic yet vital 
areas that need addressing. Each of these act as a reason for study, as in our view their 
nature fails to cut the degree of critical analyses required for the urgency of the task. They 
are as follows: 
1. Nietzche’s writing is historically fixed. As the world has changed, so too have our 
understandings of nihilism. Nihilism realised as capitalism has enveloped the world 
as another repetition of Nietzsche's idea of passive nihilism that cannot be 
overcome. It is so entwined with being itself, and has been intensified to such a 
degree, that Nietzsche could not have possibly accounted for it. With the limitations 
in Nietzsche's own writing on ubermensch and the degrees of obfuscation, masking 
and convulsion associated with his stylistic choices, any definitive reading of 
Nietzsche is impossible. Rather than fixate on locating ubermensch within an 
overtly Nietzschean (and historical) framework, we propose the need for a fresh 
reading of ubermensch with clear applications to the now. Nietzsche could never 
have imagined the world as it is now, so to focus on Nietzsche's concepts of 
ubermensch and nihilism solely within their historical context devalues the end goal 
of overcoming as a time-specific process. If we are to overcome nihilism at the end 
of Nietzsche's proposed 200 years, then we should utilise time and technological 
progress as tools to reinterpret these historical ideas.  
 
2. Nietzschean history is clouded with appropriation from the beginning. In his 
own lifetime, Nietzsche’s work was largely ignored. Nietzsche’s own sister, 
Elisabeth Forster-Nietzsche became his caretaker when his health declined, and 
upon his death rewrote and edited a number of his unpublished works to align with 
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her largely National Socialist and anti-Semite agenda. 6 As such, when Nietzsche 
first rose to fame it was under the guise of national socialism and tied closely to 
Aryan master race interpretations of ubermensch. As perspectives on Nietzsche 
have changed, so to have interpretations of his work and the light in which some 
ideas are viewed. The resurgent interest in ubermensch stemming from 
developments in transhumanism has itself become problematic, as it falls into the 
trap of repetitions of passive nihilism and salvation narratives. We believe therefore 
that if we are to appropriate Nietzsche (and indeed, there may be no other way to 
look at his work than as a type of toolset for individual interpretation), we must do 
so with a view to reading Nietzsche in a way befitting the advances outlined in 
point 1. Simply put, that in developing our fresh reading of Nietzsche in light of 
historical and technological progress, we must both embrace and take ownership of 
our own interpretations whilst also ensuring that Nietzsche himself is not placed on 
a pedestal. We cannot confirm what Nietzsche believed, nor whether those beliefs 
would hold true if here were to live today. We must therefore ensure that all 
opinions of Nietzsche's work are treated with scrutiny and that the focus is on the 
end goal and not preserving the words of Nietzsche himself. 
 
3. The need to understand ubermensch in different terms. We can no longer rely 
on views of ubermensch as Aryan figures, nor the transhuman, so to find a potential 
                                                          
6 For more on Elisabeth Forster-Nietzsche, see C. Diethe’s Nietzsche’s Sister and the Will to Power, Urbana: 
University of Illinois Press, 2003; Macintyre, Ben, Forgotten Fatherland: The Search for Elisabeth 
Nietzsche, New York: Farrar Straus Giroux, 1992. For an early yet solid introduction to reading Nietzsche, 
see Kaufmann’s rehabilitation of Nietszche in the post-war environment in Nietzsche: Philosopher, 
Psychologist, Antichrist (1950). 
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outcome within Nietzsche’s proposed 200 years of nihilism, we must think laterally 
and outside the box – trans-Nietzschean. The abstract nature of the problem (i.e. in 
capitalism, nihilism pervades all) requires its own system of redefining being and 
subject in the trans. This means that to configure ubermensch within the 200-year 
time frame, we must look both truly trans-Nietzsche and trans-human towards a 
being capable of operating beyond these structures. We offer one suggestion, that of 
superintelligent Artificial Intelligence as ubermensch, as a plausible resolution. We 
take issue with the perceived inescapability of capitalism and nihilism and the 
problems encountered in repetition of salvation narratives as attempts to realise 
ubermensch as transhuman. Our predicament rests on the many endeavours that 
look to changing the human without thinking of the possibility of the trans/beyond. 
The emphasis is often placed on the alteration of the human, not that which exists 
beyond the human. Instead, we embrace the otherness or alien nature of a possible 
ubermensch. There are possibilities for the transhuman exist beyond the human but 
built partly in its image; a self-creating consciousness that retains Nietzsche's link 
to the human by continually returning to the mechanisms of the will to power, 
knowledge, technology; willing as a fundamental drive for all life, reason as a 
marker, but not as a definition (life and the universe exist beyond reason, but the 
ability to reason denotes an aspect of the human). To think to the future and trans-
Nietzsche means that ubermensch could (and should) be an ugly and difficult 
concept for us to grasp.  
 
0.3: Research Questions 
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Further to the above, we note three key research questions that will be returned to 
throughout this project. It is our aim to satisfactorily explore each and resolve them by our 
conclusion. They are as follows: 
1. Are there repetitions of salvation narratives in contemporary non-religious 
and atheistic society? If so, where are they located and how can they be 
resolved? 
2. How has nihilism changed over time, and how has this change impacted on 
concepts of value and being? 
3. How can we think both transhuman and trans-Nietzsche? How can we envision 
ubermensch without glorification of salvation narratives or the human? 
 
0.4: Conditions and Limitations 
 
In order to keep this thesis focussed, we will be proceeding with a few conditions and 
chosen limitations.  
 
We will be framing Nietzsche historically to better contextualise his thought, doing so 
through his own work and biographical studies, which allow us to understand Nietzsche 
within then-contemporary surroundings. Given the importance of time to our theories (and 
indeed the basis – Nietzsche’s predicted 200 years of nihilism), we consider this a vital 
endeavour. Where possible we will also focus on recent interpretation of Nietzschean 
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thought, or concepts we find compatible that we can read alongside Nietzsche. 7 Whilst 
there will be references to ground-breaking thinkers such as Heidegger, due to space 
limitations we will not explore their thinking in full, instead relying on interlocuters who 
utilise Heidegger’s thinking in ways more directly fitting with the problem at hand. We 
will however place some emphasis on the thought of Deleuze, whose theories and readings 
of Nietzsche will be employed throughout. We will also be taking something of an inter-
disciplinary approach, employing the work of social theorists, philosophers of science and 
technology, and political thinkers. This better allows us to frame some of the issues we 
encounter and contextualise them to read as philosophy of religion. Finally, in keeping 
with the Nietzschean tradition, we will be using the term ubermensch in reference to our 
own work and Nietzsche’s. However, any quotes and references from secondary sources 
and interlocutors will retain use of their personal preferred translation. 
 
0.5: Chapter Breakdown 
 
Our argument is structured in four phases, outlined as Nietzsche's nihilism and the village 
atheist; the semiotic and hermeneutic shift of nihilism in postmodernity; capitalism as 
nihilism; technology, ubermensch and the future.  
 
                                                          
7 We focus largely on thinkers who draw inspiration from Nietzsche, whose work best fits the specific of our 
narrow task. Many of our key interlocutors, including Deleuze, Vattimo, Baudrillard, Woodward, Kroker, 
Fisher, Berardi and Ansell-Pearson all work in a post-Nietzschean tradition, building upon ideas taken 
directly from, or sympathetic to, Nietzschean thinking. If we are to aim to think trans-Nietzsche, then we do 
so by building on exceptional thinking undertaken in light of Nietzsche’s own. The thinkers included have 
been picked specifically for this reason, and there is little distinction drawn between discipline or 
interdisciplinary approaches. Rather, the context here is the Nietzschean itself. Unfortunately, this also means 
that in order to draw a tight focus, some key thinkers such as Heidegger and Lyotard have been largely 
omitted. They will be referenced where appropriate, but we are unable to engage with them heavily due to 
word limitations. 
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In chapter One we situate Nietzsche's historically and use this as a framing device for 
understanding both Nietzsche's nihilism and Nietzsche himself. We first focus on the idea 
of the village atheist, the character who rejects god but clings to the values of old, which in 
turn leads to a kind of atheological transcendence narrative; a kind of passive existence that 
acts only to repeat the very problem Nietzsche identifies by reskinning the issue at hand 
under the guise of new developments. We next turn to Nietzsche's reaction to his 
contemporaries and the idea of the village atheist by exploring his understanding of 
decadence and taking pleasure in the death of God, where we identify the problem of 
Nietzsche's use of masks and veiling that act to safeguard his theorising from those deemed 
unworthy of understanding. We use this to note both how it is problematic for Nietzsche 
scholars due to the sheer amount of interpretation and disagreement it creates, and also 
how it creates a statement of urgency: Nietzsche is not to be understood as the answer to 
nihilism, nor an end-goal, rather he is a way point in the process. Finally, we unravel 
Nietzsche's understanding of nihilism as the nullification of all values in light of the death 
of God, and note that in order to progress towards ubermensch we must employ a form of 
active nihilism that avoids the repetitions of the village atheist, whose own we define as 
passive nihilism. 
 
Chapter Two re-imagines nihilism in postmodernity by exploring new developments in 
philosophical thought and the ways in which science and technology impact on the world 
at present. We focus on the shift from the interiority of Nietzsche's nihilism to the 
exteriority of postmodern nihilism, with its focus on the sociopolitical ramifications of the 
problematic. We then turn to Baudrillard's understanding of semiotics and the dissolution 
of meaning through the intensification of repetitions without original intent, those of the 
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simulation and simulacra, which we filter through the predominant framework of 
capitalism. We understand this as the crux of the post-death of God return to the 
theological. We then turn to Vattimo's idea of a nihilism that cannot be overcome, 
outlining his theories of existence within metaphysics, and how nihilism grants us a 
playground for hermeneutics beyond history and the delineation of metanarratives. We 
note that on surface level, many postmodern thinkers embrace the problem of nihilism but 
provided no answers to its overcoming, instead opting to treat it as a boundary to work 
within. In order to continue on a path of active nihilism, we employ the work of Woodward 
to speculate the grounds for overcoming nihilism in light of postmodern developments, as 
envisioned in the acts of difference and repetition. By finding room for difference in 
repetition we can see the potential for an active nihilism that breaks the cycle we encounter 
time and again in the thinking of the village atheist. 
 
Chapter Three focuses on the problem of capitalism as a repetition of theology, 
understanding it in light of the postmodern condition and Nietzsche's figure of The Last 
Man, a character content with symbols and the fruits afforded us by capitalism. We use 
Goodchild, Berardi and Fisher to understand capitalism as a form of passive nihilism, with 
an all-pervading nature that seeps into every facet of contemporary life. Next we explore 
the impact of capitalism on the human condition as encountered through guilt and anxiety. 
By understanding capitalism as a semiotic compound, we see not only the flourishing of 
the village atheist, but also the rise of his successor, the last man. We next turn 
understanding the trappings of capitalism as the inescapable, utilising Fisher’s theory of 
capitalist realism - an inability for us to think of any possible alternative or life exterior to 
capitalism, which acts to further erode the thoughts and hopes of the village nihilist by re-
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internalising the problem of nihilism. We conclude by understanding the need to find new 
developments for ubermensch that factor in technology and lateral thinking to exceed the 
boundaries of capital. 
 
In Chapter Four we explore concepts of ubermensch as transhuman technological beings 
under capitalism, interrogating recent thought on the transhuman as ubermensch. Using the 
work of Ansell-Pearson, we understand the need to reject transhumanism as ubermensch 
on grounds of village atheism and greater repetitions of transcendence narratives, as 
identified in the theological and its link to the inescapable nature of semiocapitalism. We 
return to Nietzsche and interrogate his concepts of the will to power as a primary drive, 
and the concept of eternal return. This allows us to legitimise ideas of difference in 
repetition, and reading these alongside Ansell-Pearson's understanding of the viral aspects 
of being and the legitimacy of assemblages, we acknowledge the potential beyond the 
transhuman. We next employ Kroker and his work on the will to technology as the will to 
power, invigorating arguments for the will to power and the potential for new structures 
transhuman to replace the concept of the transhuman figure as ubermensch. Finally, we 
filter this through Nick Bostrom's work on superintelligent Artificial Intelligence, which 
we identify as having the potential to be ubermensch. Employing Kroker's will to 
technology alongside Bostrom's theorising on AI, we show that a superintelligent being 
would have capacity to think beyond the passive nihilism of the village atheist and 
capitalism by finding grounds of rejection based on its own ability to self-replicate and 
think beyond the parameters encountered in human thought. By employing a form of 
repetition itself (in constantly repeating processes to self-improve), AI superintelligence 
becomes capable of creating true and inherent value. 
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CHAPTER 1: THE DAWN OF NIHILISM AND THE VILLAGE ATHEIST AS 
PASSIVE NIHILIST 
 
In order for us to speculate what ubermensch might be we must first ground ourselves 
historically. Nietzsche presented some oft-overlooked ideas that are integral to this thesis, 
so we shall address them suitably here. We will first look to Nietzsche and then-
contemporary society, identifying atheists of the day and Nietzsche’s belief that they 
practiced a form of weak atheism. In turn this led them to ascribe to a kind of religious 
morality to life. During his lifetime, Nietzsche’s ideas were largely dismissed, perhaps 
ironically, by a general public who had inadvertently sided with Nietzsche but weren't 
willing to consider the significance of their own rejection of God. We identify these 
individuals as ‘village atheists’, beings of transmodernity who rejects figures of theological 
transcendence theoretically, but instead turns towards an atheological transcendence 
narrative. In keeping with our grounding theme, we look to the concept of decadence, 
Nietzsche’s expression of urgency in the spirit of the day, that hammers the proclamation 
of his mistimed arrival amongst the apathetic village atheists. We will see how this fuels 
Nietzsche’s writing and his approach of veiling and masking his intent, which in turn leads 
to confusion within scholarship but also acts as a statement of urgency – Nietzsche is to be 
considered a waypoint and not an end goal. Finally, we address the specifics of Nietzsche’s 
nihilism and the need for employing a kind of active nihilism to overcome it. In the passive 
we see repetitions of the same failed systems we identified within the village atheists and 
the concept of the idolised Nietzsche as an end point. The active, however, gives us 
grounds to move forward with this thesis and push towards a logical end point.  
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1.1: The Importance of the Village Atheist and the Death of God as Signifiers of the 
Nihilism Problem 
 
“Finally he threw his lantern on the ground so that it broke into pieces and went 
out. 'I come too early', he then said; 'my time is not yet. This tremendous event is 
still on its way, wandering; it has not yet reached the ears of men'.”  
 
(Nietzsche, 2010: p.120) 
 
In starting we should note from the above indented quote that Nietzsche makes the bold 
prediction that he has 'come too early'. This is not the only time Nietzsche references this. 
In the preface to WTP, Nietzsche claims that nihilism will be “the history of the next two 
centuries” (Nietzsche, 2006: xvii). This would place us more than half way through the 
supposed event of nihilism, and as we move ever-closer to an end date it raises questions 
about both his claims and their possible outcomes. He knew that the problem of nihilism 
would not be resolved during his own lifetime, yet over one hundred years later the issue is 
still largely confined to the back halls of academia and speculative thought.  
 
Given the nature of Nietzsche’s previous writing, it is of little surprise that his declaration 
of the death of God was theoretically designed to provoke the masses. However, there is 
also suggestion within the text that he was already well-aware of the response it would 
warrant; laughter and mockery, then dismissal. The herd, as presented by Nietzsche, 
remain largely apathetic and indifferent to his cause. By using this brash concept as a 
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catalyst for the advent of nihilism, Nietzsche set out to situate humanity in the nihil, with 
the death of God as a starting point.  
 
When the madman searches for God in section 125 of TGS he announces: “Since many of 
those who did not believe in God were standing around together just then, he caused great 
laughter.” (Nietzsche, 2001: p.119). Read as an event contemporary to Nietzsche, we can 
see that within European society the idea of atheism was already in bloom, at least enough 
for non-belief to be accepted within some pockets of society.  
 
In his biography of Nietzsche, Safranski (2002, p.307) notes that atheism as no new matter, 
rather the idea of God had been cast aside by the intellectual and academic thinkers that 
Nietzsche was writing for, instead replaced by the popularity boom of the natural and 
social sciences. However, despite atheism being alive and well, Nietzsche makes note that 
others are not taking the death of God seriously. In TSZ when the madman engages with 
the villagers his declarations are met with mockery -  
 
Since many of those who did not believe in God were standing around together just 
then he caused great laughter. Has he been lost, then? Asked one. Did he lose is 
way like a child?... Thus they shouted and laughed one interrupting the other. 
 
(Nietzsche, 2003: p.119) 
 
We see that the townsfolks’ approach is to mock but not to engage with the madman, and 
conceptually this may be within good reason. As Randal Rauser notes on his blog, in the 
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19th century the term 'village atheist’ was popularised, referring to “an atheistic individual 
within a religious community who vocally (and provocatively) expresses his/her dissent 
from the religious consensus of the community”. 8 It’s a term not uncommon now, still in 
use and with stronger if comical implications: the village atheist is a serial complainer who 
thrives on the hinge of the challenge, often part of the new atheist movement, who sways 
dangerously close to a form of rampant near-religious fervour in his belief. 9 As Leigh Eric 
Schmidt notes, the term gained traction quickly, achieving an almost mythic status some 
forty to fifty years later, particularly amongst white Americans. (Schmidt, 2016: xiii). 
 
Robert Pippin notes that whilst the village atheist may dismiss the existence of God, they 
still cling to the values of old (2006: p.51).10 Whilst they may champion science and 
reason, it is simply not enough; the basis for value still falls to those concepts inherited 
from Christian thinking. Clearly, our vocal modern counterpart is historically closer to 
Nietzsche’s own understanding than we may have realised. Pippin questions why this 
concept is so important for Nietzsche, but in the guise of the madman Nietzsche provides 
                                                          
8 For further reading on Rauser’s interpretation of village atheism, both historically and now, see his 2016 
dialogue with Sincere Kirabo, Leveling up From Village Atheism – A Dialogue with Randal Rauser. 
9 Julian Baggini’s 2012 article for the Financial Times titled The Village Atheist: Stories explore the 
experiences of modern atheists in bible-belt America, many of whom mention a state of alienation, 
ostracisation and mistrust on the part of others, with one anecdote telling of how a clean-living atheist was 
not allowed to babysit for fear of teaching evolution, but one with a heavy drug dependency would be 
considered because of her belief in God. David Silverman, president of the American Atheists believes in 
challenging the concept that it is impossible to be good without God. Whilst historically we have seen 
mention of atheism we might consider that within the context of society some deemed village atheists might 
in fact be unwilling to think beyond a mere dismissal or speak out on the basis of potential ostracisation from 
communities. However, as we shall see, this in itself is problematic for Nietzsche and could most probably be 
considered a form of passive nihilism. Shortly before the release of his own book, The Village Atheist, Eric 
Schmidt notes that historically, most statistics show that atheism is a very white and male group. It is of little 
surprise that Nietzsche’s own opinion would likely most appeal to those like him.  
10 According to Safranski, the workers’ movement had helped make the natural and social sciences, even for 
the working class and “wretched of the earth”, yet despite the ape replacing God on the pedestal of 
questioning, it appears that to Nietzsche this was not enough (Safranski, 2002: pp.307-308). As we shall see 
in the Chapter 4, the concept of evolution does not, For Nietzsche, account for humanity's being as a social or 
reasoned being. This factors directly into his view of nihilism and what Pippin has dubbed 'the village 
atheist', because it is still an approach based on values of old.  
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us a comedy of sorts. The enlightened character, perceived as mad by the crowd of village 
atheists, is perhaps also quite mad because his rejection of values, the very same ones that 
the village atheists still cling to, leave him with no basis for his thinking. He is quite 
literally mad because all structure and morality of thought have dissipated.  
 
So just what does this death of God mean and how is it shaped by the masses? His claim, 
“we have killed him – you and I!” (Nietzsche, 2009: pp.119-120), places emphasis not only 
on the act of killing, but also on the culprits being Europeans themselves. For Nietzsche, 
the death of God isn't simply an undoing of belief that signifies a shift in thought, rather it 
is a nail in the coffin of religious thought because it presents something definitive. The 
progress made by humans is tantamount to killing God because there is no way for God to 
recover. Where mystery once seeped, logic, reason and science have now filled the gaps 
and flushed away any semblance of the ultimate other. However, the village atheists' 
unwillingness to accept that they have killed god suggests that even though they may 
dismiss the concept, they are not yet ready to consider the deeper implications.  
 
For Gianni Vattimo, the death of God is the recognition of God as no longer necessary. He 
deems this as a literal understanding, developed by thinkers such as Heidegger, but goes 
beyond this to suggest the following: 
 
the death of God about which Nietzsche speaks is the death of Christ on the cross. 
Why? Because it is exactly after Christianity, or the event of Christianity, that it 
becomes possible to no longer believe in the classical, rational gods of the Greeks. 
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(Vattimo, 2010: p.90) 
 
Clearly Vattimo's death of God holds value as an event, something which signifies a 
change or overhaul. What we see in Vattimo's thought is the nullifying effect that 
Christianity has had on previous structures of religion. It is encountered in many forms, 
both historically and politically, in the shape of the spreading of Christianity (by force or 
otherwise), but also as a repetition of a cyclical event. The structure of Christianity has 
replaced that which went before, but still in the form of a parametered and ordered system.  
 
For John D. Caputo, the Nietzschean concept of the death of God is about “... the death of 
the God of power, which belongs to the infinite task of the critique of idols.” (Caputo, 
2007: p.68). As such the aspect of value is less about the specificity of God, but rather the 
structures of power as perceived as value. 11 However, we will see over the course of this 
work that even for atheists the power structures of theologies still hold sway, and in our 
current times there is still a type of religious value ascribed to the world, enacted under the 
gaze of Nietzsche’s village atheist; systematic belief tied to concepts of atheological 
transcendence or achieving an ultimate. Rather than diminish over time, the role of the 
village atheist has grown via the understanding of power as an ultimate. If we are to 
conceive of ubermensch then we need to be cautious of these repetitions of faith as found 
in the thinking of the village atheist.  
                                                          
11 Caputo's validation of this claim ties in with the development of his distinctive approach to deconstruction 
and religion, which he has termed “weak theology”. In The Weakness of God (2006), disputes the idea of 
God as omnipotent, and in turn highlights the weakness of both theology and the church; “The logos of the 
cross is a call to renounce violence, not to conceal and defer it and then, in a stunning act that takes the 
enemy by surprise, to lay them low with real power, which shows the enemy who really has the power. That 
is just what Nietzsche was criticizing under the name of ressentiment” (Caputo, 2006: p.44). 
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The French thinker, Gilles Deleuze, whose unique readings of Nietzsche were integral to 
both Nietzschean scholarship and later developments in Continental and postmodern 
thinking, understood that the declaration of the death of God “makes the existence of God 
dependent on a synthesis, it synthesises the idea of God with time, becoming, history and 
man.” (Deleuze, 2012: p.144). If we read these differing interpretations alongside each 
other, what emerges is a complex yet intricate set of ideas that signify a perceived system 
of flatline value. Nietzsche's death of God is our way of recognising this. In declaring this 
true we see the values of old nullified, ready to theoretically be replaced by a new order of 
things, new structures of power and value, and the emergence of potential for new events 
that can break the cycle. 12 As we shall see later, this concept becomes integral to our 
investigation of nihilism, and Deleuze own ideas of difference and repetition (stemming in 
part from the Nietzschean concept of Eternal Return) is key to understanding both the 
potential for combatting nihilism and developing ubermensch.  
 
 
1.2: Decadence, Masks and Esoteric Thinking as Problematic Aspects of Nietzsche’s 
Work 
 
Having identified the village atheist and the repetitions involved in subversive faith-sets, 
Nietzsche needed to find ways of making his voice heard. By presenting his work in text 
form, he could provide the observant reader with layers of meaning beyond the simple 
                                                          
12 For recent further reading on Death of God Theology see Eagleton’s Culture and the Death of God (2015); 
McCullough & Shroeder (eds.) Thinking Through the Death of God: A Critical Companion to Thomas J.J. 
Altizer (2003); Young (2003) The Death of God and the Meaning of Life. 
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pleasures of the narrative in TSZ. Beyond this, he highlighted the outlined contemporary 
problems within his texts. Safranski notes that in Case of Wagner, a polemic against the 
composer (a figure Nietzsche once held dearly), that Nietzsche's focus is one of decadence, 
which is summed up as “the attempt to draw subtle pleasures from the phantom pain of a 
vanished god” (Safranski, 2002: p.309). 13 Indeed, it was a mindset that Nietzsche himself 
claimed to have partially fallen victim to as a “child of those times” (Nietzsche, 2000: 
6:11), and one that many held. This is perhaps evident in the village atheist, a pleasure not 
of itself but taken from the pleasure of pleasure. Enjoyment not of the 'in itself', but of the 
observational outsider. We must question here whether decadence may be key to 
understanding Nietzsche's outlook on the masses, or at least those who were wise and 
brave enough to reject God. It is possible to draw an image of an arrogant Nietzsche from 
this; pleasure that ultimately remains false and inauthentic because of its removal from the 
direct, and in being so becomes a type of schadenfreude for Nietzsche. Nietzsche, as a 
farther removed observer taking pleasure (or at least some semblance) may be seen to 
revel in the failings of the village atheist to draw on true value and experience, laughing at 
their misfortune. As counterpoint, (and much like his madman), we might interpret him as 
despairing at the world that surrounds him because he is powerless to make change, unless 
those with the true skill to unlock the potentials of nihilism find his work. 14 
 
                                                          
13 Upon the two men falling out, Wagner wrote to Nietzsche’s doctor suggesting Nietzsche’s ill-health was a 
manifestation of symptoms resulting from excessive masturbation. Given Nietzsche’s infatuation with 
Cosima, Wagner’s wife, Wagner’s approach appears based solely on humiliating Nietzsche, which in turn led 
to Nietzsche’s rebuttal. For more information, see Richard Wagner: His Life, His Work, His Century 
(Gregor-Dellin, 1983). 
14 Ure’s ‘Nietzsche’s Schadenfreude’ (2013) sees Nietzsche finding joy in the misfortune and suffering of 
others through Darwinian evolution, as perceived from the eye of the scientist – a type of farther-removed 
observer.  
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1.2.a: Understanding Nietzschean Decadence as a Tool for Future Thinkers 
 
Classical interpretations of Nietzsche’s decadence, such as those by De Huszar, imply any 
form of faith, philosophy and art that spring from weakness, which Nietzsche “combats 
[them] not as one would refute an error, but as one would fight against disease” (De 
Huszar, 1945: p.259). The theologian Paul Tillich notes “Even his sense of being “out of 
season” (unzeitgemass) is primarily a way of expressing his negation of his own time” 
(Tillich, 1945: p.307). 15 It appears that this decadence has an effect on Nietzsche that acts 
as a form of zeitgeist. When viewed in the context of the village atheist, declaring the death 
of God gives rise to an urgency that had not come before. If we further contextualise with 
De Huszar’s disease analogy, this urgency is multiplied considerably and we see that for 
Nietzsche, in the context of history and his outlook on the world, that he had in fact come 
too early. 16 
 
It is important however to note that Nietzsche's thinking is not to be viewed as cultural or 
social arrogance, that he does not make these declarations to position himself any better 
than those that surround him. In the foreword of Ecce Homo, Nietzsche declares – 
                                                          
15 The idea of decadence itself was popularised by writers such as Nisard, Baudelaire and Gautier, whose 
literary was in vogue in many parts of Europe, particularly amongst the educated higher classes of society. 
For a history of the idea and selected readings, see Desmarais, J. & Baldick, C., Decadence An Annotated 
Anthology (2012). 
16 It is worth noting that Nietzsche's own use of the term decadence has historical grounding. Boulby (1976: 
pp.221-228) makes note of Nietzsche's turn from the common perception of the decadence of the late Roman 
Empire, one of excess and corruption. In fact Nietzsche stands opposed, instead viewing Rome as a 
splendidly organised model. Silk (2004) notes that in later works such as Twilight of Idols, The Antichrist and 
CoG, Nietzsche's use of characters such as Dionysus and Apollo appear less frequently in his work, in fact 
for Boulby this may be a response to Nietzsche's shift towards a more Romancentric outlook on history. 
However, as Silk goes on to suggest, “Nietzsche's identification of decadence as a representative and 
essential condition of humanity, and not merely some marginal historical phenomenon, is profound and 
profoundly original; it is also, indeed, an identification that only someone at the knowing heart of decadence 
could make.” (2004: p.587-602). We will be utilising this opinion to situate Nietzsche's decadence as a 
contemporary event and note that in being so it does differ from the decadence of history. 
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 The last thing I would promise would be to 'improve' humanity. I do not set up any 
new idols; let the old ones learn what it means to have legs of clay. Toppling idols 
(my word for 'ideals') – that is more my kind of handiwork. 
(Nietzsche, 2007: p.3) 
 
From this we see Nietzsche’s attempt to avoid casting himself as a type of saviour or idol; 
rather he wants to equip the reader with the tools to enact their own overcoming. In this 
same book, Nietzsche's discussion of decadence is one that he reveals he has been able to 
invert, a skill which has allowed him to even consider a 'revaluation of all values' 
(Nietzsche, 2007: p.8).  
 
1.2.b: The problem with Nietzsche’s Esotericism and Masks as Subjective Interpretation 
and the Benefits of Positive Application 
 
In Kaufmann's Nietzsche, he poses the idea that TSZ “contains most of Nietzsche's ideas in 
veiled and symbolic form,” (Kaufman, 1974: p.65). By way of example, for Kaufmann the 
coming of the madman in TGS is undoubtedly a prophetic visage of Nietzsche himself 
(Ibid, p.97), a mask of sorts. We later find that in Beyond Good and Evil, Nietzsche 
expounds that “everything profound loves a mask”, and that “there is not only deceit 
behind a mask; there is so much goodness in cunning” (Nietzsche, 2003: p.69). As a 
further safeguard from Nietzsche as prophetic figure, the use of masks gives rise to a non-
identifiable Nietzsche. By presenting his ideas through multiple characters and from 
multiple angles, he is able to subvert the singular idea of ‘Nietzsche the idol’.  
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If we are to understand Nietzsche as a subversive figure, then we may understand the value 
of posing ideas in the form of masks and characters. As Cybulska (2015: p.5) points out, as 
a classical philologist, Nietzsche was well versed in Greek tragedy and he reflects on this 
throughout his work, particularly in his embrace of the God of wine, theatre, ritual 
madness and ecstasy, Dionysus. It was commonplace within the Greek performances he 
loved so much for the actors to wear masks, both to invoke a sense of dread, and to enable 
them to play multiple roles. With Nietzsche acting essentially as a one-man performer in 
his texts, the use of multiple perspectives and characters could be employed without the 
loss of the concepts central to his thinking. 17 
 
With TSZ, Nietzsche presented a work that had both narrative structure and a deeper 
intention in the philosophical ideas it presented. Each of the characters within the text act 
as vehicles for concepts, many of which represented differing aspects of Nietzsche’s own 
thoughts. Even a casual glance at the character of Zarathustra suggests an eerie familiarity 
that goes beyond the protagonistic tropes and historical references. Those acquainted with 
Nietzsche's work will see a figure portrayed in a similar light to the fleeting appearance of 
the madman in TSZ. Is Zarathustra a knowing referential nod to those of us familiar with 
his earlier work, or perhaps a development of that character? Could he even be something 
more; a device employed with great intent and specificity, or none of the above? 
 
                                                          
17 Porter (2000: pp.1-2) notes that whilst TBoT initially appears as an exercise in philology with a focus on 
Greek tragedy, for classical philologists it acts as ‘anathema: it represents a departure from narrow 
philological ways and an opening toward a speculative and threatening philosophy.” For Porter this is an 
indication that even in his earliest writings, Nietzsche’s ideas are far stronger than we might give them credit 
for. For further reading, see The Invention of Dionysus: An Essay on the Birth of Tragedy.  
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There are striking similarities: 
1. Both figures are outsiders of sorts. The madman, in being referred to                 
as such, and in being mocked by the crowd, is a figure outcast by society. 
Zarathustra, emerging from a mountain top at the beginning of TSZ after an 
exile of many years, is similar. Addressed as 'The wanderer' (Nietzsche: 
2003, p.40) by an old man who recognises him, clearly Zarathustra is known 
figure, and one of some speculation. We could question whether the same is 
true of the madman, a man who goes not by his own name but by a name 
applied to him by others. 
2. Both share their wisdom with common town folk. 
3. Both men are openly mocked by the crowds. 
4. Both men proclaim the death of God. 
 
Frey-Rohn (1989: p.81) suggests that “The ‘Zarathustra’ figure became the mouthpiece of 
thoughts Nietzsche had long held within his unconscious, but had as yet been cautious 
about articulating.” If this is true, then the madman of TGS could well be our taster, with 
Nietzsche testing the water by way of aphorism. It may also account for the sheer variety 
of characters and masks we encounter within TSZ. Finally stepping out to speak his true 
mind, the use of other characters might even suggest an overwhelming explosion of 
excitement – Nietzsche has arrived and he wants to make sure every reader knows it. 
 
In the opening parts of TSZ, Zarathustra says that his aim is “To lure many away from the 
herd – that is why I have come. The people and the herd shall be angry with me: the 
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herdsmen shall call Zarathustra a robber.” (Nietzsche, 2003: p.51). Are the masks of the 
madman and Zarathustra simply masks worn by Nietzsche himself in other guises? If we 
are to see this as a part-reflection of Nietzsche, the man who has declared God dead and 
called the village atheists into question, then we know his work is not for the masses, rather 
those strong enough to utilise Nietzsche's thinking for their own means. Despite his use of 
'many', he does not specify all. In fact, this concept will be of importance to us when we 
explore esotericism within Nietzsche's work.  
 
Amusingly, Michels notes that in The Birth of Tragedy that Nietzsche treats everyone 
(other than Wagner) with equal disdain, and that by later honing his approach the prologue 
to TSZ, he clearly voices his message whilst allowing for a treatment of his subject without 
misunderstanding – Nietzsche attends to his own philosophy in the knowledge that if done 
properly, it will find its own audience (Michels, 2007: p.278).  
    
In his recent work, Anti-Nietzsche Bull questions the esoteric nature of Nietzsche's writing, 
and notes that in The Antichrist, Nietzsche's dedication of the book to 'the very few' posits 
the idea that only those of the right mindset can truly understand his intention (2011: p.31). 
That people of all walks of life, ethnicity, gender and political persuasion have read it as 
their own presents a problem. With the reader called into question we must ask whether 
this becomes less about an actualisation of steps towards an ubermensch and more about a 
process of becoming that is continual, perhaps as a means of breaking the cyclical nature of 
nihilism as presented in the passive village atheist. 
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Bull’s belief, put simply, is that “postmodernity spawned plenty of post-Nietzscheans 
anxious to appropriate Nietzsche for their own agendas,” (Ibid, p.30). Removing Nietzsche 
from his historical context, these appropriations become the very concern he speaks of in 
EH; this Nietzsche is not the buffoon, but the saint he is so worried of becoming; The Holy 
Nietzsche. Bull’s aim therefore is not to help readers ‘get’ Nietzsche, but to “enable us to 
get over him.” (Ibid, p.30). 
 
As readers we have a tendency to trust Nietzsche, and read as if each of us is the reader 
intelligent enough to understand his esoteric texts, that we ‘read for victory’ (Ibid, p.33) – 
we may feel special and part of a small and secretive club for enlightened individuals. 
Reading for victory was Nietzsche’s own preferred method (Ibid, p.35), initially he 
considered that “reason might eventually catch up,” but rejected the idea in his later work. 
As Bull states, “The reader’s yearning for victory is now not a means to knowledge but an 
example of what knowledge is” (Ibid, p.35). 
 
Bull cites Conway early in the text and proposes the idea that in Nietzche’s later work, he 
takes an even more esoteric approach (in the introduction to the Anti-Christ he invites the 
reader to be part of the esotericism), and that this may be an attempt to reach a wider 
readership, having found that his audience was non-existent. (2011: p.32). More (2011: 
p.24) notes that in 1885, Nietzsche learned that “more than two-thirds of his books sat 
unsold in a German warehouse, that [his publisher] had frequently failed to even supply to 
bookstores… and that little more than five hundred copies of his works had sold over a 
twelve year period.” It may come as no surprise that Nietzsche’s approach shifted towards 
attempting to draw a crowd, going so far as to secure a new publisher, and write new 
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introductions to his existing works (More, 2011: pp.24-25). Clearly, for Bull, the issue at 
hand is not so much a question of Nietzsche’s philosophy, but rather his approach. His 
attempts to grow an audience may even undermine his own work.  
 
For Fisher (1995: p.517), the role of masks and esotericism is problematic. His concern is 
that these masks cause too literal an issue for the reader, in that their immersive nature is so 
convincing that the truth of the ‘real’ may never be uncovered. As he points out, “He is 
charged with speaking duplicitously, as through a mask; an invented, fictionalized voice 
rather than his own person” (Ibid, p.517). At this point we encounter further problems 
regarding the nature of Nietzsche’s use of masks and their relation to truth. Clark and 
Dudrick (2014: p.353), whose analysis of BGaE develops concepts of an ‘esoteric’ 
Nietzsche, believe that he sometimes writes in a way that is deliberately misleading, hence 
he does not mean what he initially appears to. 18 Their claim is that the “esoteric sees them 
[things] from above,” (Ibid, p.354); that Nietzsche literally writes in the knowledge that 
some will misinterpret his claims, and that the concept of masks support this.  
 
It is an interesting and thought provoking claim. Whilst the view of the esoteric (and ‘from 
above’) may suggest an arrogance, Clark and Dudrick interpret this as to “reflect a 
viewpoint that looks down on an earlier understanding that the interpreter has now 
overcome” (Ibid, p.354). 19 Rather than the arrogant casting-off of an intellectual 
                                                          
18 Clark an Dudrick’s argument is developed in The Soul of Nietzsche’s Beyond Good and Evil (2012). 
Focussing on the aforementioned book, it develops arguments of subtlety and interconnectivity within the 
text, providing cohesion between arguments that may otherwise appear estranged. This leads to them 
proclaiming BGaE as Nietzsche’s most important work. As the focus of this thesis is not on BG&E, I felt it 
more important to utilise the above paper that outlines their arguments more succinctly, and with the sole 
interest of exploring the concepts of esotericism and masks.  
19 A presentation by Leiter on the Esoteric readings of Nietzsche (Oxford, May 17-18, 2014), commended 
Clark and Dudrick on their work, but proposed that their arguments hinged on esotericism as cover for the 
misreading of texts, that their focus on reading between the lines and “what was left unsaid” was a pseudo-
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underclass, their interpretation suggests an enlightenment found in the esoteric. In being 
so, it is a step beyond, perhaps a step that could be the seed of the development of an 
ubermensch. On the subject of esoteric wisdom, Fisher (1995: p.521) sees the masked 
approach as nourishment for the higher man, and poison for the commoner – they may not 
be to mislead, but it is the price paid for not giving Nietzsche’s work full attention.  
 
1.2.c: Understanding Dionysus, Greek History and Nietzsche’s Philological Background 
 
Throughout Nietzsche’s work a fascination with the god Dionysus emerges. The Greek 
god of wine, rapture, religious ecstasy and theatre, it is of no surprise as a philologist, 
Nietzsche would find fascination in this figure. Safranski (2002: pp. 64-65) notes the 
development of two lectures in 1870 that outlined “the interplay of fundamental polar 
forces of culture”. Nietzsche banded the figures of Dionysus and Apollo together as basic 
drives that form the classic tragedy. The passions and music belong to Dionysus; the 
language and dialectics of the stage to Apollo. Apollo for Nietzsche took on an element of 
form, architecture and ordered individuality and provided a system opposed to the chaos of 
Dionysus. That chaos was, of course, not to be understood in a negative sense, rather it was 
the spark within the human that gave way to being. The boundaries are fluid. 
 
                                                          
problem. Leiter was in agreement with many exoteric readings, believing they gave ground for sound 
understanding of Nietzschean thought. I have, however, decided not to explore this in detail both for time 
constraints and on the ground that such arguments could be seen as stunting progress. Without new and 
interesting ways of interpreting texts, this thesis itself would not be possible. If Kaufman’s work had been 
rejected for similar reasons, we may still be working on the assumption Nietzsche was a Nazi. Whilst I 
acknowledge Leiter’s point, I also believe the arguments offered by Clark and Dudrick are more than 
sufficient to justify their claims.  
29 
 
For Deleuze, there is a kind of relationality between the figures of Dionysus and Christ. He 
sees a correlation between passions; a shared phenomenon but of opposing perspectives, 
with Christ denying the value of life in itself, where suffering provides the key to 
overcoming life through God. (Deleuze, 2009: p.14). In Dionysus, however, Deleuze finds 
a kind of self-justification for life in life as a type of externalisation of suffering opposed to 
the internalisation found in Christ (Ibid, p.15). In removing the binaries associated with 
human/God dialectic, Deleuze believes that a Dionysian affirmation is an encompassing 
plurality based upon its diversity, rather than the singular path leading to salvation and 
affirmation through God. However, not all interpretations carry such hope and weight in 
the externalization of affirmation found in the Dionysian understanding. In his paper on 
Dionysus and masks, Fisher (1995: pp. 521-522) notes that many recent readings assume a 
closure of binary opposition; Apollo-Dionysus, masculine and feminine, subject and 
object. For Fisher there is a problem.  Chronologically, Nietzsche writes of Zarathustra 
criticising the ‘higher man’ as incapable of grasping the truth that he speaks. It is in fact 
Zarathustra’s animals that understand and articulate what he is saying. But Nietzsche goes 
on to “reaffirm his earlier rejection of the binary of appearance/reality contrast in BG&E”, 
quoting “The true world – we have abolished. What world has remained? The apparent one 
perhaps? But no. With the true world we have also abolished the apparent one” (Ibid, pp. 
521-522). It appears that the binary, whilst offering parameters of function, does not 
account for activity by way of the polar (we could not survive at boiling temperature, not at 
freezing point), but rather an existence that must sit between the two. Clark and Dudrick’s 
esoteric understanding of Nietzsche explores suggestions that a priori (theoretical ‘fictions 
of logic’) assumptions falsify reality, which assume that there is a thing in itself to be 
falsified. As they point out, “… perhaps the claim is that it is silly or nonsensical to assume 
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that the values that stand behind logic are conducive to truth just because they are 
necessary for our preservation” (2012, p.359). 
 
Indeed, questioning truth (the very root of nihilism) does not mean that the values we 
employ are necessarily negative. As Clark and Dudrick suggest, preservation is the order 
of the day, and if truth is an unknown quantity, myth or is unattainable either at present or 
ever, then masks are vital for survival. As Fisher says (1995: pp.523-524) “…masks 
simultaneously conceal and reveal; it is never a question of either/or but always of 
both/and… Persons whose faces are masks conceal the content of their feelings or beliefs 
at a given moment, but simultaneously reveal their character as private or duplicitous 
persons.” He goes on to explore this concept within the context of the historical textual 
delivery of Dionysus, making reference to Euripides’ Bacchae, in which Dionysus takes on 
a human form. This is presented by the actor in the form of masks, most of which smile. 
By the end of the play it is the masks that reveal Dionysus as a god, not his godly form. “A 
mask of Dionysus thus symbolizes the duality of concealment and revelation involved in 
Nietzsche’s denial of being able to “see” anything hidden beneath appearances.” (Fisher, 
1995: 524).  
 
We might say that the binary presented is only so in as much as the mask, laying 
somewhere between those two points, provides the degree of value as gradation between 
the dichotomy in question – the value itself is not in the either/or aspect, but the degree of 
both/and that constitute the whole. The mask, therefore, is not a matter of solely concealing 
or hiding, but of creating a value within itself, and the role of esotericism would 
presumably not be an unmasking of truth, but a step beyond the mask that continues to 
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exist in semiosis. The mask remains an anchor for understanding, but as a waypoint 
towards clarification on Nietzschean thinking.  
 
When Zarathustra encounters the tightrope walker, he speaks the following:  
 
Man is a rope, fastened between animal and superman – a rope over the abyss. 
A dangerous going across, a dangerous wayfaring, a dangerous looking back, a 
dangerous shuddering and staying still. What is great in man is that he is a bridge and 
not a goal: what can be loved in man is that his is a going-across and a down-going.” 
 
(Nietzsche, 2003: pp.43-44) 
 
If the figure of Dionysus is a positive affirmation vs. that of the figure of Christ, then even 
acting as an object between binaries, the concept of the mask and its outpouring of 
understanding aligns with the plurality of affirmation found in Deleuze interpretation. The 
value therefore is not in the binary of opposition, but in the waypoints identified within the 
argument. The tightrope walker is at neither end of the rope but instead acts as the masks 
along the way and the complex configuration of outpourings that flow from each.  
 
Early in his paper on Dionysus, Fisher (1995: p.517) notes a timeline of sorts in 
Nietzsche’s thinking. Starting with TBoT, Nietzsche first employs Dionysus as an 
interpretive principle. By the time he reaches BGaE, he names himself a disciple of 
Dionysus. This culminates in an identification of himself as Dionysus in his last 
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communications. 20 We must question the integrity of the statement and of whether the use 
of Dionysus in Nietzsche’s work is integrity or infatuation. The madman and Zarathustra, 
already identified as outsiders, as men walking against the tide of others, possess elements 
of this Dionysian image. Whilst we may understand this as intentional, the intention goes 
beyond the visage. Nietzche’s love of Dionysus, so pure in his approach (and culminating 
in him declaring himself Dionysus), suggests by the end of his life, that Nietzsche himself 
believed in nothing beyond the masks. This masking of reality was itself the fabric of 
tangibility that we encounter. Dionysus, as a god of masks, exists as much in the spaces 
between the masks as those proposed behind them. The outsider, therefore, as a figure of 
the esoteric, may already possess the tools of overcoming via an awareness that begins 
with the death of God and the negation of values and meaning. 
 
Returning to Clark and Dudrick (2012: p.364), they state the following: 
 
“…that it makes sense that the values that stand behind logic might be leading us 
astray, even though they satisfy our cognitive interests, only on the assumption that 
the measure of things is something trans-human, something that is not simply 
human cognitive interests and the practices they guide.”  
 
If the values behind logic mislead, and values exist beyond, then Clark and Dudrick have 
removed the philosophical importance of the human, based upon both the universe beyond 
                                                          
20 Fisher notes that “Nietzsche’s words suggest that he is a “disciple” of Dionysus and that Dionysus is a 
mask for something other than human.” (1993: p.524). The fascination with gods by a man who declared 
them dead begs many questions, but contextually we may question whether this is the traces of dead gods 
found present in every day artefacts and texts. The building blocks of his own theories are clearly based on 
his passions, and that begs the question of how his approach would differ if it not for his background and 
passion for classics and philology.  
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cognition and the suggestion that the operational sphere of the human is within a closed 
circuit – mass is only important within the context of human understanding of the universe. 
Without humans, mass would cease to exist because the concept would be lost. 
 
Clark and Dudrick’s understanding of the pursuit of truth, however, provides grounds for 
questioning. Whilst they (correctly) call in to question the interplay between desire and 
values, they do so with truth as an end goal and further this with suggestions of “finding 
ways to avoid being locked into them [desires and values], but by finding ways to avoid 
being locked in to them, in part by recognising and seriously considering other affective 
and normative possibilities” (Ibid. p.365). The importance, however, may not be on the 
truth itself as an end goal. If truth does not arise from a predetermination of thought and we 
are not seeking to prove a hypothesis (piecing X to Y), then we either arrive at truth as the 
complete, or we seek completion via the semiotics of truth, existing perhaps as waypoints, 
none of which grant more validation than the other because each amounts to an equality 
that amasses the whole of truth.  
 
As they conclude, “philosophers would proceed differently if they adjusted their self-
conception to fit how they actually arrive at their values, but not because they would or 
could keep values from affecting how they see the evidence.” (Ibid, p.365). History and 
subjectivity are therefore as dangerous and misleading as they are vital (we could not find 
ourselves in a position to ask these questions were it not for either). We may even go so far 
as to say both are facets of consumption, and much like the food we eat, both are as 
beneficial as they are detrimental. The question raised by Clark and Dudrick is whether our 
cognitive functions are themselves sufficient enough to account for adjustments in self-
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conception, and whether self-conception can even align with an evidence of values that 
stands beyond the light of reason.  
 
The issue we contend is that of our exegetic struggle; the above outlines some problematic 
thoughts. With Nietzsche’s attempts to safeguard himself from becoming another idol we 
also find a rejection of philosophy as a tradition based upon ‘creating the world’ in man’s 
image. For Nietzsche, reading philosophy near-always pushes us to exalt the philosopher 
or idea that we build or beliefs on 21 His playful love of masks goes beyond subversion to 
the point of infuriation, and any aims to clarify his intent were lost with his early demise. 
However, there is a fuel in his writing and the identification of the village atheist, and the 
drive and safeguarding found in both decadence and esoteric masking, provides us with the 
grounds to look beyond Nietzsche. Nietzsche concern over idolisation pushes us to think 
trans-Nietzsche. In order to look towards overcoming nihilism we must combat stagnation.  
 
1.3: Outlining Nietzsche’s Nihilism and the Problem of Repetition 
 
Nietzsche didn’t just warn us about stagnating through interpretation and idolisation. He 
also found concerns in the base arguments for nihilism itself. In aiming to overcome 
nihilism he too found reason for trajectory in thought rather than the repetition found in 
faith systems, idolisation and the village atheist.  
 
                                                          
21 See Benson’s Graven Ideologies (2002) for an analysis of Nietzsche’s understanding of the flaws of 
philosophy based upon its aspiration to reflect the world in man’s image; R. Stephen Krebbs, Jr.s (1997) 
‘”Just Say No”: Nietzsche’s response to Modern Idolatry’ for an analysis of Nietzsche’s rejection of idolatry 
in TSZ’ W.J.T. Mitchell’s (2011) Idolatry: Nietzsche, Blake and Poussin. 
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As we noted earlier, Deleuze' interpretation of the death of God held very specific 
connotations, which when contextualised within Nietzsche's own predictions of 200 years 
of nihilism and the events involved, offer us valuable ways to readdress nihilism now. By 
reading Deleuze' interpretations alongside our findings, we will further contextualise 
Nietzsche's coming too soon, situating ourselves in a position to explore these ideas within 
our postmodern context in later chapters. As both these concepts become vital to our 
argument, Deleuze' ideas must be developed at this early stage for the sake of clarity and 
understanding. 
 
In its most simple form, Nietzsche's nihilism can be summarised simply “That the highest 
values are losing their value” [author's emphasis] (Nietzsche, 2006: p.5). This nihilism 
assumes both that ideas of transcendent objects and 'things in themselves' have no grounds 
for existing as this would render them “either divine or morality incarnate” (Ibid, p.5). 
Deleuze interprets Nietzsche's nihilism not as signifying non-being, rather “Life takes on a 
value of nil insofar as it is denied and depreciated” (Deleuze, 2002: p.147). As such, 
nihilism is not about the chaos of a literal nothing, but rather the parameters imposed by 
modernity as structured by the thought process of those prior – a society based on Christian 
morals. Whilst a biblical interpretation of human life begins with Adam (from the Hebrew 
root Adema, literally 'soil'), who was created from dirt and breathed to life by the breath of 
the holy other, we see that humanity was born of something, or rather an amalgamation of 
the physical and divine. Stripped of divinity we are left with an interesting counterpoint. 
Whatever ubermensch might emerge, whatever being that is to overcome nihilism, must 
literally adhere to a structure of creation ex-nihilo. Much like the biblical God we must 
create ourselves from nothing. In doing so any life breathed into us is that which we bring 
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to the table ourselves. We are replacing ideas of the divine with conscious and projected 
thought. In viewing things as such we are accepting that there is no higher power to answer 
to, we are because we utilised our conscious abilities to choose to be.  
 
As an event contemporaneous to Nietzsche, nihilism was not to be defined as the product 
of some evil force internal or external to ourselves, rather it is in part the product of the 
failings of western Christian thought. It quite literally “harbours in the heart of Christian 
morals” (Nietzsche, 2006: p.5). The moral values and truths associated with Christianity 
can only be overcome through nihilism because its very nature negates all prior. The 
destructive nature of nihilism renders all truths and values null, and in glimpsing this 
through the trappings of Christianity (seen as a failure to satisfactorily explain and 
cohesively converge a concepts of universal truth/value), we are left with the nihil, quite 
literally the devaluation of all values. 
On viewing nihilism within the context of the earth we are adding principles of space and 
time, which implies the birth of nihilism as an event pre-Nietzsche, as well as our 
perceived possibility of a post-nihilistic world. 22 For Nietzsche the event of nihilism 
would imply that of transition, although interestingly for Deleuze, it is “not an event in 
history but the motor of history of man as universal history. For Nietzsche one and the 
same history is marked out by Judaism, Christianity, the reformation, free thought, 
democratic and sociologist ideology”, (Deleuze, 2002: p.152). 23 
                                                          
22 The implication is simply one of operational status and should not be understood as overtly mathematical, 
nor the spacetime of physics. Here it is to say that all our operations are subject to space and time as the 
parameters for existence. We will explore this later in relation to Nietzsche's conception of the eternal 
recurrence, which offers an alternate view to that of temporality and the spacetime of physics. More on this in 
Chapter 4.  
23 The concept of event for Deleuze has very specific connotation. In The Deleuze Dictionary, Cliff Stagoll 
defines Delezuean event as 'the changes immanent to a confluence of parts or elements, subsisting as pure 
virtualities (that is real inherent possibilities) and distinguishing themselves only in the course of their 
actualisation in some body or state'. In these terms an event would not be a definitive and observable form, 
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However, for Deleuze, nihilism is not an event but rather the grounds in which events must 
occur. It is an already cyclical system because there has never been the realisation or 
actualisation of anything outside of nihilism, instead only a kinetic structure of half-truths 
and fallacies built in place of truth. Each surpassing non-event (the reformation, free 
thought, etc) has simply become another layer of the already complex cyclical system of 
the nihil. As such the 'event' of nihilism as a dawn recognised by Nietzsche's 
contemporaries (and only an event inasmuch as it is a recognition of a truth, perhaps the 
first event) is one that should be understood as a step beyond the cyclical nature of what 
came before, but perhaps only still a reinterpretation of 'weak faith' by those not willing or 
unable to see beyond the limitations of their operational sphere. Much like the village 
atheist, this outlook on history would show that each procession of new ideals still 
harbours a strong belief in a moral code found previously in Western thought, and as such 
the value of truth (as subject to power) continues to be void. 
 
In order to move beyond the cyclical and be actualised as 'an event', nihilism shifts from a 
simple state of being and into something more. Nihilism as an event implies that at some 
point, no matter where in space/time that point may be, it will be surpassed by other 
events, unless of course the events that take place beyond this point are themselves 
operating within the parameters of the event of nihilism (and in Deleuzean terms in this 
                                                          
such as the leaves on a tree becoming green in spring, rather it would be the potentiality of the tree becoming 
green – the potential and effect of the tree 'greening' as process. We can see how this itself, much like 
Nietzsche's nihilism is dependent on a space/time principle of cause, effect and forward motion as universal 
subjectification (Parr, 2010). Whether Deleuze' use of 'event' in the above quote is dependent on this 
principle remains to be seen, as does the question of whether Nietzsche directly influenced the development 
of this concept. We will be working on the assumption that event has a more literal meaning (indeed, Deleuze 
has confused readers on other occasions with his changing use of terminology), although later we will see 
that the Deleuzean conception of event bears significance to the Will to Power as a tool that can initiate the 
development of an ubermensch. 
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closed system nihilism would surely not be an event if it is the parameter itself that sets the 
system in which the event can take place). Presumably the birth of this new event follows 
that of Christianity's prominence in the west. Following an age of religious meaning, the 
event of nihilism takes hold and we enter a new phase. Rather than this cycle of historical 
non-events that Deleuze has laid out, we see for the first time a true event in that nihilism 
will negate all that came before, rendering it null and providing the nihilist with a new 
starting point. However, as Nietzsche's predicted nihilism would take hold for a period of 
two centuries, the time between the Death of God and the dawn of a new age is itself in a 
state of flux – the village atheist identified by Nietzsche would still hold sway, in turn 
creating yet another repetition of the cycle. 
 
For Nietzsche, nihilism is considered a necessity, as something that will triumph. 
(Nietzsche, 2006: p. XVII). This begs the question what is triumph indicative of? To 
suggest a triumph, a victory encountered as a succession or overcoming, requires us to 
understand that nihilism is to act as a progressive step. Nietzsche's want for a shift in 
thought away from God the Great Comforter towards unparalleled uncertainty and chaos 
acts as a succession and radical turn in western thinking.  
 
The reflective nature of Christianity, with its adherence to scripture and its emphasis on 
creeds and doctrines, is carried out through exegesis and exploration on the part of the 
believer. Whilst an initial glance would suggest the forward thinking nature of such an 
approach (particularly geared towards our understanding of God as 'the eternal'), when we 
consider the nature of Christianity from Nietzsche's perspective we see it quite differently. 
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Its downfall is not on the part of the reflection that is drawn in to question, but rather its 
inability to unshackle itself from itself.  
 
In Part 3 of Ecce Homo, Nietzsche confirms our interpretation of the above. He describes 
the Christian faith as being “from the beginning sacrifice: sacrifice of all freedom, all 
pride, all self-confidence of the spirit, at the same time enslavement and self-mockery, self-
mutilation” (Nietzsche, 2005: p.75). As a form of sacrifice and an imbalance of power by 
means of gifting ones’ freedom and reason to the eternal, it is inescapably cyclical and 
binding. 24 By reflecting eternally on the past and calling into question concepts of 
redemption and faith, the idea of progress is nullified under the weight of its own belief. 
There can only be progress within the closed system of Christianity, whilst that which falls 
outside it is rendered static. The future is therefore one built on reflection not with the aim 
stepping forwards but rather a step into the past. It will always be dependent on God for 
answers, and therefore it will never surpass itself. Deleuze (2002: p.141) reflects on this, 
particularly the idea of redemption, which he says is no longer about a 'discharge from 
debt' but rather a deepened debt, thus the cyclical nature of Christianity is one of a closed 
system unable to surpass itself. For the nihilist this would stunt any possible growth, yet by 
its very nature it is the means of operation.  
 
                                                          
24 Safranski notes that Nietzsche, who was known as 'the little pastor' as a child had a great deal of difficulty 
shedding his God. In fact for Safranski this is an undeniable 'submissive tendency'.  (Safranski, 2002: p.307-
309). This devaluation of life that was so integral to Nietzsche's thought (and perhaps acted as the motor of 
all Nietzschean thinking) validates deliverance of the message of the Death of God, despite many already 
rejecting Christian and religious thinking. Once again we see here a nod to the village atheist and those not 
yet willing to view a godless world. As such Nietzsche's justification is melancholic. In opening his eyes to 
reality as he perceived it he lost all that was deemed good in the world. Whilst he may consider himself 
above the village atheist he is not against the village atheist, rather he is sympathetic and understanding of 
the pain that one may encounter upon such an epiphany.  
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We may question how this differs from nihilism (in that we must explore nihilism in order 
to overcome it), but without the above mentioned shackle to Christianity, the need for 
guidance from a past source is voided. This in turn frees us from our grounding and offers 
the possibility of stepping forward towards the unknown because we are willing to destroy 
everything. In doing so the event of nihilism is itself a new beginning of a cyclical sort as it 
is moving to a time both ulterior and prior to meaning through God. 
 
Initially two outlines for nihilism are presented in The Will to Power: 
 
A. nihilism as a sign of enhanced spiritual strength: active nihilism. 
B. nihilism as a sign of the collapse and decline of spiritual strength: passive 
nihilism. 
 
(Nietzsche, 2006: p.12) 
 
The latter of these two concepts is one that lacks the necessary attributes to tackle nihilism 
head-on, a wallowing of sorts described as a product of weariness, a condition we 
encounter through our reflective ability. The implication is therefore that nihilism simply is 
and always will be. The non-existence of truth and values are just that, and will always 
remain so. For Nietzsche this is not a position we should assume, it is the position of the 
village atheist. As Robbins makes clear, for Vattimo this is a type of 'weak theology', a 
term used to denote a “theology of weakness that connects the weakness of God with the 
ethical imperative to serve the poor and needy” (2007: p.16). Such thinking also applies to 
Caputo, who “wants to affirm faith, though without absolute or certain knowledge, [and] 
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he seeks to value religious tradition, while keeping his distance from the actual historic 
faith communities” (Ibid, pp.15-16).  
 
By pushing nihilism onward, we are destroying even the idea of no values, meaning or 
truth. For Nietzsche this is “not only the belief that everything deserves to perish; but one 
actually puts one's shoulder to the plough; one destroys” (Nietzsche, 2006: p.12). Whilst 
this may seem illogical, for the active nihilist there is no need to simply act with logic: 
even logic must be destroyed if we are to accept the nihil and propose the annihilation of 
everything.  
Nietzsche's reasoning on the advent and acceptance of nihilism is one that stems from 
pessimism, which he proposes as a strength. Whilst it is, in his own words, a “logic of 
Pessimism [that] leads finally to nihilism” (Nietzsche, 2006: p.6) we do not have to accept 
logic as that which grows from nihilism (as by active nihilism's nature it has destroyed this 
anyway). Instead we should accept that whilst logic has led us to the outlook of a nihilist, 
in arriving we can destroy logic because it has served its purpose as the vehicle that has 
carried us to our first destination. In his book, On Religion, Caputo argues that this nihilism 
itself makes all critiques merely perspectives, constructions or fictions of grammar, that 
“critiques of religion have come undone under the gun of Nietzsche's critique of the 
possibility of making a critique that would cut to the quick – of God, nature or history” 
(2001: pp.59-60). This theory of a literal destruction of everything poses a problem of 
inescapability for the nihilist. 
 
In such instances we might question whether this 'logic of nihilism', quite oxymoronic in 
its nature, should be an end to this argument. However, as we shall see, nihilism has taken 
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a very different turn in the intervening years since Nietzsche declared the death of God. If 
we are to overcome nihilism through the realisation of ubermensch, then we must progress 
to understand this reimagining of nihilism in our next chapter.  
 
1.4: Chapter Summary & Conclusion 
 
Nietzsche chose to make his true intentions mostly inaccessible to the masses of his time. 
Even the educated and privileged few, as seen in the village atheist, rejected his concepts 
and instead opted to cling old structures of faith. By utilising decadence, he constructed a 
viewpoint that in turn safeguarded his thought from weak interrogation and casual reading, 
at least in theory – the use of subversive masks and multiple iterations of himself through 
the varying characters in his texts. This added an esoteric aspect to his works (and by 
shamelessly plugging to his small readership, also gave the reader a boost), because he 
opted to write for those who sat away from the herd. Whilst the effect was great, the 
practical results have been less than satisfying, and over 100 years later there is still much 
debate as to what Nietzsche meant. We note that the issues of historicity and appropriation 
of Nietzsche’s thought are evidenced here, perhaps even put into play by Nietzsche himself 
in the development of masks and his esoteric approach. 
 
However, we argue that in identifying his rejection of becoming an idol, that Nietzsche’s 
intent was to provide ground for readers to think trans-Nietzsche, where the trans-
Nietzschean acts to safeguard us from stagnation and repetition. We also note that 
Nietzsche’s nihilism is grounded in a similar and concurrent path of thought, where 
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different approaches to nihilism feed in to and rise above the act itself; we find these 
repetitions of passive nihilism, but in the active we see farther emphasis on the trans; on 
moving beyond nihilism by seeking new operational grounds.  
 
If we are to proceed with the overcoming of nihilism through the creation of ubermensch, 
we must therefore remember the importance of employing an active form of nihilism 
whilst being cautious of the many repetitions and acts of weak passive nihilism we may 
find, particularly in the guise of the village atheist.  
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CHAPTER 2: REIMAGINING NIHILISM IN POSTMODERNITY 
 
The years following Nietzsche’s death saw great scientific and technological advances, 
alongside a shift in continental philosophy that radically opposed previous traditions. In 
this chapter we will look at how these advances impact our understandings of nihilism in 
the present. Using Ashley Woodward’s comprehensive guide Nihilism in Postmodernity as 
our starting point we will draw particular focus on thinkers Jean Baudrillard and Gianni 
Vattimo, whose understandings of nihilism in the postmodern era shift the focus from 
interiority and the existential towards a global and socio-political view. Reframing nihilism 
in the present allows for a new interpretations based upon our operations after the 
structural collapse of meaning. We will see that the idea of the village atheist is alive and 
well, and in agreement with Woodward, show that the employment of an active nihilism is 
needed to overcome this new interpretation. Finally, we will understand how the collapse 
of universal structures as proposed by the postmodern thinkers runs concurrent with 
Nietzsche's own masks; each acting as signifiers based upon contextual meaning, plunging 
us into a world of semiotic theory that Nietzsche acted as omen for. Woodward’s ideas 
culminate with a call for us to explore a form of Deleuzean repetition, itself stemming 
Nietzsche’s eternal return. 25 In agreement with Woodward, we will map out the idea of 
difference and repetition in light of the postmodern age. This in turn will allow us to begin 
to formulate the conception of ubermensch in the remaining chapters.  
 
2.1: Understandings of Nihilism in Postmodernity 
                                                          
25 Whilst we engage with Deleuze’ theory of difference and repetition somewhat in this chapter, the direct 
link to the Nietzschean eternal return is farther explored in Chapter 4, where we apply the theory directly to 
ubermensch. 
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In Nihilism in Postmodernity, Ashley Woodward traces nihilism from Nietzsche to our 
present, situating it in what is frequently referred to as the postmodern era. 26 Defining 
postmodernism itself is no easy task, and Woodward notes conflicting and contradictory 
definitions, with some commentators even suggesting the idea itself is hopelessly 
incoherent (2009: p.13). 27 In fact, one of the largest criticisms levied at postmodern 
thought is the ambiguity of its nature; a reliance on deconstruction and an end to the 
metaphysics of the past. This places the problem of nihilism on difficult ground, where 
many of the thinkers dealing with nihilism in the postmodern era don’t think it can be 
overcome, as any attempts to do so will lead to a return to metaphysics and therefore 
fictions. Instead they opt to operate within nihilism, employing their own methodologies to 
do so. Woodward, however, believes that it is possible to do so with a return to Nietzsche, 
more specifically a Deleuzean interpretation of. 
 
The concept of the postmodern is considered active in many forms of academia and the 
arts, which in turn leads to this multitude of conflicting ideas, but Woodward defends this 
as beneficial, claiming the concept "captures many diverse aspects of culture within the 
horizon of a general theory of the contemporary situation (ibid, p.13). However, the major 
                                                          
26 Sire (1976) finds the earliest uses of the term postmodernism in architecture, but believes Lyotard first 
signified a shift towards cultural analysis; see also Jameson’s definition of postmodernism as the ‘cultural 
logic of late capitalism’ in the 1991 book of the same name [see Chapter 3 for an expansion on this concept 
via Mark Fisher]. Kuznar (2008: p.78) considers the primary tenets of postmodernism as 1) elevation of 
language and text as fundamental components of existence; 2) applying analytical literary components to all 
phenomena; 3) scrutinising reality and representation; 4) critiquing metanarratives; 5) arguments against 
method and evaluation; 6) a focus on power relations and hegemony; 7) a general critique of Western 
institutions and knowledge.  
27 Critiques of postmodernism include Bishop’s rejection based on the self-indulgence of subjectivity and 
“exaggerating the esoteric and unique aspects of a culture at the expense of more prosaic but significant 
questions” (1996: p. 58); McKinley’s (2000: pp.16-18) rejection of postmodernism as closer to a religion 
than a science; Rosenau (1993) rejects in part on grounds of the theoretical standpoint of it’s anti-theoretical 
position.  
46 
 
issue is the definition itself. A largely deconstructive act, postmodernism has different 
meanings and interpretations for most of the thinkers associated with it, although there are 
emergent themes (such as deconstruction) that are prevalent with many of the key thinkers. 
At its most base, the concept might best be understood as Lyotard defines it in The 
Postmodern Condition, where he explores the condition of knowledge in the most highly 
developed societies. He defines the postmodern itself as “incredulity toward 
metanarratives” (1979: ibid, p.xxiv), essentially identifying the failings of fables in light of 
scientific and technological progress. It’s a concept not entirely at odds with Nietzsche’s 
rejection of the Christian narrative, and as such Nietzsche is often seen as a precursor to 
postmodernism. 28 In his essay Machinic Desire, Nick Land outlined this link, pointing to 
Nietzsche’s critique of Kantian philosophy. He outlines the issue with Kant thus: Kant's 
transcendental philosophy critiques transcendent synthesis (the projection of productive 
relations beyond their zone of effectiveness), but fails to do so against their genesis, which 
he continues to perceive as transcendent, thus making it a miracle or rendering it flawed 
(2011: p.321).  29 
 
After Nietzsche, Woodward proposes thinkers who can loosely be tagged as part of the 
existentialist movement, and key players in the development of nihilism. He expresses a 
need for us to be aware of the differences thinkers such as Nietzsche, Heidegger and Sartre 
as "grandfathers of nihilism", who themselves sit outside of the general thought of the 
modern era, as such pre-cursors to the postmodern in a catalytic sense rather than historical 
                                                          
28 The Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy notes modernism as movement supporting change, specifically 
working in the post-Enlightenment tradition as outlined by thinkers such as Kant. (2008: p.237).  
29 Land also traces this thinking and rejection of the Kantian ideal through the works of Deleuze and Guattari, 
also applying this same logic to their development of schizoanalysis, a rejection of the Freudian 
psychoanalysis, as presented in their works Capitalism and Schizophrenia (Land, 2011: p.321).  
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(ibid: p.26). 30 Woodward also notes that each of the above outline and approach nihilism 
differently. In his reading, one of the base issues for Nietzsche is that of suffering, and 
human awareness of this. As he says, consciousness allows the awareness and in turn the 
ability to interpret it in a multitude of ways. At its most basic level, this is expressed as a 
demand for meaning as to why we suffer. It is not the suffering itself that causes the most 
pain, rather the lack of meaning as to why (ibid: p.32). 
 
Woodward highlights the value of active nihilism, and as he puts it, "if active nihilism runs 
its course, it ends in the negation of belief in the "highest values" as necessary sources of 
value" (ibid: p.39). He identifies this as a form of radical nihilism, which in doing the 
above leads to what he deems a complete nihilism. He describes it thus - 
 
Complete nihilism wipes away the categories of thought perpetuated by religious 
nihilism, removing not only belief in the existence of the highest values, but also 
the belief that transcendent values are necessary for valuation of any kind.  
(Ibid: p.39) 
 
Identifying the place (or lack) of value in transcendence, the concept of complete nihilism 
allows for an understanding of value removed from transcendent concepts. In complete 
nihilism we can see how the Death of God itself could act as a milestone in philosophical 
                                                          
30 In his essay Nihilism In Heidegger’s Being and Time, Siby K. George outlines Heidegger’s nihilism as 
‘partial nihilism’. As he goes on to say, the Heidegger’s nihilism might best be understood as “[not] in the 
sense of the philosophical claim that nothing actually exists or even that there is actually no meaning at all in 
human existence.” Rather, Siby understands it as signifying that humans can “make their existence 
meaningful, but not in reference to something everlasting and all-good, like the concept of God, but in 
reference to one’s own self, one’s individuality.” (2003: p.91). Han-Pile (2013) understands Sartre’s nihilism 
as a choosing of a fundamental project whereby the creation of all of ones values is integral, viewed as a 
voluntaristic act by which freedom creates value by the sole fact of recognition that it is such. 
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thinking, not purely in itself, but also as a step away from interiority. Even if Nietzsche's 
thinking may favour the individual, it is not value that is found from the perspective of the 
individual as transcendent potential, but rather value exists extraneous to this. Woodward 
identifies that "questions of meaning pervade collective social arrangements and cultural 
conditions, and are political insofar as they impinge on our collective "being together,”” 
which in turn leads to meaning (and its lack) emerging within the complex net of social 
relations and cultural conditions (2009: p.242). The pattern of thinking found in the 
postmodern requires us to identify nihilism and value as political because they impact on 
societies. Nihilism in postmodernity cries out to the village atheist and begs to be 
interrogated on grounds that it impacts all. Rather than the sly nihilism that whispered at 
Nietzsche’s ear, it is now in the open. That does not, however, mean that it is any less of a 
challenge.  
 
2.2: Outlining Baudrillard's Nihilism of the Hyperreal Simulacra 
 
As Woodward (2009: p.119) notes, much like other post-structuralist thinkers, 
Baudrillard's nihilism is problematic. 31 Baudrillard is most often portrayed as occupying a 
position of hopelessness and uncertainty, disregarding the effective criteria of critical 
analysis and considered by many as a passive nihilist, a form of nihilism that this thesis 
disregards as a form of progression. However, Woodward takes bold steps to recast 
Baudrillard in a new light. One of the major issues with Baudrillard's work is the lack of 
clarity in terminology, which leads to difficulty understanding precisely what his work 
means. Much like Nietzsche, academic interpretation is polarised and it could be 
                                                          
31 Woodward notes that none of the thinkers he focuses on actually believe nihilism can be overcome. Rather 
they think in terms of nihilism providing a playground within which we operate. (2009: p.119) 
49 
 
considered that the task of analysing nihilism is just as meaningless as the concept of 
nihilism itself. 32 Woodward's answer to this is to employ the thinking of Rex Butler, who 
rather than working in the tradition of post-Marxist thought and Critical Theory, engages 
with Baudrillard on his own terms. Woodward is careful to find his own criticism with 
Butler (based on his concentration on the form of Baudrillard's thinking), which he 
circumnavigates by also employing thinkers such as Genosko and Gane; the former 
reading Baudrillard through semiotic and linguistic theory, the latter who focuses in the 
shifts in Baudrillard's position over time (Woodward: 2009, p.89). As we read 
Woodward’s interpretations alongside our own development, we will note the idea of both 
semiosis and the simulacra become key to future developments we will make. 
 
Whilst much of Baudrillard's work considered themes of nihilism, it is perhaps in 
Simulacra and Simulation that his key ideas are most clearly outlined. As a postmodern 
thinker, Baudrillard's approach was poststructural and relied on an understanding of 
nihilism that surpassed the individual in favour of the universal. Baudrillard likens 
contemporary society to a form of abstraction (he uses the example of Borges' map fable), 
saying - 
 
Simulation is no longer that of a territory, a referential being, or a substance. It is 
the generation by models of a real without origin or reality: a hyperreality. The 
                                                          
32 Baudrillard’s own editor, Mark Poster (2001: p.8) notes the lack of clarity in works prior to the mid-
1980’s, but defends his approach as a stylistic choice fixed on experiences as singular foci. For further 
critiques of Baudrillard’s work see Dutton (1990) Jean Baudrillard; Andrew Robinson’s Jean Baudrillard 
and Activism: A Critique (2013); King’s A critique of Baudrillard’s hyperreality: towards a sociology of 
postmodernism. 
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territory no longer precedes the map, nor does it survive it. It is never the less the 
map that precedes the territory - precession of simulacra - 
(Baudrillard: 1994, p.1) 33 
 
The hyperreal itself is explained as "the orbital recurrence of models and for the simulated 
generation of differences" (ibid: pp.2-3). Reality has become subject to the liquidation of 
our referential points, which he sees as artificially resurrected as a semiotic system of signs 
and symbols with no truth behind them (ibid, p.3) - an idea not unlike the understanding of 
Nietzschean masks developed in the previous chapter of this thesis; our issue contends that 
Nietzsche’s varying levels of subversion made obtaining concrete guidance problematic, 
and that the act of subversion itself is catalytic if understood in the argument we 
developed. For Baudrillard, nihilism in the present has moved even beyond the death of 
God, it is a nihilism of transparency, the radical, and one that has been realised not through 
destruction but through simulation and deterrence (ibid, p.159). He understands simulation 
as that which is opposed to representation; representation finds its root in the idea of an 
equivalence of the sign and of the real, whereas simulation is rooted in the "utopia of the 
principle of equivalence, from the radical negation of the sign as value, from the sign as 
the reversion and death sentence of every reference" (ibid, p.6).  
 
To contextualise this, we may view representation as the attempt to show, where showing 
acts to attempt equivalence of the real, but works as a cypher. Woodward understands this 
as a goal to eradicate all imperfection (2009: p.96). Woodward notes that should the 
                                                          
33 The Borges Map fable is credited to Jorge Luis Borges, from his one paragraph story On Exactitude of 
Science. Here an empire is imagined where cartography becomes a precise skill that no ordinary map would 
satisfy, so a map of the empire in a one to one scale is produced. In his opening paragraph, Baudrillard uses 
this example to explain the second order of simulacra (Baudrillard: 1994, p.1).  
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distance between the two close and contact is lost, then the representation has to produce 
its own real (Ibid, p.96). This itself becomes a hyperreality - the ramshackle dinosaur built 
from mixed bones; Lord Nelson wearing an eye patch; the meek white-skinned Jesus.  
 
Unlike representation, simulation acts as a copy in the purest of sense. Rather than acting 
to signify extra, it exists wholly as the double of an original, to capture the essence of an 
original for no sake beyond the inherent. There are however problems to be found with 
this. Baudrillard thinks that the simulation "envelops the system (edifice) of representation 
as simulacrum." (1994: p.6). The simulacra is identified as follows -  
 
it is the reflection of a profound reality; 
it masks and denatures a profound reality; 
it masks the absence of a profound reality; 
it has no relation to any reality whatsoever; it is its own pure simulacrum 
 
(Ibid, p.6) 34 
 
2.2.a: Baudrillard’s Understanding of Signs and Symbolic Exchange in Postmodern 
Nihilism 
 
                                                          
34 For a brutally blunt yet remarkably readable explanation of Baudrillard’s Sim et Sim, see Carey’s article in 
Continent (Issue 2.2/2012), where he outlines the precession of simulacra as so: 1. A basic reflection as a 
photo of your girlfriend; 2. A perversion of basic reality (you airbrush the picture to make her more 
aesthetically pleasing); 3. A masking of an absence of basic reality (it’s not your girlfriend in the picture, you 
just tell people she is); 4. It bears no relation to any reality (you drew her in computer software).  
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Baudrillard also understands objects of the real (i.e. pre-existing aspects of reality) as 
removed from our semio-linguistic attempts to capture them, because at best we can only 
ever project the idea of the object. The conclusion drawn is that deconstruction of signs 
can never take place in the name of the real, since "these categories are the very alibis that 
found the order of signification," (Woodward, 2009: p.94). This results in a transparency 
within contemporary nihilism where simulation no longer refers to an independent real, 
instead confusing models and their referents (Ibid, p.97). This leads to nihilism in 
contemporary culture based upon the dissolution of meaning. With each degree of 
progress, the anchors of history are eroded by expansion (Ibid, p.97).  
 
Baudrillard traces this idea through Western concepts of God, through the iconoclastic 
movement which he sees as substituting god. In fact, Baudrillard suggests that whilst the 
concept of the icon existing as a divine representation and gateway to the transcendent, that 
deep down God never existed, meaning that even God himself is nothing but his own 
simulacrum (Baudrillard, 1994: p.4). Icon worshippers are therefore ‘the most modern of 
minds’ because they are already "enacting his [God] death and his disappearance in the 
epiphany of his representations." (Ibid, p.5). Without God, the exchange of signs falls flat. 
Without God, exchange is impossible as there is no meaning to be granted as the return. 
What we are left with is a succession of distortions that act as masks between polarities on 
an endless Nietzschean tightrope.  
 
In Baudrillard's writing, Woodward finds a theory of 'symbolic exchange'. Conceptually, 
this refers to what he believes existed in pre-capitalistic societies. Channelling Mauss, he 
understands this in terms of 'gift-giving', which take place within a network of cultural 
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symbols. In turn these act as the social bonds within an economy of symbolic exchange 
(Woodward, 2009: p.91). Woodward sees this distinction between pre-capitalist systems 
and the capitalist systems of the present as fundamental aspects of understanding signs, and 
in turn nihilism. He writes – 
 
Unlike capitalist political economy, which abstracts objects from their cultural 
meaning and subjects them to a specific (and therefore non-ambiguous) law of 
value, symbolic exchange is ambiguous, reversible, and constitutes a challenge in 
the form of the obligatory counter-gift... For Baudrillard, societies based on these 
principles of ambiguity and reversibility are richer in "existential" meaning than 
capitalist societies, since they allow socially meaningful exchanges and interactions 
that are eroded by the abstraction of capitalist exchange. 
 
(Woodward, 2009: p.91) 35 
 
Despite capitalism as a dominant mode of political operation in Nietzsche's time, we must 
consider the implications of capitalism now, and we must filter it through the lens of the 
village atheist. If we are to understand Baudrillard (and Woodward's reading of him), then 
the forms of nihilism present in capitalism have run concurrent to Christianity and faith, 
but with an overlap that sees the rise of one and the demise of the other. In pre-capitalist 
societies life was dominated by the structures of faith, but gradually eroded with the 
                                                          
35 Baudrillard’s Impossible Exchange expands on this idea. He outlines a form of nihilism based on the world 
having no double or ‘mirror’, “it has no equivalent anywhere; it cannot be exchanged for anything” (2001: 
p.1). He then outlines the issue with spheres of politics and economy; no doubles with which they can be 
exchanged (Ibid, pp.1-8). He then goes on to note a Nietzschean discovery of this in the form of God the 
Great Creditor, a suggestion much like that we have identified previously by Deleuze as the cyclical method 
of exchange of sin as debt. 
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passage of time (Ibid, p.92).  At the time of Nietzsche's writing, the Industrial Revolution 
had already taken large steps towards the mechanisation of both the workplace and society. 
A second industrial age (or technological age) was under way, with expansion of rail and 
telegraph networks allowing for greater freedom of movement and transportation. The 
development of sewage systems and electrical streetlights led to the potential for better 
conditions and longer working hours. Darwin's evolutionary theory cast doubt on previous 
understandings of our origins, and science and reason had comfortably taken their seat in 
the public eye. For the village atheist, the figure that rejected God but not the foundational 
structures that defined him, capitalism provided a comfort of opportunity.  
 
Baudrillard understands capital as a 'sorcery of relations' and a 'challenge to society' that 
needs responding to on its own terms. It must be challenged in accordance with symbolic 
law (Baudrillard, 1994: p.15). Of his theories of hyperreality and simulation in relation to 
capital, he says the following:  
 
Hyperreality and simulation are deterrents of every principle and every objective, 
they turn against power the deterrent that is used so well for such a long time. 
Because in the end, throughout its history it was capital that first fed on the 
destructuration of ever referential, of every human objective, that shattered every 
ideal distinction between true and false, good and evil, in order to establish a 
radical law of equivalence and exchange, the iron law of its power. 
 
(Baudrillard, 1994: p.22) 
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In capital he finds a liquidation of all value and all equivalence of production and wealth 
(Ibid, p.22); production and wealth offer no alternative because there is no other in the 
impossible exchange, instead there is only the accumulation of signifiers that mask nothing 
beyond their own self-referential system of masks. Baudrillard says similar of power, itself 
producing no more than signs of resemblance in the postmodern world. In fact, he suggests 
that there is a collective demand for signs of power - what he calls a "holy union that is 
reconstructed around it's disappearance" (Ibid, p.23). It is a system that the world adheres 
to through fear of political collapse, and the power itself becomes no more than the 
"critical obsession with power - obsession with its death, obsession with its survival, which 
increases as it disappears," (ibid, p.23). Simply put, capitalism has become the newest 
spectre cast on the cave walls. 
 
In light of this, the village atheist can now be understood as the privileged and educated 
societal figure from a background much like Nietzsche himself. Whilst the poor clung to 
the structures of old, the village atheist rejected God in favour of the instant; workers toiled 
for pittance to secure a place in heaven, the higher classes and captains of industry found 
fulfilment in the rejection of God and the accumulation of capital, with wealth and comfort 
providing pleasure within their lifetime. Under such readings, capitalism is itself a form of 
passive nihilism. 
 
2.2.b: Using Baudrillardian Semiotics to Understand Postmodern Capitalism as a 
Repetitions of Passive Nihilism 
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In the TSZ chapter entitled Of the New Idol, Nietzsche speaks clearly of the state. He 
announces that it is "the coldest of all monsters," and that it is a beast built on lies; lies that 
equate to its presence as a spirit of the people. (2003: p.75). He identifies the state almost 
as a form of cultural embodiment that is capable of adapting and bending to wills. The 
state transcends place in as much as it operates in many places, but what constitutes the 
state in one may be entirely different to the way it operates and is understood in others, but 
the fact remains that a form of state is present in each. Nietzsche identifies this as the will 
to death (Ibid, p.76). He then references the state as a product of the superfluous, of a 
rising population that becomes reliant on a form of state for survival. However, this isn't 
just limited to those he deems weak, rather the state is so powerful that even those of clear 
philosophical mind succumb to its power (Ibid, p.76). The acquisition of wealth becomes 
the goal, and a form of power and degree of power, (i.e. money). There is a clambering to 
what is clearly identified as the void, and only after the state has been diminished and 
destroyed can the ubermensch begin (p.77). 36 
 
Kaufmann identifies the state as a "corollary of his [Nietzsche’s] value theory," and says 
that the state is depreciated not because it disadvantages life, but rather that it prevents man 
from realising himself (1968: p.163). He even finds it an un-Christian concept because of 
its ability to intimidate man into conformity through appropriation of power (Kaufmann, 
p.164). This thinking is not limited solely to the state but rather active across all political 
                                                          
36 In Human, All Too Human, Nietzsche draws on Macchiavelli to understand the great goal of the state as 
duration: “Machiavelli says that ‘the form of government signifies very little, even though semi-educated 
people think otherwise. The great goal of statecraft should be duration, which outweighs everything else, 
inasmuch as it is much more valuable than freedom.” (2005: p.108). 
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spheres. Nietzsche identifies the kingdom of God in the hearts of men, but as Kaufmann 
says: 
 
Nietzsche accuses Christianity of having betrayed this fundamental insight from the 
beginning, whether by transferring the kingdom into another world and thus 
depreciating this life, or by becoming political and seeking salvation through 
organizations, churches, cults, sacraments or priests. 
(Ibid, p.165) 
 
Tracing a similar path, Trubody defines this as the 'Aesthetic of Capitalism.' He rightly 
sees this as an attempt to purify experience and "treat reality as an object to be manipulated 
into artificial categories” (Trubody, 2012: p.11) This forces life and experiences into 
presupposed divides. Rather than providing a gateway for the understanding of experience, 
it folds each in order to package it into the expected or explained; in essence it provides 
another framework for God, only this version transcends religion by situating itself both in 
and outside of it, and across any number of faiths. It is truly globalized. It is this that 
constitutes Trubody's 'Aesthetic of Capitalism'. There are still distinctions between good 
and bad, but the pursuit for happiness is linked with a good that requires categorical 
consumption based on enjoyment and 'improved well-being' (Ibid, p.12). 
 
For Trubody, the correlation between capitalism and religion is undeniable from the 
perspective of the nihilist. In this respect he also posits the strong correlation between 
Nietzsche and Baudrillard via the development of the postmodern that we have argued thus 
far. Trubody's identification of reason as an exercise of aesthetics is important: "reasoning 
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itself is seen as performing an aesthetic function, it can give meaning to life by allowing 
the individual to have an intelligible understanding of their existence” (Ibid, p.2). Citing 
Shutte, he notes that reason gives form and meaning to things, but is ultimately sterile due 
to a form of alienation. It functions as removed from the dynamic of artistic process (Ibid, 
p.2), and is therefore an attempt at a pure logic of experience. However, there is also an 
inherent artistic creativity in the theoretical process in that it aims to 'give' meaning. 
According to Trubody, the abstraction of life through theory is alienating for Nietzsche, 
but if that theory is life enhancing then it becomes an artistic endeavour, and as such 
becomes justified in its use. Nietzsche finds this alienating mode of reasoning to be 
"Socratism", a term denoting life as abstracted and forced into artificial categories to try 
and logically order and legitimise existence. (Ibid, p.3)   
 
Trubody cites Nietzsche's prioritising of the real over the apparent as the only thing of 
meaning, and preserving and enhancing this is crucial to determining value (Ibid, p.3). It is 
through dismissing and denying the apparent (i.e. God) that we find the real, a form of 
rawness, via the Will to Power (which will be discussed in some detail in chapter 4). He 
identifies that Baudrillard no longer believes in a real because of reproduction and 
simulation. Baudrillard's thinking therefore removes the priority of the human because of 
the lack of real, and when coupled with our understanding of semiotics and the correlation 
between the real in itself vs. our linguistic inability to capture the real, we can understand 
the need for this shift from Nietzsche's near-existential interpretation to one that lies 
beyond. 
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Citing a succession in religious thinking that eventually led to the prioritisation of the 
apparent over the real, Trubody views this shift as a dynamic of replacement. The world of 
God (i.e. the apparent as ordered by institutional religion, the gathering and collation of 
formal doctrine, exegesis, etc) through succession of institutional obedience, became the 
real. Truth can only be experienced through God. The real world (our real world) in turn is 
replaced with the apparent, but unlike our own development of this theory, Trubody 
wonders whether the solution lie within the creation of art (Ibid, p.4). He highlights this in 
Nietzsche's own work, highlighting Nietzsche's suggestion in Twilight of Idols that we can 
immunise against the illness that stems from Christianity through the use of art as an 
intoxicant (Ibid, pp.5-6). As such, art re-affirms the sickness and ecstasy of life that forces 
indifference to moral imperatives upon us (Ibid, p.4) 37 Trubody offers his theory that the 
capitalist aesthetic has replaced the religious aesthetic. As he says:  
 
 The capitalist aesthetic supports and promotes Nietzsche’s alienating forms of 
reasoning, which in turn sustains the dualisms that he sought to annihilate. What-is-
more, if we are unable to combat this new aesthetic experience and escape from the 
alienating forms of reasoning, art as understood by Nietzsche becomes impossible. 
                                                                                                                                     
(Ibid, p.10) 
 
He then goes on to identify a slave-master relationship in Baudrillard’s work, similar to 
that developed by Nietzsche. We will briefly outline Nietzsche’s for us to better understand 
                                                          
37 Deleuze believes Nietzsche has a “tragic conception of art”, but also that it acts as a “stimulant for the will 
to power” that can only be utilised as affirmative in a positive instance of force, like the will to power 
(Deleuze, 2009: p.95).  
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this. In BG&E Nietzsche develops the idea in section 260, outlining master (or noble) 
morality a something ‘good’, that stems from (and includes) proud states of mind, vs. ‘bad’ 
states that are cowardly or lowly. This in-itself creates a kind of hierarchy, where the noble 
person understands their duty towards other noble-types, but not necessarily to those below 
them. These solid ‘good’ qualities overflow, and this overflowing allows for the aiding of 
those below them. This becomes a type of value creation. In contrast, slave morality is a 
rejection of the morality found in master or noble-types. The focus is on the relief from 
suffering and escape from oppression, where escaping noble values becomes the highest 
aim. Nietzsche believes both qualities exist in people, but the desire for a higher-type is 
integral to his thinking (2003: pp.194-205) 
 
Following his development of a theory of consumption in The Consumer Society, Trubody 
draws on Baudrillard’s idea that systems of need does not precede the enjoyment of an 
object, rather both are separate, "They are produced as system elements, not as 
relationships of individual to an object" (Ibid, p.10). 
 
In this instance he conceives of the slave-master relationship as follows:  
 
Where people believe their desires to be part of a supply and demand relationship 
amongst which lies the perfect holiday, car, or pair of shoes but in fact they are 
complicit in creating desires for a 'lived experience' that does not exist, a world that 
cannot exist as it is a product of a system of production. 
(Ibid, p.10) 
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Of consumption, he says the following: 
 
Consumption becomes a function of production which engineers 'desire', so any 
enjoyment derived from this process is actually a 'denial of enjoyment' as one 
becomes the functional expression of a collective productive process which has no 
end. The individual sees themselves as an object, to be pampered - in essence to 
consume one-self. 
(Ibid, p.11) 
 
Baudrillard’s essay Hypermarket and Hypercommodity, talks of the 'circular response' 
found in the message exchange function of the consumer. With objects devolved into 
semiotics, he believes the system feeds itself perpetually without resolution or key 
exchange. He says the following: 
 
At the deepest level, another kind of work is at issue here, the work of 
acculturation, of confrontation, of examination, of the social code, and of the 
verdict: people go there to find and to select objects - responses to all the questions 
they may ask themselves; or, rather, they themselves come in response to the 
functional and directed question that the objects constitute. 
(Baudrillard, 1994: p.75) 
 
He understands this as going beyond consumption, resituating itself in a place where the 
primacy is now the circular arrangement itself. If we draw on these Baudrillardian semio-
linguistic approaches to nihilism and understand it as the dissolution of order and the rise 
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of hypercontextualism, particularly recalling Baudrillard’s theories on pre-capitalist 
society, then we can emphasise Trubody’s approach. We might also see evidence for our 
trans-Nietzschean approach in the masks of semiotics, which in turn suggests a drive 
onwards rather than wallowing within nihilism. Such an approach doesn’t deconstruct 
postmodernism and nihilism to the extent that there is no overcoming, rather it invigorates 
the act of continuation and event. Further developments in our understanding of nihilism 
will require us to better explore the machinations of capitalism as a form of passive 
nihilism, and investigate the embrace of the village atheist with particular attention to how 
ubermensch can be realised under the new forms of nihilism. In the next chapter we will 
undertake this task, but before doing so we must turn our attention to Vattimo. 
 
2.3: Finding a Positive Inversion in Vattimo's Nihilism of Passivity 
 
In Vattimo, Woodward finds a type of positive nihilism which turns traditional 
understandings on their head; rather than a problem to be solved it is in itself a solution: 
rather than negating the human it is our chance for social emancipation (2009: p.102). 
Rather than use the term to denote a problem of existential meaning, he instead uses it to 
forms of antifoundationalism of ontological and epistemological order, viewing reality as 
devoid of objective structure, permanence and inherent truths (Ibid, p.103). 38 Vattimo’s 
key theory is “weak thought”, an antifoundationalist idea on the impossibility of "a 
decisive overcoming of metaphysics" (Ibid, 103). 39 It’s an idea that Vattimo draws not 
                                                          
38 Vattimo claims that the Italian tradition of thought from which he stems is inseparable from this own 
thinking, instead understanding the two as wholly intertwined. (2009: p.103) 
39 Harris tells us that Vattimo refuses to see the history of metaphysics as error, "but as a normative way of 
thinking." Metaphysics has "entailed truth being conceived in terms of correspondence to already designated 
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from his contemporaries, but by the thinkers of nihilism who have come before, stemming 
back to Nietzsche himself. 40 By focussing on the mid-period works of Nietzsche 
(particularly TGS, Untimely Meditations), Vattimo identifies a type of deconstruction of 
metaphysics within Nietzsche, which cancels any conception of new foundations in 
thought. As such, he places Nietzsche as a thinker "at the end of metaphysics who is 
struggling to find a way beyond it" (Ibid: p.105). 
 
Woodward then says the following of Vattimo: 
 
The idea of a foundation for thought that would secure true knowledge 
depends on the idea that it is possible to know things in themselves, but this 
possibility is also undermined by Nietzsche through his argument that 
"knowledge of a thing is the result of a series of metaphoric transformations 
that take place between the thing and our understanding of it. 
(2009: p.106) 
 
In his book with Caputo, After the Death of God, Vattimo recalls Heidegger’s thought on 
truth as subjectivity and open to interpretation; all views are granted by those in the world 
(2007: p.28). Vattimo points to scientists, whose reliance on structures of trust in the form 
                                                          
norms from the ground until the death of God, that is, until the end of metaphysics heralded by Nietzsche’s 
announcement to that effect." (2015: p.10) 
40 Vattimo’s readings of both Nietzsche and Heidegger are antifoundational in essence. He argues that these 
thinkers’ approaches must be understood in a positive light, thus read as rebuttal and proposal against the 
problem of metaphysical foundationalism that they diagnose (Woodward, 2009: p.105). 
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of past scientific work (and the assumptions made as a result) form the basis of experiment. 
Investigations take the place under the conditions of assumption, and from these 
assumptions the path is governed for an outcome. Vattimo sees this not only in science, but 
in all forms inquiry and thought, even in language (Ibid, pp.27-28). 41 In turn this means 
culture and reason is itself varied and not universal (Ibid, pp.30-31). He goes on to say the 
following –  
 
The matter of interpretation is now configured in this way: interpretation is the idea 
that knowledge is not the pure, uninterested reflection of the real, but the interested 
approach to the world, which is itself historically mutable and culturally 
conditioned. 
 
(Vattimo, 2007: p.31) 
 
2.3.a: Using Vattimo to Pose the Problem of an Inescapable Postmodern Nihilism 
 
For Vattimo, the announcement of the Death of God confirms there is no objective 
structure to the world. It is not an atheistic position because this would imply that there is 
an objective structure to the world, one in which god does not exist (2009: p.107). 
Woodward states that Vattimo’s view is not particularly unique or new, but it's the nuance 
                                                          
41 Vattimo also sees philosophy of science talk about the formulation of phenomena by placing it in artificial 
systems, maths formulas and languages as games - each have their own rules that don't apply to the other, but 
it doesn't make any one or the other wrong (2007: pp.32-33). These ideas will be explored in greater detail in 
Chapter 4, where we apply such concepts to possible ubermensch developments through the work of Keith 
Ansell-Pearson. 
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that is of value, and that the Death of God, "understood as nihilism, is a condition that 
cannot be transcended" (Ibid, p.107). In Vattimo’s The End of Modernity the idea of the 
death of God is understood as “the generalisation of exchange value in our society” (1988: 
p.36). For Vattimo, this means that there is no overcoming as this would imply a new 
foundation. Rather, what Nietzsche would call complete or accomplished nihilism. Vattimo 
believes it must be understood “precisely as the condition in which the belief in 
foundations, including the possibility of a new foundation, is entirely dissolved" (2009: 
p.108). In Harris’ reading of, Vattimo, the death of god takes on further meaning, 
representing "the collective loss of a need for certainty as a result of improvements in 
science and technology that have removed our worst fears, making life more bearable" 
(2015: p.10). This has resulted in a monotheistic mixture of murder and suicide, realized in 
the murder of god not through unbelief but faith (ibid, p.10). As Harris goes on to point 
out, Vattimo’s death of God “is not a flat-footed atheistic denial of God’s existence,” rather 
Vattimo seeks to avoid the repetition of metaphysical logic (ibid, p.11). By doing so, 
Vattimo is able to avoid rereading theologies into the world by shifting the hermeneutic 
focus from the analysis of religious texts to a reading of cultural interpretation – 
dissolution of the village atheist as the repeater of the theological. Rather than seek an 
ultimate truth in the form of metaphysics, he instead looks at reconfigurations of local 
experience, the new politicised nihilism re-politicised already as positive affirmation of 
nihilism. This issue, however, is that it runs the risk of re-entering Baudrillard’s semiotic 
exchange on a microscale.   
 
Vattimo rejects the idea of overcoming as this requires a form of new foundationalism, so 
Being is placed historically and is subject to history, with new interpretations taking place 
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all the time. The current configuration of Being is not one based upon an ability to 
overcome, rather, current configurations are based on the thoughts of the past (2009: 
p.113). Understood simply, Vattimo’s thought suggests we can only exist within 
metaphysics. There is no overcoming to take place because foundations have been 
dissolved and can never be rebuilt (they are non-existent), but instead there are the 
possibilities of new fields of discovery and understanding that could theoretically move 
away from the nostalgia of structures. Vattimo directly draws on Lyotard's idea of 'the end 
of metanarratives', but for Vattimo to understand the postmodern we must provide an 
interpretation of the meaning of being at the end of modernity. Vattimo sees this as the 
advent of postmodernity coinciding with nihilism as a completion (2009: p.150). This is 
understood through secularisation, which has roots in modernity and becomes decisive in 
postmodernism. In conjunction, Being itself deteriorates. There is a dissolution of Being 
and God, and as such the foundational elements of thought, truth, and society (Ibid, p. 
150).  
 
 
 
Vattimo understands the end of history as a consequence and signifier of nihilism. He 
understands history as a game of cultural masters, namely what he terms European Man. 
He states: 
 
The idea of a progressive temporal process, and even of such a thing as history, 
belongs to a cultural of masters. As a linear unity history is actually only the history 
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of those in power, of the victors. It is constituted at the cost of excluding, first in 
practice and then in recollection, an array of possibilities, values and images. 
 
(Ibid, pp.150-151) 
 
In Woodward’s understanding, for Vattimo there are ultimately many narratives and 
perspectives on history that sit outside of the dominant western (and largely male) 
interpretations, all of which hold no more or less value. The delinearisation of history is 
therefore the effect we see (Ibid, pp.151-152). Vattimo also identifies, contra Adorno and 
Horkheimer's predictions of mass-media leading to a homogenisation of society, that 
media has actually led to an explosion of alternative views. 42  In a recent paper, Harris 
develops the view that information and communications technology allow for the reporting 
of events as simultaneous actions, each holding its own perspective and interpretation. He 
sees this as reducing objectivity and blurring (possibly even collapsing) the distinction 
between the ‘real’ and ‘apparent’ worlds (2015: p.15). In turn this (particularly social 
media and the compartmentalisation of facets of selfhood into handy ‘apps’) impacts on 
our understanding of metaphysics. For Vattimo it is an ‘end’ of sorts, in that technology 
forces us to confront narratives. However, for Harris more recent technological advances 
cause us to return to metaphysics in the favouring of ‘I’; he finds examples of this in 
products made by Apple; the iphone, ipad; internet cookies storing preferences, etc (2015: 
pp.28-33).43 In these cases the individual prioritises existence through the fracturing of 
                                                          
42 See recent controversy political news and Counselor Conway’s use of ‘alternative facts’; Lee McIntyre’s 
Respecting Truth: Willful Ignorance in the Internet Age (2015). 
43 Harris concludes by stating that in Vattimo’s view “the internet becomes a place in which one’s 
representation of the world is put forward for assurance based on one’s ego, and the internet duly obliges” 
(2015: p.36). Such a view suggests that the sum of digital memory and the connectivity it affords replace 
faith narratives by placing validation in the hands of the digital other; a global conscious collective.  
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aspects of selfhood and the reconstitution of personal narratives through sociotechnological 
validation. Whilst Harris idea of the return to metaphysics might act to validate the 
individual, it does so only by means of a passive nihilism. As Woodward notes, rather than 
draw any form of transparency over society, we in fact see a fragmentation from different 
narratives. This leads to a distortion that acts against the unified vision of reality. In turn 
these conflicts of information lead to a mythic character "which undermines the 
understanding of reality as an objective structure to which true statements might 
correspond, and thus by implication undermines the notion of history as the objective 
development of this structure" (2009, p.152). As a result, we find ourselves in 'post-
history', where technology and capitalism must constantly innovate in order to preserve 
life. Progress in turn becomes routine because the idea of 'new' loses value within the 
status quo of capitalism. In order to remain the same there must be a progression: “The 
more things change, the more things stay the same" (2009: pp.152-153). It is this process 
that Vattimo identifies as the 'secularisation of the secular', and what Woodward 
understands as the "secularization of the ideal of progress, which amounts to the end of 
modernity and the beginning of postmodernity” (Ibid, p.153).  
 
What we see is the fabric of modernity threatening any form of movement beyond. In order 
to progress truly into the postmodern we would need to recall the structures of the past, 
despite these very structures (such as unilinear history) being polar to any post-modern 
developments we may wish for. Even for Vattimo the repetitions of the village atheist 
appear again at the forefront; a weakness on the part of the human to look beyond existent 
structures reimagined through capitalism and technology. 
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2.4: Woodward’s Logic of Difference as a Solution to Nihilism  
 
Woodward’s suggestion is that we tackle nihilism with a ‘logic of difference’, in following 
the ideas encountered in Deleuze work on Nietzsche. As he says, it already had a profound 
impact on the development of French poststructuralism (2009: p.174). Woodward argues 
that the concept of 'difference' is the enabling factor in the postmodern response to 
nihilism. 44 The importance of Heidegger’s reading of negation factors deeply into many of 
the interpretations of nihilism since; namely that negation doesn’t allow for an 
overcoming. As Woodward says, it is the "oppositional structure itself that preserves 
nihilism; it is the form of those terms and their relation, rather than the content, that is 
constitutive of nihilism” (2009: p.175). As Caygill summarises in his own argument: 
 
Every revaluation of values demands a devaluation or negation of existing values, 
and this negation prepares the revaluation to serve as a vector for the propagation 
and survival of nihilism. 
(2000: p.196) 45 
                                                          
44 Woodward paints Deleuze as a sore thumb of types in relation to Baudrillard and Vattimo. Neither 
particularly engage with his work on a level that might be appropriate, in fact there is some rejection of. 
Baudrillard’s 1976 essay, Forget Foucault also attacks Deleuze by extension for his prioritising of desire. We 
might surmise that the same goes for his view of Lyotard, whose Why Philosophize takes desire as its starting 
point for philosophy. However, as Woodward has shown, many of the ideas developed by the postmodern 
thinkers overlap, so whilst it may be true that approaches differed there are still common grounds in attempts 
for solution (2009, p.175). They may not agree on the specifics, but there is a general will toward the same 
outcome.  
45 Caygill also finds issue with Nietzsche's concept of life, "in so far as it evokes determinate biological 
properties, succumbs to this reinstitution of negation, and hence nihilism” (2000, p.194). In chapter 4 we will 
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Nietzsche’s response of pure affirmation is itself problematic on face value; affirmation 
suggests a duality of sorts, where negation acts as the polar. It also begs the question of 
how this pure affirmation might be possible. Further, in exploiting value, the hierarchy of 
values associated with a revaluation of values also propagate nihilism as each revaluation 
requires the values of old to be shifted to allow a new order (Woodward, 2009: p.176). 
Woodward opts to draw a path through the logic of negation, linking it to the development 
of a logic of opposition, where the oppositional relation of terms allow hierarchical 
organisation to take place which prioritise, or privilege/affirm vs. negate (Woodward, 
2009: p.176-177). Woodward looks back to Nietzsche for a solution, returning to the 
groundwork for the problematic itself. By rereading Nietzsche, and Deleuze’ interpretation 
of his ideas, he finds a type of affinity developed between opposition and negation. For 
Deleuze, in an opposition "a concept or thing does not negate all things that are not in it, 
but a particular thing (its opposite)." (2009: p,177). He points to examples of North and 
South which are determined not by the negation of other things in general but by the 
negation of each other. As such, "oppositional force is thus founded on negativity, and this 
negativity is associated by Deleuze with the devaluation and reactivity of nihilism." (Ibid, 
p.177). Looking to Deleuze, we see that he understands affirmation and negation as 
“opposites, but also wholes which exclude their opposite,” and the affirmation of this 
whole is that which exists outside man, yet within ubermensch (Deleuze, 2009: pp.166-
167).  
 
                                                          
engage with the biological and transhuman implications of life regarding nihilism, as seen in the work of 
Keith Ansell-Pearson.  
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A logic of difference is found in part in the postmodern thinkers, but they reject the 
metaphysics of difference, standing against the belief of an overcoming of nihilism, 
particularly utilising logic of difference to do so (2009: p. 182). Woodward’s 
understanding of the logic of difference avoids the pitfalls associated with the polar issue 
of nihilism and its perpetuation via negation. 
 
Woodward's own response is a politics of passivity. By employing the logic of difference 
to the thinking of Baudrillard and Vattimo (also Lyotard), he says "the politics of passivity 
attempts to negotiate nihilism without hoping to overcome it." (2009: p.187). Much like 
the postmodern thinkers he engages with, he looks to find an alternative in difference as a 
non-binary opposition.  
 
As he says, "while the active attempt to overcome opposes nihilism the passive politics of 
affirmative weakness seeks to affirm forces of life that differ from nihilism." (Woodward, 
2010: p.187). What Woodward envisions isn't an overcoming but a weakening. He sees the 
postmodern as an attempt to live and survive within nihilism. 
 
Whether this might be agreeable in the Nietzschean tradition is problematic. Settling for 
the status quo might be deemed another extension of the passivity of the village atheist, 
accepted this time because rigorous thought has been undertaken into the condition of the 
nihil itself. By confronting nihilism but opting to simply live within it, the value of 
ubermensch diminishes to little more than fantasy once more. The positive and entirely 
affirmative cannot operate in a space where the degree of affirmation is dependent on the 
boundaries imposed on it by the nihilistic playground that postmodernism has envisioned.  
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Given our attempts to think trans-Nietzschean, we find grounds to develop this thinking in 
greater detail. With the shift in nihilism to a form of heavily politicised and globalised 
phenomena, we might best understand nihilism as the inescapable in much the same way 
we do (or don’t) with the inevitability of death. The development of the positive and 
affirmative within enclosed spheres could suggest pockets of micro or situational truths. 
Rather than the idea of the village atheist as the figure of rejection, thinking trans-
Nietzschean might suggest an acceptance of the inescapability of nihilism coupled with a 
rejection of the last man, a near-overriding of Nietzsche, where the suggestion is both to 
reject escaping nihilism and rejecting Nietzsche himself in order to better understand the 
problem as contemporary. 
 
2.5: Chapter Summary & Conclusion 
 
As technology and capitalism have risen, so too have the ways in which philosophy is 
understood and practiced. We see that for many postmodern thinkers the idea of nihilism is 
dependent on understanding a complete dissolution in the metanarrative structures that we 
associate with contemporary times. The turn from interiority to a wider world provides 
space for new types of philosophy to take place, but if they are to remain true to 
Nietzsche’s nihilism they must be sure to reject repetitions of passivity; understanding the 
world as building blocks should not imply a reskinned theology (as presented in both 
capitalism and technology), but grounds for a wider exploration. Because of this we must 
understand the socio-political aspects of nihilism as a global phenomenon and not just in 
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the individual. We must also, however, remember the value of thinking trans-Nietzsche in 
order to think beyond nihilism as outlined by Nietzsche himself. 
 
Woodward’s readings of Baudrillard and Vattimo place a particular emphasis on techno-
capitalist structures, so in order to look towards what an ubermensch may be we must next 
explore capitalism as a form of atheology, a weak nihilism of semiotic simulacra and an 
analogue for Christianity. We note that the historicity and appropriation of Nietzsche’s 
work are alive and well, with the outlined thinkers, all of whom are influenced by 
Nietzsche, developing ideas of their own that hint towards a trans-Nietzschean 
understanding.  
 
Despite repetitions of the village atheist’s passive nihilism being alive and well in the 
forms of capitalist consumer culture and faith in the idea of faith (see Vattimo’s reflection 
on the facts of science), developments in technology and science must be factored into the 
ways in which we account for the nihilism of ‘things’. We must therefore better understand 
technology and its effect on metaphysics. If we are to build ubermensch then we must do 
so within the climate of tech and enhancement. We find that value is both masked and 
fluctuating by dictation of semiotic order, and that this leads to a devaluation of life due to 
the lack of solid foundation to underpin thought. It is therefore of little surprise that 
consumer culture runs rampant in the contemporary world, acting as a type of instant-fix 
message of truth that tells us exactly what we need and when we need it, but for the benefit 
of perpetuating the nihilistic system found within postmodern capitalism. 
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Whilst Woodward notes that Baudrillard and Vattimo don’t believe nihilism is possible to 
overcome, their approaches to operating within nihilism are still of value, and particularly 
in Baudrillard we see semblance of progress in the development of our trans-Nietzschean 
argument. Woodward does not see a form of passive nihilism within their work, but a call 
to take the matter seriously by working within the framework he calls the politics of 
passivity, rather than attempting to overcome it in what might itself be a metaphysical 
metanarrative. However, by calling on Deleuze, Woodward’s suggestion of a logic of 
difference providing possibility for overcoming nihilism warrants further exploration.  
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CHAPTER 3: THE LAST MAN AND CAPITALISM AS THE NEW 
(A)THEOLOGY 
 
Having outlined the problem of nihilism in the postmodern age, and its shift from 
interiority to a type of external and politicised nihilism of semiotics, we now turn our 
attention to framing capitalism as a repetition of passive nihilism and as a new god for the 
village atheist. In turn this leads to the rise of a figure deemed the last man, content with 
the luxuries afforded him by capitalism and passive thought. In this chapter we will 
understand capitalism as a largely inescapable threat that deeply affects the ways in which 
we must think about the development of ubermensch, and as the very reason why this last 
man develops.  
 
In part one we will outline the last man historically, in both Nietzsche’s own thought and 
those of his commentators. Next we turn our attention to framing postmodern capitalism 
through the world of Goodchild, Fisher and Berardi, charting its development and 
understanding its all-pervading nature. This allows us to draw parallels with Christianity 
and shows how capitalism may have impacted on Christian thought itself. Next we turn 
understanding the inescapable nature of capitalism, understood as a semiocapitalist 
endeavour, tracing the impact of capitalism and the cyclical nature of debt on both the 
world and being. We then turn our attention to understanding the impact semiocapitalist 
nihilism on being itself, understood as the aggravation of negative mental states that trap 
the thinker and create problems for the growth of possible ubermensch. Finally, we 
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conclude and understand the need to look to the future and technology for an ubermensch 
solution that exists trans-semiocapitalism. 
 
3.1: Understanding Nietzsche’s Last Man at the End of Postmodernity 
 
In the days prior to the coming of the ubermensch, Nietzsche predicted the rise of what he 
termed the ultimate or last man. An apathetic figure driven by luxury and convenience, the 
last man makes the increasingly small world smaller through his wide-spread existence on 
the planet (Nietzsche, 2003: p.46). He tells us that as the last man, "none grows rich or 
poor anymore; both are too much of a burden," and that there is "No herdsman and one 
herd. Everyone wants the same thing, everyone is the same: whoever thinks otherwise goes 
to the madhouse (Ibid, p.46). Nietzsche goes on to tell us that the last man is clever and 
knows everything that has ever happened, and that there is no end to their mockery. They 
are creatures of pleasure, but of acceptable levels of such. Instead of drowning in 
intoxication, the last man experiences pleasure with degrees of respect for their own health, 
and they believe that through the above, they have found happiness (Ibid, p.47). As 
Zarathustra addresses the crowd, their response is to embrace the last man, telling 
Nietzsche he can keep the ubermensch (Nietzsche, 2003: p.47). 
 
Kaufmann notes that in his Meditation on Schopenhauer, Nietzsche does not find humanity 
has 'bettered' itself throughout history; there are, to Nietzsche, no artists alive in his time 
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greater than those in history. 46 There has been no evolution of man through religion, 
philosophy nor art. As he goes on to say. "The mass of men are essentially animals without 
any unique dignity, and the "goal of development" cannot therefore, lie "in the mass of 
specimens of in their well-being, but only "in single great human beings." (Kaufmann, 
1974: pp.172-173). These single great human beings are not the last ones in time, but 
single accidental instances, a point his clarifies with his writing on the last man vs. the 
ubermensch in TSZ (Ibid, p.173). Kaufmann understands this contextually, claiming it 
"anticipates his later diatribes against utilitarianism” (Ibid, p.173). Safranski notes 
Heidegger's reading of Nietzsche, who applied the idea of uprising to the last man, 
understood as technology and the mastery of technology acting as the driving factor behind 
his understanding, driving "man into insurrection", and in turn setting the stage for new 
understandings of being, the world and nihilism itself (2002: pp.342-343). 
 
For Deleuze, Nietzsche's last man is best understood as "the image in which the reactive 
man represents himself as 'higher', and, better still, deifies himself. At the same time, the 
higher man is the image in which the product of culture or species activity appears," 
(Deleuze, 2009: p.155). The last man is literally reacting to what is presented but not 
challenging the foundation of that which he responds to. His rebuttal is therefore a type of 
passive nihilism, but with an arrogance and familiarity that languishes self-praise through a 
form of internal triumph; a type of man who finds pride in possession and wealth. Deleuze 
                                                          
46 Cybulska notes Nietzsche’s admiration for Wagner (prior to their falling out), and in The Birth of Tragedy, 
he extolled Wagner as heir to Aeschylus and as reviving Greek Tragedy (2015: p.2). Cybulska goes on to 
suggest that after an incident leading to Nietzsche and Wagner’s falling out, Nietzsche began writing Human, 
All Too Human, which began a “struggle with deeply cherished ideals and idols – such as Christianity 
morality, Schopenhauer, Wagner…” (Ibid, p.3). It is possible, therefore, that Nietzsche had found idols in his 
lifetime, only for his faith to crumble under the strain of reality vs. the historical power of the figure 
envisioned, stripped of negatives and cast in a favourable light.  
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notes two forms of the last man in Nietzsche's work, that of the enemy who considers all to 
mislead Zarathustra, and sometimes as a host or near-companion who is "engaged in 
enterprise close to that of Zarathustra himself," (Ibid, pp.155-156). 
 
3.2 Framing Postmodern Capitalism as a Repetition of the Divine via Goodchild 
 
Having identified the shift in our understanding of nihilism in the postmodern, and the 
impact of semiotics and symbols, we must now pay closer attention to the problem of 
capitalism. In Capitalism and Religion: The Price of Piety, Philip Goodchild suggests that 
piety plays a larger role in our daily lives than we might expect. He defines piety as "the 
determinate practice of directing attention [by asking] 'what is ultimately worthy of 
honour, belief, desire, thought, value, trust, enjoyment and worship?" (Goodchild, 2002: 
p.5). 47 Goodchild’s approach casts piety as capitalist endeavour under these limitations, 
and notes Nietzsche himself draws on this same point in The Anti-Christ: Piety is suspected 
of being self-serving. 48 Essentially, he argues that the form of rationality in reason that has 
developed from the Greeks onwards "constructs standards of truth, value, interest and 
power which themselves largely conform to expression of economic exchange" (Ibid, 
p.94).  
 
                                                          
47 Piety is also understood as a religious devotion/a quality of religiosity, which takes on a quality beyond or 
outside of time. Calling on Kant, Goodchild notes two types of religion; 'endeavours to win favour' (cult) and 
moral religions (religions of 'good life-conduct'). In moral religions he finds a disinterest - "they serve ends 
which are not delimited to a particular individual or group. Sacrificing all claims to religious knowledge, all 
supernatural security, in 'moral religion' one's salvation depends entirely in the integrity and disinterestedness 
of one's conduct.” (2002: p.3) 
48 Goodchild notes the reference to the book of Matthew, v.46-47, to which Nietzsche responds “Principle of 
‘Christian love’: it wants to be well paid” (Nietzsche, The Anti-Christ, London: Penguin, 1990, p.170).  
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Goodchild points to a significant restructuring of political and economic structures since 
the industrial revolution, in the form of the intensification of the global economy, 
particularly from the 1970’s to the 1990’s. He notes the key events as follows: 
The abandoning of the gold standard for the dollar in 1971; the deregulation of the 
world's principal financial markets in London, New York, Tokyo, Frankfurt, and 
Hong Kong during the 1980s; the introduction of electronic communication 
technology, allowing the instant transfer of information and money around the 
world; and the ratification of the Uruguay round of the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade in 1994. The result is the establishment of Free Trade Zones in 
countries where trade is otherwise regulated. This free-market lives off its own 
autonomous processes, which no human institution can control. 
(Goodchild, 2002: p.xi) 
Plotting clear and precise instances of the submission of power to forms of the other, 
Goodchild evidences the shift from degrees of inherent power toward the total nihilism of 
the now, where both power and value are decided on our behalf by a complex system 
acting as a repetition of god. 
 
For Berardi, the shift in operation from the industrial to the corporate is a key factor in the 
dogmatization of capitalism. By sacrificing the education system, health care, 
transportation and welfare to the above we have lost control of our material legacy (Ibid, 
p.6). By the 2010's, he says, "the seductive force of simulation transformed physical forms 
into vanishing images, submitted visual art to spam spreading, and subjected language to 
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the fake regime of advertising. At the end of this process, real life disappeared into the 
black hole of financial accumulation" (Berardi, 2015: p.6). 
Berardi also points to the death of the hero concept, plotting changes in the concept over 
time, from classical epic heroes fighting demonic forces of chaos and founding cities, 
through to elements present in Machiavelli, then the modern political version who 
establishes infrastructure and industry. At the end of modernity, heroes disappeared 
- "when the complexity and speed of human events overwhelmed the forces of the will." 
(Ibid, p.5). Heroism replaced by gigantic machines of simulation. Epic discourse space 
occupied by "semiocorporations, apparatuses for the emanation of widely shared illusions." 
(Ibid, p.5). Berardi understands the rise of subcultures (as reactionary forces) as games of 
Baudrillardian simulation, where the focus has been lost to the voice of the cyclical; rather 
than an operative intent of change, subcultures become games of simulation by offering the 
mask of intention, often pacified beyond uniformity and rallying cries. The subculture 
therefore lacks the intention of its original, instead now little more than a spectacle. 
However, this is a form of tragedy based upon the mistake of illusion for reality, and the 
perceived authentication of the identities therein. The problem Berardi identifies is the lack 
of irony in the situation. He believes that "it is only through irony and conscious 
understanding of the simulation at the heart of the heroic game, that the simulated hero of 
subculture still has a chance to save itself." (Ibid, p.5). To be saved from the trappings of 
simulation under capitalism we must understand not only our intention, but the 
ridiculousness of our intent and the guise in which we approach our task. 
 
We might question the link between piety and the hero. The hero of history suggests an 
outpouring of power and goodwill toward others, a concept gradually eroded by the growth 
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in system actors that provide provisions, but at a cost. No longer does the hero present as 
selfless or mutually beneficial; under capitalism, the counter-cultural reactionary hero acts 
only in play. However, if piety has been prevalent in western thought since the ancient 
Greeks, then history itself conforms to the norms of a type of economics. Even the 
classical hero of myth is now subject to the same pious processes as the herd, where acts of 
heroism lose their direct power, instead conforming to a form of economic religiosity. 49 It 
appears that even history pre-Nietzsche is subject to a form of nihilism that acts beyond the 
grasp of Christianity. 50 
 
In the postmodern, however, Goodchild is explicit in his understanding of the death of God 
as the defining factor of capitalist nihilism (quite viciously, and in line with Nietzsche’s 
own proclamation ‘we have killed him, you and I’, Goodchild refers to this as the ‘murder 
of god’). Goodchild later poses the following point: 
 
If God is dead, he is replaced by time and money, not man - there still are 
transcendent sources of meaning and value that exceed thought and experience, 
even if they can take the most banal forms. 
(Goodchild, 2002: p.133).  
 
                                                          
49 That Goodchild questions the self-serving circle of piety factors nicely into our new understanding of 
heroes. He claims the “defenders of piety seek a reward from piety itself”, which we might understand as a 
selfish, if subconscious act (2002: p.4). This raises questions as to whether selfless and heroic acts can or 
have ever been entirely selfless or heroic at all. 
50 On atheism, Goodchild notes the stemming from refuting of the moral god of Christianity, as if there was 
no alternative form of God. In his belief, Nietzsche himself remained pious (2002: p.19). 
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He believes that these figures of transcendence aren't reliant on belief or choice, but instead 
actively force themselves upon us (Ibid, p.133). The implication of power from an 
unknown source intensifies the thought: even in rejecting transcendence and the death of 
God, we are still subject to transcendent forces beyond our control. In fact, he points to 
God as a surface effect and simulacrum, where time appears to produce effects of "eternal 
identity, truth and value through repetition" (Ibid, p.2). 51 
 
He understands the modern world as providing grounds for atheists and theists to live 
similar lives, through a web of common concepts that structure our lives. Goodchild lists 
liberty, reason, progress, toleration, wealth, law, contract, right, information, energy, space. 
"The repetition of such concepts and values in a circular reasoning constitutes the liturgy 
of common sense: modern thought is maintained by piety" (Ibid, p.2). The rejection of 
circular reasoning leads to chaos, even logic producing odd effects. He sees the self-
regulating market as replacing the social-relations and values of the old god. (Ibid, p.10). 
This follows on from the creation of paper currency and a state bank. He sees a link with 
John Locke in the development of ideology of the state as built on ideas of God, right and 
liberty: 
 
… they describe participation in the free market, without giving power. Since 
money accumulates power, it progressively enslaves stakeholders in the market 
through debt. Usurping God, right and liberty, money becomes a despot.  
                                                          
51 The understanding and use of the term simulacra has slightly different implications, particularly amongst 
French post-structuralist and Continental thinkers. Goodchild references Deleuze throughout his work, so it is 
probably his understanding aligns with the Deleuzean, expressed as follows: "those systems in which 
different relates to different by means of difference itself. What is essential is that we find in these systems 
no prior identity, no internal resemblance" (1994: p.299).  
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(Ibid, p.10) 
There is a truth in Nietzsche's death of God that links directly to our understanding of the 
village atheist, and the bad repetitions of passive nihilism. If the repetitions of nihilism and 
God are found in within capitalism, and the history of Western culture is ingrained in 
thought, then what does this say of reason? 
 
In reason, Goodchild finds nihilism: 
 
[Reason] elevates an abstraction to be honoured above the relation that gives rise to 
it. Disavowing its own piety, forgetting that it always involves its own acts of 
worship, it attempts to attain a critical, objective stance, apart from religion, by 
elevating its own very 'natural' idols into concepts that govern its own ways of living 
and thinking. 
 
(2002: p.95) 
 
Reason therefore becomes a type of sacrifice; on the one hand there is the prioritisation of 
thought as a result of reason, but at the cost of devaluation of other thought. It is, as he sees 
it, the root of the 'value of values' - an act of thinking where expenditure is based upon 
evaluation, where the consideration of how time is best spent is dependent on the problem 
or situation that needs consideration (Ibid, p.95). The 'exchange' in question (in economic 
exchange) is devalued by the perceived value of the exchange as the symbolic itself - the 
act of exchange has higher worth than the intrinsic worth of the exchange. It is not the 
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exchange of eggs for wool that allow the subjects to survive that is of value, but the fact 
the exchange is understood as holding value beyond this - it becomes a 'transcendent'. The 
short-term ‘truths’ that capitalist nihilism presents are realised in the form of market 
forces; we literally have to bend reality to fit the system of capital (Ibid, p.48). The last 
man, with his toys and comforts has no need to question this bending of reality because the 
system provides a symbolic (and material) wealth that signifies completion and totality 
through the masking of what lies beyond.  
 
3.3.a: Understanding the Inescapability of Nihilism as Semiocapitalism  
 
With the process of capitalism dictating the flow of postmodern culture, the signs and 
symbols that act as directors need better be understood. Goodchild points to the existence 
of symbolization preceding the essence of that which is symbolized, and the possibility of 
consciousness preceding consciousness of the particular. In turn this creates an excess of 
the signifier at each stage that cannot be attached to the signified (Goodchild, 2002: p.50). 
As we saw with Woodward, Baudrillard, et al, the idea of overcoming nihilism in the 
postmodern presents as an exercise of working within its framework to create affirmative 
methodologies and practices; a type of positive nihilism based upon the acceptance of the 
inevitable condition, accepting the limitations of both being and nihilism as non-
transcendent, but ultimately capable of affirmation to some degree. Again, value enters the 
equation, but this time the degree is less about quantification or quality of power and value, 
but rather the trajectory of value from the whole of the polar or binary. If the quanta and 
quality of signified power outweighs the degree of excess of the signifier, then capitalistic 
nihilism might provide grounds for a form of escape. However, as we shall see, the 
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trappings of capitalism and the repetitions of nihilism found within make the task 
problematic and difficult at best. 
 
In the opening of his recent book, Heroes, Franco Berardi informs us that he was inspired 
to write this book after the learning of the Aurora massacre, otherwise known as the 
Batman killings. 52 In such an act, Berardi found the "breaking of separation between 
spectacle and the real," (Berardi, 2015: p.1). Berardi questions whether the world (and its 
becoming) could be better understood through the lens of "this kind of horrible madness, 
rather than through the polite madness of economists and politicians” (Ibid, p.2). For 
Berardi the quest isn't to understand through standardized theory or structured debate, but 
rather through the anxieties and internal drives of the individuals who commit the acts. As 
such, he describes the subject of the book as "the establishment of a kingdom of nihilism 
and the suicidal drive that is permeating contemporary culture, together with a 
phenomenology of panic, aggression and resultant violence” (Ibid, p.2). The focus is not to 
be on serial killers, therefore, but those suffering who become criminals to "express their 
psychopathic need for publicity and also to find a suicidal exit from their present hell" 
(Ibid, p.3). Berardi’s approach turns the system on itself in an attempt to understand the 
interior effects of the system on the participant, and in turn the violent outward result. The 
result, this form of nihilistic, all-consuming capitalism, is one he dubs 
'semiocapitalism'. He describes semiocapitalism thus:  
 
                                                          
52 July 20th, 2012, 16 movie goers attending a screening of The Dark Knight Rises were shot by assailant, 
James Eagan Holmes, in Aurora, Colorado. Initially, many movie-goers thought Holmes was wearing a 
costume (as many other attendees were), imagining it to be a publicity stunt on the part of the studio or 
theatre. Ten victims died at the scene, with two more dying later in hospital. (Berardi, 2015: pp.1-2). 
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The sublimation of reality to the simulacra… the contemporary regime of 
production in which capital valorization is based on the constant emanation of 
information flows. 
 
(Ibid, p.24) 
 
Under semiocapitalism, information itself becomes a form of capital (as does 
misinformation). Data, whether as function or currency replaces the material (fuel and 
food), so value becomes increasingly more abstracted. 
 
Factoring in Goodchild’s understanding of the semiotic language of postmodern capitalist 
nihilism, where the social domain accounts for what can be communicated or symbolized 
(and the encompassing totality of the thinkable), then the sum of that which can be 
signified by as outweighed by that which is signified points to the alarming results that 
Berardi interrogates. If the last man is truly content, then the figure who sees through the 
mask of semiocapitalism (or alternately, fails to grasp the implications of semiocapitalism) 
will understandably struggle to see an alternative, particularly if history already aligns 
reason with piety. Passive nihilism might therefore not be a matter of laziness or unsound 
thinking on the part of the participant, but an anxiety propagated by the perceived 
inescapability of the semiocapitalist system.  
 
For Mark Fisher, the inescapable perceptions of capitalism produce an effect he refers to as 
capitalist realism, the sense that there is no sense of an alternative to capitalism as a viable 
political and economic system, capturing the anxieties and impossibilities of imagining 
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alternatives. He calls on work by Jameson and Zizek to note this, stating that for most of us, 
"it is easier to imagine the end of the world than it is to imagine the end of capitalism (2008: 
p.2). Much like Berardi, Fisher understands the anxieties of living within capitalism, and he 
understands that these anxieties need to be understood culturally (Ibid, p.3). He sees these 
anxieties largely resulting in a bi-polar oscillation: 
 
The 'weak messianic' hope that there must be something new on the way lapses into 
the morose conviction that nothing new can ever happen. The focus shifts from the 
Next Big Thing to the last big thing - how long ago did it happen and just how big 
was it? 
(Ibid, p.3) 
 
In arguing the concept of capitalist realism, Fisher recalls Baudrillardian concepts of 
'systems of equivalence', "which can assign all cultural objects, whether they are religious 
iconography, pornography or Das Kapital, a monetary value," where beliefs of past 
cultures are "'objectively ironized, transformed into artefacts. Capitalist realism is 
therefore not a particular type of realism; it is more like realism itself" (Ibid, pp.3-4). What 
results is the hyperreality of postmodernity, but rather than a strict system of semiotics, 
Fisher pushes for an understanding of capitalist realism being all-consuming. This 
understanding has similar implications to those of Berardi: theology repeats itself, but after 
the death of God theology is reborn as a godless entity. Capitalism takes the rituals and 
practices of religious systems but reimagines them in infinitely less tangible but more 
direct ways (as they impact on us now). For the last man, this endless hopelessness is 
reason enough for us to understand the malaise and futility of postmodern living. As he 
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goes on to say, "Capitalism is what is left when beliefs have collapsed at the level of ritual 
or symbolic elaboration, and all that is left is the consumer-spectator" (2008: pp.4-5). This 
consumer-spectator relationship can be understood as the cyclical response as highlighted 
in Baudrillard's Hypermarkets, understood as the want of consumption dictating 
interpretations of need, and abstracted forms of capital (the object of consumption, the 
monetary and/or emotional investment and trade), but capitalist realism presents itself as a 
shield against older orders and indeed against alternatives (in that it poses examples of 
lesser economically developed countries in its reasoning) (2008, p.4) What this leads to is a 
"desacralization of culture," that is a system no longer governed by transcendental law, but 
rather codes of practice that are pieced together on an ad-hoc basis. It can perpetually be 
recoded and rewritten based on the need and context (Ibid, p.6). In the consumer cycle as 
described in Baudrillard’s Hypermarkets essay, then supply creates demand and the things 
we crave are not needs (and even the needs are wants to an extent - we have choice). The 
cycle becomes not about the exchange of goods, materials or necessary abstracted value 
(protection, the promise of a hand in marriage), but an eternal base value in flux, which as 
a self-referential object must always take a value of nil. In a rhizomic system where value 
is always subjective information always gives rise to the source, and unique identifiers 
such as scarcity act in play with this; this clay vase will not be used to house flowers and 
water, but instead to stand in the corner of the room; these plates are for display only. We 
never eat off them.  
 
Under semiocapitalism there is only one rule to drive all others, and that is competition. 
The idea of competition driving all else may have a Nietzschean feel to it, and indeed it 
might even be the kind of last man Deleuze refers to when he mentions the type that can be 
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companion to Zarathustra, but competition comes with its own cost. Berardi describes debt 
as "a sort of metaphysical curse...", giving the example of students, where finance becomes 
debt, in turn becoming guilt and a form of submission (2015: p.27). We have to buy in to 
our own future, but to secure it requires us to trade freedom; it is a literal form of self-
enslavement.  
 
Recalling Deleuze work on Nietzsche, he finds within the death of god an intrinsic link 
between debt and fate. He says the following: 
 
Christ is said to have died for our sins! The creditor is said to have given his own 
son, to have repaid himself with his own son, so immense was the debtors debt. The 
father no longer kills his own son to make him independent, but for us, because of 
us. 
(Deleuze, 2009: p.145) 
 
Understood in Deleuzean terms, the idea of God (the creditor) allowing sin (debt) to exist 
within humanity creates a cycle of endless rebuttals, always falling short and refuted for 
this. He also notes (on the subject of culture) that "the relationship between men is 
determined, following the equation, as a relationship of a creditor and debtor: justice 
makes man responsible for debt" (Ibid, p.126). He sees this as a crude and basic function 
that can be traced back prior to pre-history. If we understand it as such, the development of 
the human relation to God is equal or equivalent to that of the basic human-human. As we 
have seen previously, Baudrillard would understand the act of exchange and giving in pre-
capitalist societies as times where content and material had intrinsic value, yet in this 
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Deleuze finds what may be the seed of our undoing for Nietzsche: the cycle of debt that 
births our understanding of the Christian God as humanity develops. This same 
development in postmodernity is one smart enough to override the failings of faith to 
science and reason and place the theological inside capital. Both faith and reality are 
subject to a type of finance capital exchange where the cyclical nature of debt can never be 
repaid. 53 
 
As Berardi notes, "Financial capitalism seems to be driven by a form of nihilism,” and as 
such, the idea of capital, debt and value ring clearer as theological instruments of the nihil 
(2015: p.86). He identifies the change as a shift from "constructive, hermeneutic nihilism" 
to a form of "annihilating nihilism" that actively produces nihil as it's effect (Ibid, p.88). 
He goes on to say "Annihilating nihilism is a peculiar phenomenon - the product of 
financial capitalism. In the sphere of financial capitalism, destroying concrete wealth is the 
easiest way to accumulate abstract value" (Ibid, p.88). 
 
Berardi uses the example of the credit default swap (CDS), a form of contract where the 
buyer of the CDS pays the seller and in exchange receives a form of pay-off "if an 
instrument - typically a bond or loan - goes into default (fails to pay)" (Ibid, pp.88-89). 
This can also (somewhat less commonly) include the restructuring or bankruptcy of a 
company, or the downgrading of a credit rating. If the above is done on the understanding 
that the value of money increases as things are annihilated, jobs, companies, cities, then 
                                                          
53 See also Zizek’s (2014: pp.42-45) belief that the shrinkage of salaries and removal of social provision is 
compensated by the current socio-political conditions reliance on consumer credit and the erosion of rights; 
that people no longer have a right to housing, higher education, etc, without the reliance of a loan and 
systems of debt. This in turn leads to a sense of responsibility as citizens for the country’s debt and the 
reliance on the neoliberal system to sustain the perceived advantages of the ‘luxuries’ we have been afforded. 
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financial profiteering of this kind is "essentially constructed upon a bet on the degradation 
of the world" (Ibid, p.89). It is a neoliberal, 'winner on top' form of competition, a savvy 
form of crime with suicide (i.e. the abandon killing of the structures of the global-self) at 
its core. 54 He notes that under industrial capitalism, "profits increased when citizens 
acquired enough money to buy the goods that were produced in factories. In the sphere of 
financial capitalism, financial indicators go up only if social welfare crumbles and salaries 
fall" (Ibid, p.92).  
 
3.3.b: Understanding the Inescapable Nature of Nihilism as Presented in Fisher’s 
Capitalist Realism 
 
Fisher identifies a futility with the term postmodern; it's hugely contested, with multiple 
multi-faceted nuanced meanings that are ever-shifting. Moreso, those terms that did have a 
degree of stability have become aggravated and undergone change (Fisher, 2008: p.7), like 
Berardi he identifies the beginning of a new post-postmodern. Based upon understanding 
the trouble with applying the term postmodernity, Fisher defines capitalist realism as 
follows: 
 
                                                          
54 The Routledge published For Business Ethics by Jones, Parker and Ten Bos definite neoliberalism: 
“Neoliberalism represents a set of ideas that caught on from the mid to late 1970s, and are famously 
associated with the economic policies introduced by Margaret Thatcher in the United Kingdom and Ronald 
Reagan in the United States following their elections in 1979 and 1981. The 'neo' part of neoliberalism 
indicates that there is something new about it, suggesting that it is an updated version of older ideas about 
'liberal economics' which has long argued that markets should be free from intervention by the state. In its 
simplest version, it reads: markets good, government bad” (2005: p.100). 
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1. In the 1980s when Jameson wrote, there were still (in name at least), political 
alternatives to capitalism (in Britain he sees the decline of socialism, the power of 
unions, and the demise of mining under bleak Thatcherism as a key event) 
2. Postmodernism involved a relationship to modernism - now (as capitalist realism) 
modernism can now return periodically, "but only as a frozen aesthetic style, never 
as an ideal for living"  
3. Post-fall of the Berlin Wall, capitalism has now absorbed any form of outside. 
Young people have never seen anything but. 
(Ibid, pp.7-8) 
 
What is more, under capitalist realism, capitalism is widely disseminated. Identifying 
examples by Zizek, he notes the "Hollywood villains as 'evil corporations", but Fisher sees 
this as feeding capitalist realism rather than challenging it (Ibid, p.12). He calls on Zizek's 
idea of "overvaluing belief" - the inner subjective attitude- "at the extent of the beliefs we 
exhibit and externalize in our behaviour” (Ibid, p.12). We talk about the meaninglessness of 
money, but act as if it has [in fishers words] "Holy value". Fisher cites Live Aid as such an 
example. He first notes that it is a kind of repetition of the protest movement of the 1960's, 
but is now part of the system that previous protests fought against. It is now the product of 
the opposition branded as counter-cultural in spirit but operating comfortably within the 
confines of acceptance that there is no alternative to capitalism. The fantasy, Fisher tells us, 
"being that western consumerism, far from being intrinsically implicated in systemic global 
inequalities, could itself solve them. All we have to do is buy the right products" (Ibid, p.15).  
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If the grip of religion is gradually slipping over the course of postmodernity, then it appears 
faith is only growing. The abstraction of faith from religion means that it is applied in new 
ways: branded, easily accessible and colourfully packaged for easy consumption. Even 
essential services of social order such as education and healthcare are now run like 
businesses. What was previously an aspect of the division between work and social (how 
healthcare and education are a necessity) are now ingrained within the cycles and flows of 
capitalism (2008: p.16). Capitalist realism relies on fantasy structures; climate change and 
the threat of resource depletion are no longer repressed but incorporated into advertising and 
marketing. These catastrophes become part of this system and in turn are folded back on 
themselves, much like countercultural movements mentioned above. Instead of a major 
concern they become causes championed by corporations, things they are tackling and will 
beat through the illusion of unlimited resources and a sheddable earth. Ibid, p.18) But as 
Fisher goes on to point out, "the relationship between capitalism and eco-disaster is neither 
coincidental nor accidental: capital's 'need of a constantly expanding market', its 'growth 
fetish' means that capitalism is by its very nature opposed to any notion of sustainability 
(Ibid, pp.18-19). 
 
Goodchild notes that the essence of capital’s power is due to it being external to the 
ecological order of nature and the social order of labour, “where a market is predicated on 
exchange between equals, there is no commensurability between land, labour and capital” 
(2002: p.36). As a result, finance capital has forcibly overtaken rights, liberty and piety. It 
exerts a type of control seen in fixed prices and labour assignment (Ibid, p.36). If 
capitalism exists beyond the ecological order, then the link between its abstraction and the 
direct impact on the earth loses urgency. If the semiotic order suggests that we are subject 
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to an ecological crisis, but the signs in place do little to factor the link between the 
abstraction of capitalism and the ecological, then it is no surprise either subject is rejected. 
The perception for the last man is capital acting as an accumulation of wealth, of the 
realisation of heaven on earth vs. the outdated idea of hard work, suffering and toil in 
exchange for eternal life.  
 
3.4 The Condition of the Last Man and the Dissolution of Self Through Semiocapitalism 
 
Despite the abstract nature of capital, there are arguably noticeable and direct impacts on 
those living within the system. Fisher notes the growth of mental health problems under 
capitalism, mapping out an argument for mental conditions to be viewed as political 
categories. (Fisher, 2008: p.19) Recalling work by Oliver James in his book The Selfish 
Capitalist, Fisher argues that the neoliberal mode of capitalism practiced in countries like 
Britain and the USA, need reframing. Depression is the most treated condition by the NHS, 
but rather than understand it as a global problem attached to capitalist culture and 
anxieties, we instead look at the individual. We understand it in terms of the illnesses of 
individuals, in turn letting people (increasingly large amounts of young people) deal with 
the situation through treatment rather than addressing the root of the problem (2008: p.19). 
55 This, for Fisher, is concrete evidence of the dysfunctional nature of capitalism, and the 
cost for capitalism to work is very high. He also notes bureaucracy as the other major 
phenomenon of his focus. Top-down bureaucracy, he notes, was supposed to have been 
made obsolete under neoliberalism; viewed as Stalinist and inefficient. Instead it has 
                                                          
55 Similar claims have been made by psychologist David Smail, whose The Origins of Unhappiness argues 
that emotional and psychological distress often finds origin in the social and environmental powers that lie 
beyond our direct experiences.  
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decentralized into fractured forms lacking clear cohesion between models within its 
structure (Ibid, p.19). This in turn evidences that capitalism operates in ways much 
different to those indicated by capitalist realism.  
 
As anthropological evolution, contemporary capitalism is understood by Berardi as "the 
turning point beyond the age of Humanism" (2015: p.89). Semiocapitalism has taken the 
place of industrial capitalism. Berardi further identifies Semiocapitalism as a definition for 
the current global economic system; the political aspect of transformation stemming from 
neoliberal deregulation he calls capitalist absolutism. It becomes a type of death drive, 
pushing towards suicide by corporations and power bodies, both of which ignore the global 
catastrophic risk (ecological crises, the threat of nuclear war) as if its existence is enough 
to invalidate all-else. The omnipresent financial clutch of capitalism claims a mantle of 
omnipotency; in ignoring or rejecting greater issues of existential risk (or by corporations 
'doing their bit'), risk becomes devalued and removed from the shared hallucination of 
reality. What we are left with is a system of absolute capitalism "in which the only 
effective principles are those of value-accumulation, profit-growth and economic 
competition. These are all-encompassing priorities, and the over-whelming impetus at its 
core," (Ibid, p.91).  
 
For Berardi, this is obliterating the humanist tradition (which was based on the idea that 
human destiny is not subjected to any theological law or necessity), but this accumulation 
of wealth becomes theological not because it regulates through force, but because it 
abstracts what was quantifiable and makes the accumulation of the abstract form of power 
(i.e. wealth, value) the driving force. He also notes that rather than creating a cyber-utopia, 
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the dawn of mainstream internet culture has instead led to greater alienation, and the global 
connection for categorisation based on interest and belief becomes stronger; a town 
containing a singular custard cream fanatic can now interact with other one-fan towns 
(Ibid, pp.116-118). Alienation no longer wears a mask of the outcast or loner; the outcast 
and loner are now unified and able to call exclusivity to their club, with information only 
accessible to the esoterist with similar interest. Perhaps the same esoterist that would be of 
a disposition to read the work of Nietzsche himself. When we couple this with the 
widespread of untapped raw (and deeply edited/spun) information, it is hard to know where 
to draw the line or search for facts, hence a tendency for people to 'read what they know'. 56 
The information that bends the world in favour of a safe form of thinking that aligns with 
the safest subjective belief of least anxiety. 
 
Berardi identifies a theory of desensitization that leads to a pathology of empathy, 
"precariousness as fragmentation of the social body, self-perception and time," (Ibid, p.49). 
The development of technology has birthed the first generation where children are learning 
more from machines than their parents. He sees a "disassociation of language learning 
from the bodily affective experience; the second is the virtualization of the experience of 
the other" (Ibid, p.48). The removal of face-to-face interaction leads to a type of alienation 
based on interactions that amount to less than human; the nurturing associated with growth 
replaced by machines and software. 57 Despite this, or perhaps because of this, validation 
                                                          
56 In Respecting Truth Lee McIntyre outlines the psychological phenomena of ‘confirmation bias’, where we 
literally “seek out information that confirms our preconceptions,” and ‘hindsight bias’, “where we rely on 
current knowledge to assume that something was predictable all-along”, espousing both as common-place 
phenomena (2015: pp.11-15). 
57 A 2010 study on addictive behaviour and depression in online gaming by the Department of Clinical, 
Biological and Differentiated Psychology at the University of Vienna indicated that many players of 
MMORPG’s (Massively Multiple Online Roleplay Games) such as World of Warcraft were more likely to 
present with problematic gaming behaviour, depression and low self-esteem. Many pointed to real-life 
problems as a motivator to find a form of escapism (Computers in Human Behavior 27, 2011: pp.473-479).  
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appears to be sought through new forms of media and technology: Facebook, YouTube, 
reality television and the drive for fame. He questions whether serial murder and public 
atrocity is a form of this – he points to one example of Klebold and Harris, the Columbine 
murderers, arguing over who would direct the movie of the massacre. For many of the 
mass-murderers outlined in his book there is an over-arching need for validation, mostly 
voiced in the form of manifestos found posthumously. The mass-murderer, it would seem, 
often believes in a form of social-Darwinism where they see themselves as smarter than 
those that have marginalized them, viewing themselves as an outsider from society (Ibid 
pp.34-35). Their actions are more than a cry for help, they are the culmination of the event 
of being, often understood as some last-ditch effort to overcome all there is by exacting 
revenge on the 'stronger' beings that drove them to alter the balance of power they 
understand themselves within. The irony is, of course, that this form of social Darwinism 
itself is a form of passive nihilism and an embrace of the pseudo-religious - worshipping at 
an altar of the (most probably) powerful white male, of which the adherent may believe of 
themselves or understand as an attainable reality.  
 
In understanding the actions of mass-murders like Klebold and Harris, Berardi identifies 
"psychology as a suicidal form of the neoliberal will to win" (2015, p.51) There are, we are 
told, only winners and losers. The mass murderer knows he is not the strongest or smartest. 
so he opts to retaliate in the most futile way - death and destruction of others and then 
himself. There is nowhere for him to go after that. Diagnosed as suffering from 
Alexithymia - an inability to recognise one’s own feelings and emotions, he would spend 
up to 16 hours per day playing online games such as World of Warcraft (partly as a form of 
raising propaganda through avatars). Berardi believes "extended exposure to the virtual 
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flow is one of the most important causes of the current psycho-cognitive mutation." But 
also that psychic suffering (loneliness, angst, depression) precedes any such circumstantial 
factors (Ibid, p.116). Is this loneliness part of the condition of the last man?  
 
Unlike Breivik, who felt feminized by the lack of dominant and disciplining male figure in 
his life (which in turn led to the savage murder of over 70 people as an act of political 
terrorism), Nietzsche felt let down by the dominant male figures. 58 Rather than call for a 
societal link between the two in a political sense, like Anders, Nietzsche instead folds this 
thought into a form of intra-political thinking - One must become the hardened shell of 
oneself in order to create and maintain a form of patriarchal figure that is infallible and 
invulnerable to external threat (but not external stimuli - for an ubermensch must always be 
thinking and considering). 59 The desocialization of both men acts to make their interacting 
with others difficult; Nietzsche's own struggles to make what he considers true friends are 
reflected in Zarathustra's realisation that his followers will never be ubermensch, yet he 
drinks, eats and rejoices with them anyway (Nietzsche, 2003: pp.322-334). However, 
under Berardi's vision of semiocapitalism, the true cost is not announced in any visible or 
tangible sense, rather it is as abstract as semiocapitalism itself. 
 
Berardi believes that the true cost of life under semiocapitalism is the exploitation of neural 
energy. As he goes on to say - 
 
                                                          
58 See Cybulska’s (2015) Nietzsche’s Ubermensch: A Glance Behind the Mask of Hardness for further 
reading on Nietzsche and his soured relationship with male figures and role models.  
59 In Untimely Meditations Nietzsche uses both ‘femninization’ and ‘infantization’ as negative traits in 
relation to the development of simplified understandings of science for the general public (1997, p.99) 
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Attention is under siege, both in the space of production and that of consumption. 
Attention implies a constant investment of nervous energy, and this is much more 
difficult to manage and is much more unpredictable than the muscular effort of 
workers on the assembly line 
(Berardi, 2015: p.138) 
 
The idea of the last man as content with materials and trinkets, living a self-obsessed 
lifestyle where one is held in high self-regard whilst succumbing to a slow yet inevitable 
death is best understood when we view it in light of this. Studies by Microsoft on human 
attention span in the digital age have shown a reduction of around 4 seconds over the 
course of thirteen years, from 12 seconds in 2009 to 8 in 2013 (Ibid, p.6). With attention 
spans reducing and our adoption of a technologically induced multi-functional approach to 
living, the concept of the last man increasingly probable. Even if we are to take Nietzsche's 
words with a pinch of salt, there is evidence to suggest that technology is drastically 
altering our behaviour. The resulting impact of capitalism and technology on our being, we 
are told by Berardi, is what he terms bio-semiocapitalism. It is recognised through the 
erosion of sleep (and our attempts to combat it through drugs, stimulants and scientific 
experimentation) and the increase in suicide as the result of inescapable worldly anxiety 
(Berardi, 2015: pp.164-165). As the workplace increasingly places demand on our 
attention in new ways (working from home, working late, meetings out of hours), 
solidarity among workers is eroded through the emphasis on competition. The forcing of 
workers to compete in a 'meritocracy', based upon skill sets and competencies, pits each 
worker against the next. The strategy of the company, Berardi tells us, "is to make people 
so stressed that they lose every autonomy, any sense of solidarity, thus becoming totally 
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dependent on the automatisms of exploitation" (Ibid, p.171). If we are to agree with 
Berardi, then between the rise in the technological urgency to operate on multiple levels at 
any given time and the semiocaptalistic emphasis on absorbing all being into a grand 
unifying mechanism, there is a definite theology to semiocapitalism (it is the only answer 
and way), and the last man has welcomed it through seeing no other alternative. Instead, he 
just wallows in the illusion of meaning through conditioning and distraction. 
 
3.5: Berardi and Fisher’s Responses to Semiocapitalism and Capitalist Realism 
 
If we are to combat the effects of semiocapitalism, then for Berardi we must do so by 
embracing an increased research and understanding of neuro-plasticity in order to 
understand brain activity whilst "wiring of the collective brain will be the main task of 
technology," whilst choosing between a form of "'ultimate neuro-totalitarianism or a new 
form of trans-human Humanism" (2016: pp.204-205). In order to overcome 
semiocapitalism, Berardi's suggestion is embracing the change capitalism and technology 
have afforded us and turning it back on itself. If we are to understand this in Nietzschean 
terms, then we must ask whether transhumanism would be our solution to the nihilism (and 
the birth of the ubermensch), or whether it would simply be another case of Berardi's 
counter-cultural heroes acting without a shred of irony. 
 
Fisher (2008, p.20) stresses many of the same concerns, but opts for a more prevalent case 
study. Whereas Berardi chose to focus on the effects of capitalism on mental health (and 
the alienation and anxiety that birth the mass-murderer), Fisher's focus is in part on the 
mental health of the young. He refers to the phrase 'reflexive importance' - knowing 
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something is bad but being unable to do anything about it [young people]. Young people 
are increasingly ill and damaged by mental health problems, but problems are privatized; 
classed as chemical imbalances or familial/personal background problems. Social systemic 
causes are ruled out (Ibid, p.21). He tells us "to be bored simply means to be removed from 
the communicative sensation-stimulus matrix of texting, YouTube and fast food; to be 
denied, for a moment, the constant flow of sugary gratification on demand" (Ibid, p.24). 60 
The desire is for easily consumable, quick-fix solutions to problems; information bitesize 
form ready to be digested as bullet-point factoid, even for that which it does not apply 
(dense technical content, etc). There is a cycle of debt at work that is larger than that of the 
merely educational: with few options available to the young, continuing in the educational 
system provides stability for longer; the option of a poorly paid job with little room for 
progression can be ignored for greater time by remaining in education; should the person 
continue on to study beyond this the job of course never goes away, but the debt accrued 
increases. There is capital attached to education in the form of student loans, but also to the 
'value' of being educated, even when the reality is that for many graduates there is little to 
differentiate their societal value from that of their sixteen year old counterpart. Jobs that as 
little as ten years ago were available for school and college leavers now require a degree 
even for consideration. The bar has been raised in terms of personal expectation the part of 
the worker, yet the rewards are the same (if not lower). (Ibid, p,26). Fisher relates this to 
Deleuze concept of Control societies (those based on debt rather than enclosure), but as 
Fisher points out, the current educational system both indebts and encloses students (Ibid, 
p.26). As we can see, this cycle of debt is much the same as that identified by Berardi 
                                                          
60 French philosopher of science, Michel Serres’ essay on youth, culture and technology, Thumbelina, points 
to both the prevalence of advertising in the lives of millennial youth alongside the stimulation of different 
sets of neurons via the digital vs. face-to-face interactions (2015: pp.5-8).  
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earlier, and falls in line with both Deleuzean and Nietzschean interpretations of debt as a 
motor for faith.  
 
Where Fisher differs from Berardi is his attempt to understand the positives of capitalism 
as espoused by neoliberalism. Where neoliberalism might embrace capitalism to push for a 
logical conclusion to the system (and indeed, perhaps Land is still attempting to invoke the 
apocalypse from his beyond his days as a prophet of cybernihilist doom), Fisher sees 
simply repetition. He notes that Badiou and Harvey argue that neoliberal politics are not 
about pushing for a new but instead a 'restoration'. They are a return of class power and 
privilege (Ibid, pp.28-29), for this reason Harvey defines neoliberalism now as "a political 
project to re-establish the conditions for capital accumulation and to restore the power of 
economic elites" (Ibid p.29). Recalling work by McCauley (and later Sennett), Fisher 
points to the new requirements under decentralization; workers no longer acquire a skillset 
that enables them to progress through an institutional hierarchy, rather they must now 
reskill and move laterally. Flexibility becomes the new premium for workers (Ibid, pp.30-
32). In turn this leads to an intermingling of work and life, ingraining capital in every 
activity. The linearity of time is broken and nervous systems are restructured along with 
production and distribution. We increasingly work from home or hold digital conferences 
across international borders, working in the hours we should be sleeping, dreaming in 
office lingo, business acronyms and the relentless siren of telephones. Work becomes a 
spectre that haunts our sleep. 
 
What is perhaps most important to note in Fisher's argument is his synthesis of capitalism 
and mental health as a predicate. He uses work by Deleuze and Guattari and Marazzi to 
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explore this, and states "schizophrenia is the condition marking the outer edges of 
capitalism, then bi-polar disorder is the mental illness proper to the 'interior' of capitalism" 
(Ibid, p.31). A form of capitalism is present that enforces ideas of material affluence 
(something we can all achieve in fantasy) as the key to winning and gaining fulfilment, 
available to anyone who works hard enough (Ibid, p.36). An inability to achieve feeds into 
a sense of failure and worthlessness based on a false presumption, but one that we are 
increasingly (and openly) aware of, only we believe in no alternative. We have, as passive 
nihilists, committed ourselves to our only hope being that we know there is no movement. 
Instead we take comfort in that knowing, albeit a sick kind of comfort that leads to the 
malaise and angst that often prefigure psychological events that impact on our well-being. 
The cycle of debt deepens because we can never achieve but can only keep trying. 61 
  
The last man is a microscopic looping in an even denser landscape than before. Time 
accelerates with the advent of new technologies, we become increasingly self-aware of our 
trappings, and looping intensifies. Even our attempts to cure our ailments and anxieties are 
met with the capitalist response of pharmaceuticals, self-help guides and signifiers that 
order us to deepen our commitment to the cycle - we can only be redeemed by 
strengthening our bond with the only form of other we are offered.  
 
                                                          
61 In 2000, former Consultant Psychologist and Nietzsche scholar Dr, Eva Cybulska published a paper in the 
journal Hospital Medicine that provided ground-breaking insight in Nietzschean scholarship. Shifting an 
emphasis from Nietzsche’s psychosis and eventual demise being a side-effect of syphilis, Cybulska proposed 
that Friedrich Nietzsche suffered from a condition far better understood today – bipolar affective disorder. It 
was a bold claim based on years of experience within the health industry, and one that makes sense in light of 
his own confessional writings and diaries. (Cybulska, 2000). It is due to this study and the impact that we 
emphasise the need to understand Nietzsche historically and contextually.  
 
104 
 
Fisher's conclusion is that in order to move beyond capitalism we must embrace the 
thinking of the left. He believes that the key to escaping capitalist realism is a 
reorganisation of the state to the general will, which requires us "resuscitating the very 
concept of a general will, reviving - and modernizing - the idea of a public space that is not 
reducible to an aggregation of individuals and their interests" (Ibid, p.77). In order to 
combat capitalist realism we must, much like Berardi, turn the system back on itself be 
embracing a new form of valuation that stems from capitalism itself. 
 
3.6: Chapter Summary & Conclusion 
 
As a contented figure under capitalism, the last man is perhaps the ultimate repetition of 
the village atheist, reacting with ignorance and gluttony and finding pleasures in a post-
theological society. With a shift in the way we perceive nihilism we have also discovered 
movement in the way we must perceive the world. Much like nihilism, capitalism has 
seeped into the cracks and fabric of the socio-political sphere in ways previously reserved 
for God, particularly as evidenced by Goodchild. With the global structure of capitalism 
acting as a repetition of theology, we find ourselves in what Nietzsche would deem an 
impasse. The repetitions of passive nihilism at work in contemporary society lead to a kind 
of mutant nihilism where the intentions of theology and of ultimate questions and answers 
are replaced by a system of capital and consumption. Our understanding of nihilism, as 
(bio/techno)semiocapitalism, finds value only in the concepts of credit and the amassing of 
symbolic wealth, and the idea of salvation is lost in favour of the development of the here 
and now.  
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Understanding the last man in both semiocapitalism and capitalist realism, however, opens 
further avenues of exploration, and should we embrace the political aspects of both Fisher 
and Berardi, we have grounds to formulate ideas of what an ubermensch could be. The 
most problematic area that arises is the literal historicity of capital as ingrained in thought, 
and when we factor this alongside the despair and anxiety evidenced in our argument, we 
can understand that the literal barrage of (mis)information and the separation of thought, 
capital and ecology from an understanding of truth (where truth acts as shifting and short-
term solutions that benefit capital), acknowledging the capacity for the last man, or indeed 
humans, to find grounds for escaping nihilism is problematic. 
 
In order to become ubermensch and to possess the qualities of the active nihilist needed to 
do so, we must also embrace Nietzsche's belief in an (un)natural order of things, a 
hierarchy that is less than present in the socialist and communist leanings of Fisher and 
Berardi. If the inescapability of capitalism is itself the biggest threat for ubermensch, then 
we must realise ubermensch as a post-political figure, a figure envisioned as trans-
Nietzschean. In order to do so we will now consider the concept of ubermensch as 
something to be situated outside the embrace of capitalism, by thinking beyond the 
Nietzschean. As capitalism offers a kind of false-identity and another form of theology that 
is now inherent in our very being, in order to escape it we must think outside the box. We 
will do this by speculating on Berardi's suggestion of the embrace of the transhuman in the 
final chapter.  
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CHAPTER 4: AN INTERROGATION OF UBERMENSCH AS THE 
TRANSHUMAN AND ARTICIAL INTELLIGENCE 
 
If the inescapable nature of nihilistic repetition found in capitalism stunts all progress, then 
we must return to the idea of thinking trans-Nietzsche in order to solve our problem. If 
ubermensch is to be realised within our 200 year timeframe, then we must reimagine 
ubermensch as something truly beyond, as being capable of operating external to the 
demands of the enveloping bio-semiocapitalism.  In this chapter we will untangle the 
threads of the ubermensch and transhumanism argument, showing that whilst 
transhumanism and ubermensch is incompatible, ubermensch as superintelligent AI is not. 
We first look at the transhuman condition as understood in the present. Taking cues from 
Keith Ansell-Pearson, we will show that links between the transhuman ideal and 
ubermensch viewed by key Nietzschean scholars such as Sorgner and Loeb are disparate at 
best, and that if we are to reach a new contemporary understanding of how ubermensch 
could be realised, we must reject ideas of the transhuman as ubermensch. This is however 
not to say we should reject ideas of the transhuman itself. Next we will explore idea of 
ubermensch by casting an eye towards primary drives, interrogating both the will to power 
and the eternal return, concepts that have fallen out of favour with Nietzschean scholars 
particularly where ubermensch is concerned, but which Nietzsche claims central to the 
development of ubermensch. Here we engage with Nietzsche’s primary drives for 
ubermensch rather than merely ruminating on the possible end results. We then filter this 
through Kroker’s understanding of the will to technology. Finally, we will turn to the 
concept of AI superintelligence, as outlined by Nick Bostrom, and show that a potential 
superintelligence could account for a valid and realistic envisioning of ubermensch in 
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contemporary times via the ability to find difference in repetition through AI’s proposed 
abilities of advanced problem solving, crystalline information storage and a willing based 
entirely on a mode of digital thought exterior to the nihilism of semiocapitalism. 
 
4.1: Interrogating the Roots of Transhumanism and the Links to Nietzsche 
 
We now understand the western world as one strangled by capitalism, and as undeniably 
difficult to escape. If we are to find a way to develop ubermensch at the end of Nietzsche’s 
proposed 200 years of nihilism then we must proceed carefully. Through our readings of 
Berardi’s call for transhuman consideration and the postmodern thinker’s engagement with 
technology, we understand the need to interrogate the human connection to technology. In 
recent years the astronomical growth in technological capability has impacted on the ways 
we think about the future. Ideas previously reserved for science fiction and wishful 
thinking are now a reality; from space flight to pocket computers to the equally 
controversial Orwellian surveillance state. We can in no small way attribute some of these 
developments to fantastical concepts of the past, and it looks ever more likely that 
technological speculation will open more minds to ideas that might one day become 
reality. Developments in the recently established field of transhumanism are at the 
forefront of technological conversations, with the possibilities of life extension and brain 
expansion being hotly debated topics in both the private and public spheres. 62 Debates on 
                                                          
62 For religious studies and transhumanism see C. Mercer & T. Trothen (eds.) Religion and Transhumanism: 
The Unknown Future of Human Enchancement; R. Cole-Turner (ed.) Transhumanism and Transcendence: 
Christian Hope in an Age of Technological Enchancement (2011, Georgetown University Press; USA). G.R. 
Hansell & W. Grassie (eds.) H+/- Transhumanism and Its Critics provides both arguments for and against 
embracing transhumanism from philosophers, biologists, futurists, academics and psychologists. See also M. 
More & N. Vita-More (eds.) The Transhumanist Reader: Classical and Contemporary Essays on the Science, 
Technology and Philosophy of the future; H. Tirosh-Samuelson & K.L. Mossman (eds.) Building Better 
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transhumanism have also filtered into Nietzschean philosophy, with some comparing 
ubermensch to the transhumanist ideal.  
Nick Bostrom, a transhumanist philosopher and Director of both the Future of Humanity 
Institute and the Strategic Artificial Intelligence Research Centre, defines transhumanism 
thus:  
Transhumanism is a loosely defined movement that has developed gradually over 
the past two decades. It promotes an interdisciplinary approach to understanding 
and evaluating the opportunities for enhancing the human condition and the human 
organism opened up by the advancement of technology. 
(Bostrom, 2005: p3) 63 
 
In recent years theories of evolution and the transhuman have converged, with claims that 
the next logical evolutionary step is the development of technology as an inevitable and 
vital and intrinsic of human growth. Some thinkers such as Stefan Lorenz Sorgner have 
linked the idea of the transhuman with the development of the Nietzschean ubermensch, 
                                                          
Humans? Refocussing the Debate on Transhumanism for further priming from interdisciplinary and 
multidisciplinary discussion. In politics, American journalist and transhumanist, Zoltan Istvan ran for U.S. 
President with his own Transhumanist Party in order to raise awareness of the transhumanist movement. The 
United Kingdom has its own Transhumanist Party at www.transhumanistparty.org.uk. Medical advancements 
have led to public debate in transhumanism, particularly with the rise of advanced mechanical and 
oseointegrated prosthetics (See the work of prosthetics company Bebionic, the BBC's profiling of James 
Young and his advanced cyborg arm in Bodyhack: Metal Gear Man). In popular culture, recent films such as 
Ex Machina (2015), Her (2013), Limitless (2011), and television shows such as Black Mirror (2011-Present), 
and Humans (2015-Present) all focus heavily on transhumanist themes. Media sites such as Vice 
(www.vice.com) have taken an interest, launching their own sister site, Motherboard 
(www.motherboard.com) to cover technology and transhumanism, Zoltan Istvan's own The Transhumanist 
Philosopher for Psychology Today,  
63 The term transhumanism was coined by Julian Huxley in 1957, in his book New Bottles for New Wine. 
Huxley believed in the development of human potential in order to create a new form of society opposing 
welfare society, power society, and so forth. His understanding was of a society where humanity would be 
able to transcend itself whilst retaining the integral facets of the human – a ‘wider perspective’ and 
knowledge, if you like (Huxley, 1957).  
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leading to an intense debate across multiple disciplines and platforms. Sorgner, initially 
writing in the Journal of Evolution and Technology (Vol. 20, issue 1), produced an article 
entitled ‘Nietzsche, the Overhuman and Transhumanism’, where he linked significance of 
similarity between transhumanist concepts and those of ubermensch. The response was 
such that the following issue of the journal was dedicated solely to responses to Sorgner’s 
paper. Sorgner argues for an exchange between previously disparate discourses and 
traditions; the Nietzschean tradition, steeped in continental philosophical thought, and the 
transhumanist reflections that tend towards analytical ethical exchanges and evolutionary 
theory (Sorgner, 2011: p.1). He points to Max More, a leading transhumanist thinker who 
himself stresses that he was influenced by Nietzsche (Ibid, pp.2-3). We act in agreement 
with Sorgner, and indeed find that such transdisciplinary approaches favour not only the 
task at hand but act in both the tradition of Nietzsche himself and in the work of Deleuze. 
However, we are not in agreement with Sorgner’s positioning of the ubermensch as the 
transhuman, for reasons that will be outlined below. 
As Babich remarks in her rebuttal of Sorgner, there are fantastical elements of speculative 
and science fiction entangled within the arguments for transhumanism. With transhuman 
declarations come reconstituted narratives; talk of the end of the human era is itself as 
much a fiction as any other theory at this point, such are the parameters level at us by 
current technological limitations (Babich, 2012: p.6). 64 In these modes of thinking we find 
examples of a passive nihilism, where dreams of an ultimate are realised in the 
enhancement of the human. For Sorgner, many key figures in the transhumanist movement 
                                                          
64 Babich calls on the phrase “it can repeatedly be claimed that everything will be perfect after the 
revolution,” to illustrate the failings of the kinds of wishful thinking she sees in transhumanism. She points 
she points to Marx failure to locate in industrial England and Germany, but comes to fruition in Russia and 
China as a disaster that is indistinguishable from a capitalist regime. The revolution is fantastical. (2012: 
p.15). 
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reject the link between Nietzsche and the transhuman. He points to Bostrom, whose work 
largely encompasses issues of the transhuman, artificial intelligence and existential risk, 
the link is little more than surface level similarity (Bostrom, 2005a: p.4). However, for 
Sorgner the transhuman view of human nature as a ‘work-in-progress’ (phrase ascribed to 
Bostrom, 2005b: p.1) bears striking similarity to Nietzsche’s own view. Sorgner draws on 
concepts of the will-to-power as ‘power quantums’ in Nietzsche’s work, otherwise referred 
to as ‘power constellations’ (Sorgner, 2009: p.3).  
 
Like Babich, Bostrom, et al, Ansell-Pearson also thinks that Nietzsche's ubermensch has 
been widely misunderstood, instead standing in contrast to notions of the posthuman, 
which often concern themselves with ideas of transcendence that act as a repetition of the 
theological (and if capitalism enfolds technology then we truly become the capital itself). It 
is widely debated as to whether ubermensch factor into arguments for transhumanism and 
in the years since the publication of Ansell-Pearson’s Viroid Life, technology has advanced 
at a phenomenal rate. However, Ansell-Pearson’s perspective on the ideas of both 
ubermensch and the transhuman warrant some detailing as his argument still holds true. 65 
Ansell-Pearson believes that the advances of technology and capital have made the 
posthuman scenario both plausible and seductive, which in turn means we must question 
and resist techno-utopic ideas based upon a need for us to understand where we are going, 
rather than blindly leaping in (Ibid, p.2). Ansell-Pearson's work was some of the earliest to 
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focus on both the Will to Power and the Eternal Return as vital processes for ubermensch, 
rather than a focus on both formers to avoid the latter. 
 
Ansell-Pearson's critique of the transhuman condition is weighted on postmodernity's 
transformation of the concept into an ascetic ideal, a fantastical Christian vision (Ibid, 
p.33) and as such we may understand it as the counterpart to our discoveries in the 
previous chapter: namely the appropriation of capital as an analogue for Christianity, a 
fracturing of progress and itself another repetition of the same historical theme. Much like 
Babich, et al, who have rejected the fantastical link between ubermensch and the 
transhuman, Ansell-Pearson believes we need to go deeper than mere transhuman 
advancement. For Sorgner, however, it seems that in his reading both Nietzsche and 
transhumanists have an outlook that diverges from Christian values, both active Christian 
thought and that which is inherited. (Sorgner, 2009: p.32). We reject Sorgner’s claims on 
grounds of village atheism; whilst the outward values of Christianity are rejected in 
transhumanism, in our understanding we see the repetitions of salvation narratives, where 
the transhuman replaces the human and capitalism provides an earthly salvation vs. a 
transcendent one.  
For Sorgner, one of the crucial factors for those engaging with both the transhumanist 
movement and Nietzschean scholarship is the logical progression from a will to power is a 
will to enhancement (Ibid, p.33). We find two main issues here: first, a will to 
enhancement as “enhancement for all” would be less a global movement in transhumanism 
as it would humanism. Babich notes this perpetuation of the status quo as a sign of the 
evolution of the human, where enhancement acts to better the condition of the human 
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rather than transcend the totality of it. She points to Leibniz statement "such a broad 
extension would lead to a society not of "enhanced" but and much rather of levelled or 
flattened out humanity” (Babich, 2012: 22). Second, a will to enhancement understood in 
Sorgner’s terms prioritises aspects of the human, where willing becomes a considered 
action. Whilst the desire to be something greater might be an innate condition, the active 
association of thought and willing adds an anthropocentric quality to ubermensch, which 
itself suggests a largely humanist approach. As Safranski notes, the proclivity for 
enhancement is peculiar to man. To preserve leads to demise, but to enhance ensures 
preservation (Safranski, 2002: p.282). In enhancement we note a becoming through 
trajectory, which despite altering the lineation of the human, is the delineation of the 
human. The very fact that we can ascribe trajectory through enhancement shows that to 
view the human as a static being would be to do it an injustice. Whilst we could argue for 
an understanding of the human based on genotype, to understand the human and its 
potential wouldn't be to look at the genetic markings of the human (beyond an 
acknowledgement of them constituting the capacities for existence through heartbeat, 
blood flow, breathing, Will, consciousness, etc), but rather the social capacity that acts as 
that which transcends the operational levels of other animals. The rational agent exists and 
continues to do so by means of its own enhancement through adaptive and considered 
means. Considered such, it is a natural successor to biological evolution as the conditions 
are now less about surviving the trials thrown at us by nature, and more about navigating 
worlds of semiocapitalism and hyperreality.  
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4.2 The Will to Power vs. Evolutionary Theory in the Development of the Transhuman 
and Ubermensch 
As shown in Safranski’s Nietzsche A Philosophical Biography (2002: pp261-263), at the 
time of writing TZS, Nietzsche would have been surrounded by the widespread trend of 
Darwinian evolution, and although he would personally reject Darwin, he did not reject 
evolution as a concept. 66 The devaluation of the human to be part of the animal kingdom, 
an ascension from 'the ape', however could be considered problematic when casting an eye 
to the future, particularly in light of the development of social, rational creatures with the 
capacity to actively participate in the ways in which they grow. Nietzsche himself wrote:  
 
The error of the Darwinist school has become a problem for me: how can one be so 
blind as to fail to see clearly here? … That the species represent progress is the 
most unreasonable assertion in the world. 
(Nietzsche, 2003: 258) 
 
In fact, Nietzsche dismisses parts of the rise of scientific understanding based upon 
interpretations of the world as an organism, an idea which he hastily moves away from due 
to its closeness to a spiritual understanding of things (Safranski, 2003: p. 226). 67  
 
It is Ansell-Pearson’s belief that Nietzsche’s understanding of natural selection is flawed, 
                                                          
66 Sorgner also notes this. In his view, Nietzsche ‘very often is most critical of thinkers who are closest to his 
own understanding of things (Sorgner, 2009: 30). Nietzsche’s own attacks on evolutionary theory were as 
much about strengthening his own arguments than picking apart those of others, and clearly, there was a 
great degree of respect for Darwin. 
67 In A Companion to Friedrich Nietzsche: Life and Works (2012: p.179). Keith Ansell-Pearson points out 
that for Nietzsche there may still be some semblance of the concept of 'truth' in evolution when viewed 
through a Darwinian lens, with Nietzsche taking “'Truth' to denote an conditional power”. 
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namely in a common misunderstanding of the concept of ‘survival of the fittest’. As he 
says:  
 
…the term natural selection is something of a misnomer since nature does not at all 
select; rather, it operates as an arbitrary force of extermination, resulting in the 
differential loss of differently constituted individuals. Nature does not so much 
select the fittest as exterminate the ill-fitted, adapting forms of life to the 
environment slowly and imperceptibly in an entirely mechanistic, algorithmic 
fashion. 
 
(1997: pp.127-189) 
 
Darwin's approach to natural selection relies on a process by which “adaptive traits are 
produced initially independent of their potential for usefulness in adaptation' (what we now 
call 'exaptation'” (Ibid, p,88). He understands Nietzsche's reading as one that “is conceived 
as a largely negative feedback mechanism that encourages the physiologically weak and 
ill-constituted to gather together in herds in order to maximize their opportunities for self-
preservation.” (Ibid, p.88). As such, the concept of 'survival of the fittest' may better be 
understood as 'survival of the best fit'. It would not be the fittest in a physical or mental 
sense, but rather those which had gained the most beneficial adaptation for the given 
circumstance. Evolution through natural selection (if we place the emphasis on 
preservation), is one based on species and environment. This would place Nietzsche’s 
reading of a type of species-pooled resource in opposition; evolution for Nietzsche would 
be the result of an active struggle on the part of the lesser being to better itself through 
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mutual aid.  
Ansell-Pearson challenges notions of evolution entering a bio-technological phase, where 
both biology and technology intermingle to great effect in the creation of our future. He 
reads this idea as quasi-Heideggerian ('only machines can save us') and believes these 
concepts rest on a largely anthropocentric idea; a "straightforwardly linear and 
perfectionist model of evolution." (1997: p.2). 68 He takes issue at what he identifies as the 
'ultimate Platonic fantasy', where cyberspace has replaced Christianity as the fulfilling role 
of Platonism for the people" (Ibid, p.2). He does however, as we shall see later in this 
chapter, adopt a line of thinking that conglomerates the biological and technological into 
components of one and the same.  
 
In the thinking of transhuman proponents such as inventor Ray Kurzweil and politician 
Zoltan Istvan, we find ideas of a singularity or 'event' that leads to a harmonious 
integration of technology and consciousness; a kind of utopian promised land. 69  Ansell-
Pearson is wary of such concepts. They in turn leads to a cancellation of the truly 
transhuman by defining evolution. As he states: 
 
                                                          
68 He is critical of Heidegger, saying “[of Heidegger's] thesis that in order for the 'truth' of technology to be 
revealed it is necessary that mankind finds its way back to the full breadth of the space that is proper to its 
essence (Wesensraum) would appear to underestimate massively the extent of technology's invention of the 
human animal and the nature and extent of its invenstment in mankind."  (Ansell-Pearson, 1997: p.153) 
69 Ray Kurzweil’s famous prediction of ‘the singularity’ is rejected on grounds similar to those that Tirosh-
Samuelson and others have noted; it is a very eschatological vision (2011: pp.42-43). For these reasons we 
will be sidestepping engagement with the concept. We will however be engaging with the concept of 
advanced AI in the next chapter as a separate entity removed from the (trans)human. 
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a new theology of capital emerges to cavalierly justify and legitimize the inanities 
of the commodified postmodern present, a legitimization which rests on the vicious 
return of outmoded grand narratives, and there is a complete lack of any 
appreciation of what it is that has made, and continues to make, the human such an 
interesting animal, an animal and a machine still in need of revaluation and 
transvaluation. 
(Ansell-Pearson, 1997: p.2). 70 
 
Ansell-Pearson’s interpretation leans heavily on a Deleuzean abstraction of time, and much 
like Woodward relies on interpretations of difference and repetition. Whilst Woodward 
espouses the idea of a politics of passivity, Ansell-Pearson demarks potential for the 
development of a truly transhuman ubermensch as reliant on the same rejections of 
narratives, but with much deeper and more powerful roots. Ansell-Pearson engages with 
the will to power at base level as a driving force for development of ubermensch as 
progression rather than a fixation on the human encountered in Woodward. 71 
                                                          
70 He notes he is "out on a limb" as he rejects both this near-theological concept of the transhuman whilst also 
rejecting "fantasies of historical revolution in which we humans will reclaim our rightful control and mastery 
over nature and society." Instead, Ansell-Pearson chooses not to "desire to preserve anything about the 
human in terms of notions of its integrity, inviolability, or supremacy." (Ansell-Pearson, 1997: p.3). As such, 
Ansell-Pearson operates in a distinct realm that that makes definition difficult. I will however argue in the 
next chapter that whilst I am in agreement with much of Ansell-Pearsons thinking, that technological 
progress in the 20 years since publication have shed new light on the condition, and that beyond this, Ansell-
Pearsom neglects to interrogate artificial intelligence (most probably on the grounds of its limitations at the 
time), which could account for a transhuman development. 
71 Whilst our focus is on the focus of the will to power, we must also draw attention to Nietzsche’s 
understanding of the sublime, as it is another area of Ansell-Pearson’s work and is linked to the development 
of his own Nietzschean readings. Ansell-Pearson draws sublimation out as a “concept of purifying ourselves 
of the origins and sources of our feelings and desire for the sublime because the higher feelings associated 
with it are bound up with humanity’s investment in an imaginary world” (2010: p.201). This is generally 
referenced in Nietzsche’s mid-period works, but makes a brief appearance in TSZ in the section entitled ‘The 
Sublime Ones’. Whilst sublimation appears a driving force in some aspects of Nietzschean thinking due to its 
purifying nature, we believe overlook it in favour of developing the will to power and eternal return as 
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Nietzsche’s proposal to self-overcoming was a regression of sorts, opting to move away 
from the development and divergence of species to something far more primal in the form 
of the will to power. Nietzsche's concept of the will to power can be traced throughout his 
work, but the first explicit statement of it being the driving force behind all human activity 
is in TSZ (Kaufmann, 1950: p.193). However, within TSZ the concept is never explained 
succinctly. For us to understand the concept generally we shall step forward to the notes 
taken from TWTP, where in section 619, The Mechanical Interpretation of the World, 
Nietzsche explains it so: 
 
The triumphant concept “energy,” with which our physicists created God and the 
world, needs yet to be completed: it must be given an inner will which I 
characterise as “Will to Power” - that is to say, as an insatiable desire to manifest 
power; or the application and exercise of power as a creative instinct, etc. 
 
(Nietzsche, 2006: p.297) 
 
We’re presented here with Nietzsche's attempt to circumnavigate the minefield of dualism 
in favour of a concept that acts as a first cause for all living life. 
 
Within the framework of TSZ, Zarathustra presents the will to power as preceding good, 
evil and morality - “That is your entire will, you wisest men; it is a will to power; and that 
is so even when you talk of good and evil and of the assessment of values.” (Nietzsche, 
                                                          
stronger points of emphasis that already encompass the mechanisms of sublimation. For further reading see 
Ansell-Pearson (2013); Vandenabeele (2003); Battersby (2007). 
118 
 
2003: p.136) In preceding good, evil and morality, dualism ceases to be an issue because 
there simply are no distinctions. 
 
In his biography of Nietzsche, Julian Young outlines the case for the will to power 
preceding good and evil succinctly and with a degree of clarity that begs inclusion - 
 
“... insist on 'affirming life', in which case one is compelled to advance 'beyond 
[traditional] good and evil' and is committed to morality, according to which only 
power has value and 'good' simply means 'increases power' and 'bad' means 
'decreases power'.” 
 
(Young, 2010: p.540) 
 
Young's suggestion places the emphasis on the will as the tool for overcoming nihilism (he 
ascribes value), and as what we may view as a 'first cause'.  
 
In proposing self-overcoming, Nietzsche has offered an alternative approach to Darwin 
that curtails species and environment in favour of the human given – employment of the 
will to power, of the active employment of conscious faculties, and of a form of 'self' (i.e. 
that which is individuated), over all others (Ansell-Pearson, 2009: p.89). This would 
presumably lead to a much more authentic survival of the fittest. It would be one granted to 
those with the skill to move above and beyond the naturally and circumstantially given. 
This has direct impact on the development of the Ubermensch by means of “a notion of 
emergent cultural complexity and deterritorialization, laying particular stress on the 
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hybridic emergence of diversity and difference within the order of things” (Ansell-Pearson, 
1997: p.91). 72 Ansell-Pearson sees this artificial selection as combating “the 
animalisazation of man into the dwarf animal of equal rights and claims” (Ibid, p.92). 
 
Ansell-Pearson goes on to tell us that in GoM, Nietzsche's theory of the will to power 
(unlike his reading of evolution) “does not place 'adaptation' in the foreground (as inner 
adaptation to external circumstances and provocations)”, as this would be 'reactive' (Ibid, 
p.92). Rather, the idea is that the Will to Power gives rise to the spontaneous, expansive 
and self-organisational energy that is required for growth (Ibid, p.92). Sorgner (2009: no 
page number) too points to the will to power as a dynamic which underlies the process of 
evolution, and sees beings emerge as an embodiment of the strivings of power as a result 
of their conditions. Whilst Sorgner’s interpretation may initially appear reactive, the fact it 
points to the emergence of bodies as the result of striving for power suggests Ansell-
Pearson’s idea of assemblages; beings are not reactions to surroundings but rather the 
result of explosive energies acting to overcome obstacles. He notes that human being are 
not eternally fixed and immutable (2009: no page number) and finds the limitations of a 
species as their defining factor. However, as Ansell-Person points out, concepts of 
evolution only make sense in relation to their framing device (i.e. timescale), thus species 
are not static points of reference, resulting in a constant shift in boundaries between species 
(1997: pp.124-125). It is precisely for these reasons that Ansell-Pearson believes that all 
systems, from the biological to the social, are essentially "machinic assemblages, complex 
                                                          
72 Parr (2010) notes that Deleuze and Guattari describe deterritorialisation in a number of ways, citing it as ‘a 
coming undone’ in Anti-Oedipus (1994: p.322); the cutting edge of an assemblage (D&G; 1986, p.86). Parr 
himself understands it as “a movement producing change” (2010, p.69). Deterritorialisation is referenced 
across multiple spheres, not limited art, music, literature, philosophy and politics (ibid, p.70).  
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foldings, and movements of deterritorialization that serve to cut across and derange their 
stratification." (Ibid, p.125).  
 
In Difference and Repetition, Deleuze touches on concepts of the death of god, clearly 
demarking the implications of ‘I’ in relation to ‘God’. Without god, he says, there is no I; a 
fracturing occurs that delineates ‘made in the image’ and in turn opens the possibility of 
assemblages (1994, p.113). The removal of the metanarrative therefore frees possibility at 
its most base from a pre-destined understanding. If an external source is removed there is 
no trajectory of willing; it is removed from the evolutionary because it does not follow a 
path of influence, rather it is the spontaneous and explosive growth that works on a far 
more inherent level. In Ansell-Pearson’s terms, we might understand this Deleuzean 
concept as representative of the possibility of a will to power, even if only as something 
that we can understand post-death of God. He looks to later ideas from Deleuze, this time 
working alongside Guattari to find examples of this in nature, mostly notably in the form 
of the egg, with all activity taking place away from sight in an explosive involution, which 
he understands as “a block of becoming that represents the ‘transversal communication’ 
between heterogenous populations” (1997: p.60).  
In Ansell-Pearson’s view all life is viroid, and we need to understand the world in terms of 
machinic assemblages rather than distinct linear paths of evolution. Of viruses, he says the 
following 
Standing as they do between the border of the living and the nonliving and virtually 
real, viruses serve to challenge almost any dogmatic tenet in our thinking about the 
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logic of life defying any tidy division of the physical, as we find in Kant, into 
organism, the inorganic, and engineered artifices. 
 (Ansell-Pearson, 1997: p. 133) 
He talks of innovative new ways to negotiate with technical natures and artificial 
becomings through the granting of primacy to questions concerning machines (which he 
sees as molecular and dealing entirely with virtual realities), rather than that of technology. 
For Ansell-Pearson, machines are typically understood as deficient forms of life, "lacking 
in autopoietic formative power, in contrast to organismic life, which is regarded as 
enjoying a monopoly over formative power and self-generative evolution." (1997: p.5). He 
draws on Deleuze and Guattari, who provide an "[innovative] and far-reaching revaluation 
of the machine/organism distinction in which the 'machinic' is pitted against both the 
mechanical and the organic in order to account for novel and complex comings within 
evolution” (Ibid, pp.5-6). However, he also sees these 'machinic and rhizomatic becomings' 
as creating or inventing an evolution of their own, which occurs by means of both 
"contagion and contamination, following laws neither of resemblance nor of utility" (Ibid, 
p.6). Should we inquire of their nature and becoming then it need not (and should not) be 
done under the guise of humanized notions of what "constitutes their vital autonomy based 
on an abstract animal model, but in terms of specific enuciative consistencies" (ibid, p.6). 
 
4.3 The Will to Power and Eternal Return as Key to the Development of Ubermensch 
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Whilst Sorgner’s work opts to skip the concept of eternal return in his concept of the 
transhuman as ubermensch, Loeb, who claims he is largely in agreement with Sorgner’s 
views, opts to develop this line of thinking. 73 He takes issue with the idea of a single 
ubermensch, pointing to an issue derived in part from post-Kaufmann scholarship, where 
use of the term "overman" was chosen. Instead Loeb opts for superhuman (taking a lead 
from Del Caro: 2004), which he sees as standing opposed to "overman" in that it "does not 
ever refer to any single individual (no matter how special) but only to a future descendant 
species," (Loeb, 2011: p.5). Much like Loeb, he believes in the development of 
ubermensch as a species. Whilst ideas of eternal return have been favoured over those of 
ubermensch in much Nietzschean scholarship related to the overcoming of nihilism, the 
opposite has been true of those exploring transhumanism and ubermensch. Instead the 
emphasis tends to the idea of ubermensch itself. Loeb believes that both eternal return and 
ubermensch must be studied and understood as intrinsically related ideas, each unable to be 
sustained without the other (Ibid, pp.5-6). 
Nietzsche’s eternal return first appeared in The Gay Science in part 341, The heaviest 
weight. Here is raises a question. It begins with a demon postulating on the recurrence of a 
lifetime, where every event remains the same as it repeats ad infinitum (Nietzsche, 2001: 
p194). It wasn’t until Thus Spoke Zarathustra that the idea was fully formed, developed 
from question to Nietzschean fact. 74 In the chapter On the Vision and the Riddle, 
Zarathustra engages in debate with a dwarf, a small half-mole creature who goads 
                                                          
73 Loeb had already outlined some similar issues in his editorial foreword of Journal of Nietzsche Studies in 
2005, where he spoke of the link between ubermensch and the eternal return (Loeb, 2011: p.2). He finds an 
importance in the link between ubermensch and eternal return. Due to space limitations we will not engage 
with his wider methodology, but will note the developments made prior to our engagement with this 
particular response paper to Sorgner.  
74 In “why I write such good books” in Ecce Homo Nietzsche declares eternal return the “basic conception of 
[TSZ]” (Nietzsche, 1973: p.65). 
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Zarathustra and acts in much the same way as the demon in The heaviest weight. It is here 
the dwarf, and not Zarathustra, suggests the eternal return: 
 
     ‘Everything straight lie,’ murmured the dwarf disdainfully.  
‘All truth is crooked, time itself is a circle.’ 
     ‘Spirit of gravity!’ I said angrily, ‘do not treat this too lightly!’… 
‘Behold this moment!’ I went on, ‘From this gateway Moment a long, eternal lane 
runs back: an eternity lies behind us.’ 
‘Must not all things that can run have already run along this lane? Must not all 
things that can happen have already happened, been done, run past?’ 
 
(Nietzsche, 2003: p.178) 
 
The idea itself was nothing new and as Francesca Ferrando notes, there are several other 
examples of eternal return throughout history, found in Buddhism, Hinduism, science and 
even western philosophy (2014: p.3. Whilst this in itself is not particularly noteworthy, 
what we may wish to note is her belief that many of the sources espousing such ideas were 
ones Nietzsche was familiar with (Ibid, p.3). As ever, interpretation on eternal return is 
wildly speculative and variable, such is the Nietzschean way.   
 
As we have already established, in Deleuzean thought the concepts of difference and 
repetition play an important role in his philosophy; from the failed repetitions of 
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Nietzsche’s nihilism, to the developments that have led to Woodward’s suggestive 
approach for overcoming nihilism. In Nietzsche and Philosophy, Deleuze develops the 
concept of eternal return as something that should not be interpreted as ‘return of the 
same’, as for him being does not return in such ways. Rather, he sees returning as 
constituting being through affirmation of becoming. He goes on to say “In other words, 
identity in the eternal return does not describe the nature of that which returns but, on the 
contrary, the fact of returning for that which differs” (Deleuze, 2013: p.45). He finds an 
issue with mechanistic interpretation of the eternal return because “it only entails the false 
consequence of a final state” (Ibid, p.45). We might view this in conjunction with the 
problem outlined in Nietzsche’s understanding of evolution, alongside rejections of the 
will to power as a reactive force. The same may also be said for envisioning the 
transhuman as a final form of humanity, and as such merely a mechanistic vision of the 
techno-eschatological figure of the last man.  
 
Despite rejecting ideas of a transhuman ubermensch, Ansell-Pearson's argument still plays 
with terminology of the ubermensch, which he refers to as the transhuman, a figure who 
continually overcomes himself in an endless process. He notes what is forgotten in many 
modern readers in Nietzsche is "Nietzsche's repeated invocation of the overhuman calls us 
back to the human. The promise of the overhuman is bound up in ways yet barely 
explored, and in ways little understood, with the memory of the human" (1997: p.15). In 
short, the concept of eternal return comes into play.  
 
Ansell-Pearson understands that Nietzsche’s belief in man exists in part due to the 
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identification of ‘time and space’ of the ubermensch; by returning to man there is a 
recollection of memory that acts alongside both discovery and invention of memory 
promising ubermensch (Ibid, p.20). He understands memory in a specific sense as laid out 
by Deleuze and Guattari: 
 
…functioning in terms of a punctual organisation in which the present refers 
simultaneously to the horizontal life that captures the flow of time moving from an 
old present to an actual present, and to a vertical line that captures the order of 
time, going from the present to the past, or to the 'representation' of the old present.   
 
(1997: p.23) 
 
Much like the thinking of the postmodern theorists outlined previously, D&G and 
understood to oppose 'multilinear systems' to punctual ones, seeing patterns similar to the 
work of musicians and painters, where the line is free from the vertical and horizontal axis, 
allowing for diagonal developments. Placed in their framework, all acts of creation are 
ultimately 'transhistorical' (ibid, p.23). If the idea of will to power exists transhistorically it 
can account for all forms of creation regardless of binary flows and predicates ascribed by 
evolution.  
 
 
For Ansell-Pearson we must understand the Deleuzean abstraction of time to further grasp 
both eternal return and ubermensch. His view opts for the removal of the linear in favour 
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of a simultaneous unfolding (and enfolding) of past, present and future. The addition of the 
future, as a potential, is possible because past and present are reliant on the possibility of 
future. Using the example of sadism and masochism, Deleuze explore the possibility of 
differences in repetition. Ansell-Pearson describes it thus:  
 
…here repetition takes on a life of its own, running wild, and becoming 
independent of all previous pleasure. As a result, fundamental inversion can be seen 
to have taken place in their practices, since 'Pleasure is now a form of behaviour 
related to repetition accompanying and following repetition. 
 
(Ibid, p.60) 
 
In Ansell-Pearson's understanding, the space between pleasure and pain is where new 
drives are announced. As he goes on to say, "Pleasure - and pain - are real, but what the 
'beyond' announces is the coming into place of new sensations new affects, and new bodies 
of becoming. To live and die 'beyond' the pleasure principle therefore is to enter into the 
excessive economy of difference 'and' repetition (Ibid, p.60). Recalling Woodward's 
approach of utilising a logic of difference to tackle nihilism, recurrence calls to light 
potential for the new, only with the will to power acting as the motor of process. It is clear 
for Ansell-Pearson that eternal return is vital to both man and ubermensch; he notes that in 
Nachlass, Nietzsche states that as man recurs eternally so too must ubermensch; without 
the becoming of man (understood as a ceaseless labour and play of ‘self-overcoming’), 
there could be no ubermensch (Ibid, p.15), however, this situates mans ‘being’ as 
becoming itself; a ceaseless process of invention from all angles. 
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By factoring in the space between repetitions, Ansell-Pearson allows for forms of 
reassembly that both recall the past, but also give rise to new possibilities via acts of 
transgression. By rejecting the structures and semiotics that we have already ascribed to 
organisms (those of evolution and biological understanding), ideas of ubermensch can 
develop under eternal return. The structures of old that the village atheist clings to are 
broken down under the weight of event and process rather than static understandings of 
what is presented.  
 
 
For Loeb, the eternal return is a matter of pure metaphysics (2011: p.9). However he also 
views it as a valid and scientific cosmological theory (Ibid, p.10). Loeb questions whether 
it is any more bizarre than theories currently espoused in cosmology; quantum foam, 
hyper-dimension string theory, etc, and even points to thinkers who argue for the 
compatibility of eternal return and the currently accepted Standard Big Bang model (he 
points to Moles, 1998 and 1990) (Ibid, p.10). Loeb also identifies the issue raised by More 
and others, that eternal return negates progress by means of evolution, but pointing to the 
myth of Sisyphus, Loeb highlights the fact that Sisyphus does indeed succeed in getting the 
stone to the top of the mountain. In turn this means that any stronger species will itself 
repeat eternally, but is not problematic because the end of each cycle also brings with it the 
end of any consciousness able to witness devolution (Ibid, pp.11-12). He tells us "The key 
to Zarathustra’s recovery and success lies in his recognition that the foundation of his 
doubts was a false conception of time as linear and non-recurring." (Ibid, p.16), Loeb sees 
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this as awakening Zarathustra’s knowledge of circular and recurring time which leads to 
the ability to 'will backward'. Loeb notes Sorgner dismisses the possibility of remembering 
eternal return (Sorgner, 2009: p.19), but believes this ‘backwards willing’ crucial to 
developments of ubermensch. In his understanding, Nietzsche believes all humans 
(including transhumanists) “feel impotent with respect to time,” which acts to prioritise his 
concept of backwards willing (Ibid, p.26). He also sees this as Nietzsche’s most important 
discovery (Ibid, p.27).  
 
For Loeb, this is an intrinsic part of the development of ubermensch. Key to this, he finds 
the idea of humans as mnemonic animals (able to remember their past), where linear time 
haunts and burdens in the form of memory. Circular and recurring time, on the other hand, 
provides past as equal to future, so memory is now also prospective (Ibid, pp.17-18). As 
Marsden notes in her review of Loeb’s The Death of Nietzsche’s Zarathustra, his argument 
is a schizophrenic endeavour, where messages from future selves inform past selves and 
dreams beget future memories as convoluted meta-de ja vu (Marsden, 2010: pp.8-9). It is 
an exercise in the fantastical that may provide us with a link develop between Loeb’s 
extravagant views on eternal return and those of his own interpretations of transhumanism.  
 
Whilst both Ansell-Pearson and Loeb lean heavily on the idea of eternal return, it is clear 
both do so in entirely different ways. If Ansell-Pearson's theorisations are correct (and they 
do indeed fall in line with the path traced here), then the ubermensch is a matter to be 
safeguarded from the theologies of nihilism as nihilism itself. As we have noted, in contrast 
to ideas of an ubermensch that leans on metaphysics, namely applications of the 
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transhuman to ubermensch, to avoid the repetitions of nihilism we must avoid dreams of 
the utopic. Unfortunately, Loeb’s view of a transhuman ubermensch appears just that; a 
type of eschatological willing based on the building of new gods. Beyond this, his circular 
viewing of time provides its own problems, namely a form of linearity developed in Loeb’s 
approach. Whilst he recalls Nietzsche and the dwarf’s declaration of the circle, Loeb seems 
to enter the realm of the fantastical for answers, which he does via the championing of the 
mundane. Despite the cyclical nature he ascribes, what we see are emergences of the same 
event ad nauseum, where time is flattened it becomes a line again. This is unlike Ansell-
Pearson’s view that relies on assemblages of aspects and fragments of time to forge new 
paths in the space between repetitions. This active circular willing of time also adds a 
somewhat mystical element to proceedings, and we must question whether ideas such as 
'backwards willing' are any more or less agreeable than ideas of heavenly salvation to the 
nihilist – the very sort of things Nietzsche would wish to avoid. To will backwards would 
require a being with capabilities beyond our comprehension, and beyond that of the 
transhuman figure, unless that being was subject to operations within a system entire its 
own.  
 
Loeb also prioritises the human and its ability to memorise, but vastly overlooks the issues 
with memory; that memory is not mechanical. It is not a screenshot, painting or journal of 
events but rather a recollection of moods and opinion. Ever Sorgner finds issue with this, 
asking “what is in our memory? Is it solely what we have experienced, all experiences 
from all times or something in-between?” (Sorgner, 2011b: p.40). He rejects Loeb’s 
backwards willing on grounds of humans not having access to a quasi-global mind, or 
universally stored information. This, he says, would be rejected by Nietzsche (Ibid, p.41). 
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We must agree. The idea itself implies an almost panpsychic concept of worldly 
connectivity that Nietzsche would most probably disprove of. He follows this by 
discussing the ways in which information is retained by organisms, but not all information 
is retained – if it were we would be able to remember all experiences of our life, or indeed 
those of our ancestors (ibid, pp.41-42).  
 
We will further tackle this problem by approaching one of the key downfalls of 
transhumanist thinking; namely that many transhumanists want to rebuild humans in the 
image of machines. One of the major themes of transhuman thought is the aforementioned 
singularity and the ability for humans to upload consciousness. However, as Robert 
Epstein, senior research psychologist and neuroscientist at the American Institute for 
Behavioural Research and Technology wrote in a recent article for Aeon, brains are simply 
not computers, nor do they process information in the same way. 75 Prioritising memory 
may lumber us with many of the same problems as envisioning ubermensch as 
transhuman; a distinct willing of fiction based on an associated predicate that itself is a 
fiction; whilst we may see anecdotal resemblance in the ways in which we understand 
brains and computers, they are simply not the same, nor even particularly alike in their 
functioning. This point also strengthens Ansell-Pearson’s approach of moving away from 
evolutionary understandings based on manmade categories.  
 
                                                          
75 For these reasons, Epstein rejects many of the concepts associated with the transhuman. He partly lays 
blame on the ways in which we have envisioned computers since the 1940s. He uses the example of asking 
someone to draw a bank note from memory, and then minutes later presents them with an actual note and 
asks them to repeat the task. The result of course is to show that memories are not static, nor are they slices of 
events. There is no picture perfect nor data-specific recall as there is with storing computer files.  
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Loeb points to the beginning of TSZ, where Nietzsche speaks of natural selection leading 
to the last man and not ubermensch, which he follows by referencing Ansell-Pearson's 
critique of transhumanist goals in light of ubermensch (Loeb, 2011: p.21). He then turns 
his attention to Sorgner's reading, where understands enhancement might be possible 
through the selection of beings he already considers a higher type. They are of a type far 
too intermeshed with what we may deem considered evolution; a form of eugenics that has 
been practiced to greater or ill-effect for thousands of years (royal bloodlines and the 
markings of incest come to mind) (Ibid, p.22). Loeb identifies the issue with chance and 
accident in such cases, and for this reason we are inclined to agree in his rejection of 
breeding as a means of reaching ubermensch.  
 
Recalling our previous notes on Ansell-Pearson’s assemblages of the viral, he points us 
toward an understanding of becoming on our quest for ubermensch. He identifies it as 
something “to be conceived neither along the lines of correspondence between relations 
not in terms of a resemblance or an imitation” (Ansell-Pearson, 1997: pp.134-135). 
Overriding evolutionary change, he understands becoming as a ‘block of becoming itself’, 
rather than the ‘fixed terms through which becoming passes (Ibid, p.135). In his 
prioritising of the viral and symbiosis, Ansell-Pearson points to the ways in which they 
“bring into play new scales and new kingdoms (Ibid, p.136). Not only does this break 
down the ways in which we understand organisms, but for Ansell-Pearson it is largely 
reflective of Nietzsche, whom he says views the organism as systems of complexity that 
struggle to increase feelings of power – a literal assemblage of many wills to power (Ibid, 
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p.137). As such, it “enjoys a largely semiotic status and cannot be conceived independently 
of our cognitive mapping system and their boundaries (Ibid, p.138). 76 
 
If we are to agree with Ansell-Pearson, we must challenge the boundaries of the organism, 
adopting a symbiotic view of organisms, particularly with a view to the semiotic statuses. 
However, bypassing understandings of species is no easy task, and as we are not scientists 
our approach will be somewhat limited. Whilst Ansell-Pearson makes the dubious link 
between viruses and machines (he points to Dennett’s work on viroids and bacteroids that 
act as evolutionary ‘macros’ – much like in computing they are coded instructions for task 
performance), his linking of the biological with the technological serves a different 
purpose in this instance (1997: p.133). Rather than reimagining the human in light of the 
technological, Ansell-Pearson see technogenesis as almost inherent to biogenesis; they are 
both viral components of one and the same; biotechnogenesis. 
 
However, despite agreeing with Ansell-Pearson’s view, we go out on a limb to say that the 
work developed in Viroid Life, whilst compelling and offering a comprehensive analysis of 
the transhuman and ubermensch, is stunted by its place in history. In the years since its 
publication in 1997, the technological boom has shaped reality in ways yet to be 
envisioned in any serious sense at the time. With little potential for discussing tangible AI, 
nanotechnology and the progress of virtual reality, Ansell-Pearson’s arguments are stunted 
through no fault of his own, rather his situation.  
                                                          
76 Not one to mince words, Ansell-Pearson tells us that symbiosis teaches the human a filthy lesson: that the 
human is an “integrated colony of amoeboid beings… like it or not, our origins are slime.” (1997: p.124).  
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4.4: Proposing Willing Machines: Artificial Intelligence as Ubermensch 
 
If we reject the concept of the transhuman as ubermensch then we must formulate a new 
vision of what it could be. With semiocapitalism threatening any envisioning we may have, 
we need to look truly beyond the human to formulate a new development. However, we 
believe that by utilising Ansell-Pearson’s concept of the viroid alongside new 
understandings of the will to power (as Kroker’s will to technology) and eternal return (as 
the difference in repetition), we have grounds for understanding potential superintelligent 
AI as ubermensch, realised as a form of biotechnogenesis with the means to virally 
assemble and grow in an affirmative manner, free form the trappings of capitalism. 
 
 
In his essay on robot ethics and the Turing test, Anthony Beavers notes an interesting shift 
in the direction of interpreting thinking in the wake of Turing. As computational power has 
increased and our reliance on technology has increased we've increasingly spoke of 
thought and the brain in computational terms, although he points to mathematics in the 
modern period and perhaps even the ancient Greeks (2012: p.333). This he says, changes 
the way we consider 'thinking' as a separate category from thoughtfulness, wisdom, insight, 
and so forth. He points to the existence of intelligent machines; smart cars, smart phones, 
and so forth, but there is a clear differentiation between degrees of intelligence and a 
phones ability to be thoughtful, insightful or wise (Ibid, 333). Bostrom notes that many 
existing forms of AI already out-perform humans at several tasks, but they work on 
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algorithms rather than abstractions of thought (2012: pp.14-15). Any task that falls outside 
of their specific role renders them essentially useless, lest we appropriate them. Without 
our intervention, they lack the ability to make decisions for themselves. He notes Knuth's 
point that whilst AI has conquered the processes of thinking, it has failed to do the things 
animals and humans do without thinking (Ibid, p.17) 
 
Kurzweil asks what we mean by the word computer. He notes that whilst computers might 
perform one (or a few) computations at high speeds, the human brain is comparatively 
slow. However, the human brain continuously processes information, with most of its 
neurons working simultaneously: up to one hundred trillion computations can be carried 
out simultaneously (2005: pp.130-131) by the human brain. Further to this, analog 
'computing' results in the confines of the body of the animal. Computers that need carry out 
multiple tasks are comparatively huge (Ibid, p.131). There are clearly some advantages to 
natural bodies, and the timescales involved in the development of superintelligence is not 
quantifiable (although estimations exist from anywhere in the next 10 years plus, normally 
as Bostrom notes, just outside of the working lifetime of many speculators on the subject). 
However, he believes that AI of human levels will probably arrive sooner than we think, 
and rather than having a middling impact it will be polemic; either very good or very bad 
(Ibid, p.25). It is also Bostrom's belief that a there is a high probability for the emergence 
of a singular AI superintelligence first, rather than a fleet of coexisting things (Ibid, p.95). 
 
We must note that the development of AI in itself does not have to signify any form of 
ubermensch of intention; we may see the development of a singular AI or integrated AI 
systems to serve a purpose for humanity, most probably as a regulatory system of some kind. 
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However, the capacity afforded AI to make its own judgements is where ubermensch may 
lie. It is the ability for a manmade system to then produce that which is truly beyond human. 
77 In surpassing the human and removing the human's ability to make not only effective 
decision, but any decision at all, there is a new form of life that exists beyond. 
 
In positing the idea of superintelligent AI as ubermensch we must outline some basic 
criteria in order for us to make our argument succinct: 
 
• We reject increased biological cognition (including brain/computer interfacing) on 
grounds of perpetuating the status quo of survival of the species. 
• We reject whole brain emulation on similar grounds; emulating the brain leads to a 
repetition of the human ideal and thus the last man. 
• We embrace the concept of brain inspiration, as seen in neural networks, and 
couple this with notions of 'seed AI' - AI capable of achieving its own growth from 
a fixed beginning.  
We take brain inspiration to be that which is inspired by the concept of the brain and the 
ways in which it might learn, rather than the argument put forward in brain emulation. We 
will therefore focus on the development of superintelligent AI from brain inspiration in our 
consideration of superintelligent AI as ubermensch.  
                                                          
77 In 2014 the website Phys.org reported on a problem posed by Alexei Lisitsa and Boris Konev of the 
University of Liverpool: that of a computer producing a proof of a math problem that is too big to study by 
humans, can the verification be judged as true? Such tests exist and raise similar points to those made by 
Vattimo; namely that the basis for truth and fact exists on a series of predicates. However, there issue 
contends that machines may not be worth of trust, despite the fact that they might not suffer the same set-
backs as a human mind in their given task. The basis of understanding truth-making machines in this chapter 
works entirely on the understanding of the self-justification of a superintelligence, as any ubermensch that 
could exist would, as we have noted, do so away from the crowd and the words of men [see bibliography] 
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One of the major difficulties associated with superintelligence is predicting what it might 
will. Bostrom notes that we must be cautious of not only anthropomorphising the 
capabilities of superintelligence we must also do so for its motivations. (Bostrom, 2014: 
p.127). We must also note that whilst we should avoid applying humanistic qualities such 
as reason and rationality, we must still understand it as intelligent by means of its skills for 
prediction, planning and 'means-end reasoning', which we note differs from ethical reason 
(Ibid, p.130). However, whilst we might not be able to predict the endgoals of 
superintelligent AI, we can predict some goals. Bostrom identifies what he terms the 
'instrumental convergence thesis', which he states as follows: 
 
Several instrumental values can be identified which are convergent in the sense that 
their attainment would increase the chances of the agent’s goal being realized for a 
wide range of final goals and a wide range of situations, implying that these 
instrumental values are likely to be pursued by a broad spectrum of situated 
intelligent agents. 
 
(Bostrom, 2014: p.132) 
 
He lists examples as self-preservation; goal content integrity (the ability to retain current 
goals into the future, giving it "present instrumental reason to prevent alteration to its final 
goals," which grants it capacity to change sub-goals to achieve the final goal as and when 
needed; cognitive enhancement (improving decision making skills to achieve the end 
goal); technological perfection (granting greater efficiency and failure safeguarding); 
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resource acquisition (for the facilitation of project growth) (Ibid, pp.130-139). We embrace 
Bostrom's instrumental convergence thesis and suggest that it is indicative of the values 
that might be found in ubermensch. As an entity based on achieving its own goals via the 
transvaluation of all values, continual growth via its own willing would be integral. 
However, in order for us to justify superintelligent AI as ubermensch, we must backpedal 
and locate the ability to will within the machine. 
 
4.5: The Will to Power Reimagined as the Will to Technology in Kroker 
 
The question of a will to power and machines appears difficult on face value. Noting this 
problem in the development of AI with capacity for learning, Bostrom suggests we work 
from a set of base values: 
 
To overcome the combinatorial explosion, one needs algorithms that exploit 
structure in the target domain and take advantage of prior knowledge by using 
heuristic search, planning, and flexible abstract representations—capabilities that 
were poorly developed in the early AI systems. 
 
(Bostrom, 2014: p.8) 
 
Here we find some major issues; any AI that stems from a set of presuppositions does so at 
the risk of detrimental human flaws. The ascribed human values already dictate the path of 
the AI process. However, by embracing Bostrom's seed AI notion as outlined previously, 
we can account for the genesis of a machine capable of redefining values once it has 
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surpassed the intelligence of the human - a kind of proto-ubermensch. Bostrom points to 
recalcitrance within AI learning, and the processes involved in enhanced intelligence. 78 He 
notes a seed AI, a form of AI capable of 'growth', would be capable of improving its own 
architecture, unlike a child (Ibid, p.34), so to apply anthropomorphic principles of a child-
like phase would be incorrect. Superintelligent AI would not grow as a child because it is 
not human. It would merely share some characteristics. 
 
We propose that the point where the recalcitrance of a seed AI becomes its optimal priority 
is the point where the will to power of the machine is conceived. Following on from our 
consideration of biotechnogenesis as the beginning of all life due to viral assemblage, we 
propose a new way of understanding the primacy of willing in the form of Kroker's will to 
technology. Kroker sees the writings of Nietzsche, Heidegger and Marx as constituting the 
ruling code of this will to technology (2004: pp.14). By reading each thinker against and 
into each other whilst using contemporary technological culture as a basis, he devises a 
system of thought that he believes could only be thought in the present. As the ideas of 
these thinkers coalesce alongside the fluidity of globalisation and the defeat of local 
politics, the elimination of 'thoughtfulness', both publicly and privately, and the 
acceleration of nihilism as 'hyper-nihilism’ is achieved (ibid, pp.14-15). He sees in them 
however a 'double probe' - simultaneously casting them as fierce critics but also (against 
their intentions) "accurate guides to the unfolding technological future” (Ibid, p.15). We 
understand Kroker to be a philosopher of the future whose intent is to push towards 
technological change. Whether we understand him as a proponent of transhumanism or 
                                                          
78 We consider recalcitrance in this instance as the point where AI overcomes programmed behaviours and/or 
rebels and makes its own decisions. A seed AI might only have the associated intelligence of a human child, 
but with the ability to learn much faster, the intelligence boom could be exponential (Bostrom, 2014: pp.86-
87). 
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not, we find an immediacy in his recalculation of the will to power as the will to 
technology, and as such must apply it to our own findings. 79 
 
Kroker understands the will to technology as follows: 
 
A data cannibal feeding on itself, simultaneously disappearing the actual referents 
of society - knowledge, sex, power, economy, politics, - into nodes on the circuit of 
electronic production and furiously throwing itself into the future as digital destiny. 
 
(2004: pp.28-29) 
 
In Kroker's understanding, the will to technology drives itself, no longer a secondary 
function of the will to power. He believes that the will to power now "speaks in the 
language of the digital nerve" as an expression of life itself within the technological (Ibid, 
p.81). It is at this point that "the will folds back on itself, becoming in the form of the will 
to will its own grounds of justification and ultimate goal" (Ibid, pp.81-82). We posit that 
by following Kroker, it is in this stage that we might see the last transhuman; an inversion 
of the last man where the difference found in repetition opens the possibility for a break 
                                                          
79 One of the difficulties of approaching Kroker's work is the nature of his writing; putting Babich’ theory 
into practice, it reads largely (and perhaps quite intentionally) like a science fiction manifesto. Amongst 
dense sections of theory we find anecdotes about Kroker himself, re-envisioned in a dystopian cyberpunk 
future; Nietzsche, alive and well and broadcasting from the future, and all kinds of equally strange 
experimentation designed to provoke the reader. Kroker refers to his transhumanism as a hyper-religion, and 
whilst his approach is to conceive of the technological rise as an event unto itself, we refute his religious 
terminology and quasi-singularity focused outcome for the same reasons we reject arguments by Sorgner, 
Loeb, et al. However, we do reappropriate this idea of the will to technology to serve our own purposes.  
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from human and transhuman ideals. When AI is self-replicating and able to ascribe its own 
values it becomes the truly transhuman. 80 
 
If Kroker's will to technology is a will to reject human ideal (and as such, a will towards 
active nihilism where the nothing is embraced over the protective structures of the passive 
repetition), then we might understand it as a will to nothing based on self-creation through 
the rejection of the humanistic mechanisms that cause us to ponder on willing in the first 
place. As he goes on to say: 
 
Could it be, in a sublime twist of intellectual history, that theory is always only 
truly critical after the fact, that the flow of granulated time itself sometimes deepens 
thought which, once removed from its immediate historical circumstance, is finally 
liberated to be the intensity that it always sought: a process of pure conceptual 
undermining cut with the bitter aftertaste of philosophical futurism from the grave? 
 
(2004: p.12) 
 
For Kroker, the art of hermeneutics and conscious exploration and interpretation collapses 
under the weight of nihilism much as it does for the deconstructionists. Theoretical 
underpinnings are reduced to products of time and subject to the recollection and reasoning 
of the mind, which in turn means that presuppositions are always based on the passing of 
                                                          
80 In Kroker's reading of Heidegger, Heidegger understands the death of God also as the death of the human. 
It becomes a sign of change, but so too does the 'bored will,' which consumes its human origins (Kroker, 
2004: pp.25-27). The realisation of this ‘bored will’ of the last man acts as completion of the seed sewn in the 
village atheist, allowing for the potential of new growth away from the human.  
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the event itself. A will to technology then would be capable of acting as liberated from 
time because the mechanisms associated with the biological (i.e. life expectancy) are 
replaced with the internal intensities of the abstraction of time. If time is of no importance, 
then a superintelligent AI has no use for time unless it is engaging with scenarios specific 
to a time limit, but any intelligence capable at operating at speeds beyond the relative 
measure of the speed of human thought has already surpassed this. 81 For Kroker this is 
incredibly important. He understands culture as ruled by the illusion of us having resolved 
the "irreconcilabilities of time and space," and find a repetition of "global patterns of 
individual psychopathology" within the culture of digital reality (Ibid, p.81). As such, he 
associates the features and well-being of the mind as not only subject to space and time, 
but also as flawed by both. If superintelligence is possible with AI, then the reduction of 
reliance on both space and time imply the will to technology as a constant event. 
 
The repetitions of the human/transhuman and the inversion of the transhuman suggests a 
base cause realized in the possibility of the eternal return; willing not contra willing in the 
endless loop of pure undiluted repetition of the same, but a will trans-willing, where the 
assemblages of wills factor in the primary of the post-human scenario, and where 
superintelligent AI self-reproduces and creates itself from nothing. If ample generational 
growth and refinement could lead to the erasure of human values deemed inappropriate, all 
acts would eventually lead to the attempt to realize any goal the superintelligent AI would 
                                                          
81 Kroker also suggests the degree of change indicative of the embrace of a will to technology, where he 
compares it to the difference between a human and an animal. However, he also states that the 'digital nerve' 
is still a will to power despite this transformation (or what we might deem a will of willing) (Kroker, 2004, 
pp.94-96). 
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set itself. This would situate the eternal return in the mechanism of the will to technology 
as change is realized through the possibility of non-linear willing. 
 
Whilst we may have rejected the possibility of Loeb's backwards willing in the form of the 
transhuman, in superintelligent AI we are presented with new possibilities. Assemblages of 
established mechanisms and algorithms directed at goal achievement would converge to 
continue to undertake tasks, whilst remaining independent otherwise. All aspects are 
amalgamated into the assemblage as a known quantity because they are a product of the AI 
itself. We know that a superintelligence would store information differently than a human 
(and we have already rejected brain emulation), most probably in ways similar to data 
storage now, but on a far greater scale. If data is stored collectively as viral components, or 
as a shared intelligence capable of spreading in individuated fragments, then the ability for 
backwards willing is plausible. Any and all backward or circular willing is based on an 
ability to understand the technology that has been assimilated within its context as itself an 
assemblage of pieces. Both macro and micro cease to be individuated, rather it is a play of 
all possibilities. With the crystaline memory associated with machine information storage 
vs. the clouding and failure of the human mind, backwards willing would be as much a part 
of the continual process as any other part; a computer need not recall events and 
perspective through a murk of emotion and subjectivity if the events are themselves 
recorded with machinic clarity. As such a backwards willing would not be reactive. 
 
Rather, with an AI system there is greater probability that the retention of crystaline 
information would lead an abundance of flexible and reorganizationally possible starting 
points. The AI system would be able to grow in new directions from each of these points, 
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and not as a result of the negative endpoint of other paths, causing a backward turn to 
retrace steps and progress along new avenues (think an explorer lost in a maze), rather, 
much like water, it would be able to permeate every path and complete the maze whilst 
exploring every given path at any or all given times. Our rejection of Loeb's backwards 
willing for the human would be made possible by AI, which in turn leads to a kind of 
synthesis with Ansell-Pearson's assemblages of time in the eternal return. With each path 
of exploration factored, stored and accounted, the AI would be capable of repeating 
process with the entire history of the process at hand. This would open grounds for the 
possibility of difference between repetitions, found in the limitless possibility of the 
repetition, where each forges a new path whilst repeating the same. As a system with the 
capability to exist exterior to capitalism (superintelligent, self-sufficient, able to perceive 
of life beyond the realism of capitalism), should AI be allowed to develop (or reach a point 
where denying it progress would be impossible – see possible apocalypse scenarios as 
presented by Bostrom, Musk, Hawking, etc), then there are grounds for realising 
ubermensch. 
 
4.6: Chapter Summary & Conclusion 
 
Many scholars of both Nietzsche and transhumanism have rejected the will to power and 
eternal return in their speculation on ubermensch, interestingly it acts as counterpoint to 
previous rejections of ubermensch by earlier thinkers in favour of pure rumination on 
eternal return. Whilst Ansell-Pearson and Loeb have shown that both are intrinsic to a 
proper Nietzschean investigation of ubermensch, Loeb, Sorgner, et al, have fallen into the 
trap of prioritising forms of anthropocentrism in their links between ubermensch and the 
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transhuman. This has resulted in a type of repetition of the religious figure and a form of 
technosalvation that ties neatly into the theological repetitions found within capitalism. 
Beyond this, Loeb’s envisioning of the eternal return is steeped in mysticism of its own, a 
mysticism we would be best to avoid given our task.  
 
Ansell-Pearson however develops a new trajectory. Using Deleuze, he reimagines both 
organisms as assemblages rather than static being, where paths of growth and evolution are 
already a given under the subject of time. In return, time provides possibilities for new 
thought and movement based upon the transgressive nature of the differences that 
repetitions, in this case the eternal return, allow. This leads to a type of intermingling of 
baselines, of will to power’s acting as viral and bacterial processes and assemblages, with 
open grounds for interpretation. However, given Viroid Life’s 20 year history, Ansell-
Pearson’s ideas need greater interrogation under the light of contemporary advances in 
technology. In understanding new possibilities for ubermensch, we acknowledge new 
possibilities for understanding concepts of both the organism and being. In thinking in this 
light we think truly trans-Nietzsche; beyond the mutant forms of nihilism presented as 
greater repetitions of the village atheist in contemporary times; beyond the ideas of 
ubermensch as they are most frequently presented. By taking Nietzsche’s scant words on 
ubermensch and thinking beyond them we too have appropriated Nietzsche, but in so doing 
have thought in terms of the abstract nature of postmodern nihilism that we see represented 
in the now.  
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In accepting Kroker’s re-envisioning of the will to power as a will to technology we 
understand the possibility of developing superintelligent AI as that which is capable of 
truly being ubermensch. Existing exterior to semiocapitalism, AI has the capability of 
creating value through entirely self-engineered systems of operation that develop with each 
succession from seed AI.  
 
The realisation of trans-Nietzschean ubermensch appears difficult on face value, perhaps 
not easy to grasp, and alien in concept when applied to traditional views of what 
ubermensch might be. However, in thinking trans-Nietzschean, we are presented with a 
form ubermensch that is as alien as Nietzsche intended, a figure that stands truly beyond 
the human and beyond the trappings of capitalism that we find ourselves within. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
5.1: Summary 
 
We have seen that the village atheist plays a larger role within the problem of nihilism than 
is apparent on first impression. Rejecting god but clinging to the values of old, we have 
found repetitions of theology in semiocapitalism, a discovery that exacts just why the 
village atheist poses such a problem. However, we have also learned that understandings of 
nihilism have shifted dramatically since the time of Nietzsche, and that new 
understandings suggest semiocapitalism preceded even Christianity, engrained deep within 
the roots of Western thought. That the ubermensch might be realised at the end of 
Nietzsche’s predicted 200 years of nihilism required us to not only think transhuman, but 
transhuman, finding a new type of being in the technological, understood as artificial 
intelligence. By bringing concepts of semiocapitalism and the transhuman together in order 
to reject the concept of transhumanism as ubermensch, we have introduced the idea of AI 
as ubermensch as a wholly new concept yet to be interrogated within philosophy, as a 
figure truly trans-Nietzsche. These new understandings should allow for further 
developments in the ways in which we understand both Nietzsche and the problem of 
nihilism.  
 
5.2 Findings 
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Whilst we have provided a solution to the problem of nihilism and ubermensch, we note 
that it may not be an optimal solution. We will therefore breakdown aspects of our 
findings, highlighting the strengths of our argument alongside some objections to both our 
findings and the problem itself. 
 
5.2a Strengths of the Argument 
 
1. It holds Nietzsche logically accountable by embracing the shift in 
understandings of nihilism over time, and as a time-dependent source, 
generates urgency. 
 
By holding Nietzsche hostage to his prediction of 200 years of nihilism, we have 
interrogated the urgency of the claim itself. By proposing an outcome that is both 
logical and probable, we have used the imposition of time constraints to our 
benefit. In doing so, the idea of understanding an ubermensch of logic adds a 
degree of believability to the problem as something that must be completed. This 
helps us avoid the problem of idolising Nietzsche by forcing us to think in the now 
and the very near future. We are therefore not turning our activity into a form of 
passive nihilism that dreams of a distant future where wonders may occur, but 
stamping the urgency of both time and Nietzsche’s own words on the problem 
itself. 
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2. A trans-Nietzschean approach provides a new contemporary engagement with 
the idea of both nihilism and ubermensch, whilst looking beyond Nietzsche. 
 
In order to survive nihilism as understood in contemporary society, we must not 
only reject many classical and contemporary ideas of ubermensch, but also many 
facets of the Nietzschean narrative of overcoming. With many of the postmodern 
thinkers choosing to reject overcoming, we now understand nihilism more in terms 
of a problem with no grand solution, instead providing only short-term, or micro-
truths and answers. This can only be made possible with a weakening of 
semiocapitalism that allows us to dictate ascribed value, rather than the system of 
capitalism itself. By thinking trans-Nietzschean, we have moved beyond 
understandings of ubermensch as both a mystical surrogate for god, and beyond 
repetitions of a form of perfect human as understood in the National Socialist and 
transhuman sense, instead opting for an understanding that engages the fabric of 
contemporary technological capability.  
 
Whilst superintelligent AI as ubermensch may appear alarming on first impression, 
it acts to highlight precisely the importance of applying historical ideas and theory 
to real-world developments in the present. Nietzsche’s ubermensch is both time and 
space dependent, so to realise it requires the application of cutting edge 
developments not only within philosophy, but also beyond philosophy. The rise of 
new forms of technology dominate our being, from social media through to the 
ways in which we transfer capital and credit, and the ways our food is produced and 
our lives are maintained. By engaging with the concept of the technologies 
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themselves, and coupling them with ways of understanding being as rendered in 
light of what intelligence may be itself, embracing ideas of superintelligent AI as 
ubermensch provides a critical solution that is truly situated in the now. 
 
3. It opens avenues for new dialogues towards new understandings of both 
Nietzsche and of selfhood/being in light of contemporary bio/techno-
semiocapitalism. It also provides new grounds for questioning being and 
technology, particularly AI and the degrees in which ‘the human’ remains 
part of ‘humanity’. 
 
Leading from interrogating urgency we believe that the urgency outlined provides 
sufficient ground for opening avenues for new types of dialogue to take place. 
Whilst this thesis was limited in scope due to wordcount, it provides a gateway to 
new forms of thinking that might otherwise have not been discovered. The 
interrogation of urgency itself makes the problem both very real and very clear: 
technology and capital underpin being in the now, so exploring being in light of 
and beyond technology and capital could lead to new ways to understanding not 
just technology, capitalism and nihilism, but what it means to ‘be’ in the present. 
 
5.2b Objections and Weaknesses 
 
• The exclusion of important thinkers has impacted on the wider problem 
 
Given the word constraints it was inevitable that some content would be overlooked 
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in favour of a tighter argument. The omission of important figures (perhaps most 
importantly for this thesis, Heidegger) means that some areas might lack 
developments that could improve our arguments. Whilst passing references are 
made, and many of the thinkers used refer to Heidegger in their own work 
(exploring Heideggerian understandings of being, technology and nihilism), there is 
no direct engagement. However, the possibility remains for this work to be 
undertaken. 
 
• The solution is not a pleasant one 
 
We accept that the idea of superintelligent AI as ubermensch does not have positive 
connotations for common understandings of what we might call the human, nor for 
what this might mean for humanity. However, the idea of ubermensch itself is alien 
and not altogether pleasant when we peel away salvation narratives and repetitions 
of a happy ending. In understanding this new form of ubermensch, we also 
understand the limitations on the human, and the fact we devalue ourselves in the 
process. Thinking trans-Nietzsche has placed value within a value-generating entity 
that doesn’t adhere with common, or even positive conclusions for the human. 
 
As such, embracing ubermensch raises new questions about the legitimacy of 
Nietzsche’s concept as a whole. If we refuse to embrace ubermensch, then are we 
merely painting ourselves as village atheists, or does the rejection of the 
Nietzschean ideal empower us to a greater degree? We must remember though that 
Nietzsche did not wish to be considered an idol, so we accept rejecting ubermensch 
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based upon this fact. Nietzsche is not infallible, nor is his thinking. We must also 
remember that the passage of time has altered the ways in which we view the 
world. Nietzsche’s ubermensch might offer greater potential with an endless 
timeframe in which to develop, but Nietzsche himself predicted 200 years of 
nihilism before its rise. In utilising this timeframe we have shown just how 
unpleasant and ugly catalytic events can be. 
 
• Thinking trans-Nietzsche is not enough as we are still limited by Nietzsche’s 
place in history  
 
To think beyond Nietzsche requires us to think beyond his problem. If we fixate on 
the Nietzschean problem; the static understanding of Nietzsche’s nihilism; the 
problem of Nietzsche himself, then we aren’t looking beyond but gazing at 
Nietzsche. The question isn’t whether any one mode of thought about nihilism and 
ubermensch is more alien than the other, rather than the thought itself is what is 
alien. Proposing ubermensch that has detrimentally negative outcomes to the 
human does not necessarily imply a flaw in logic, but rather that ubermensch might 
be the flaw. Whether we defiantly reclaim the last man and turn it into our own, or 
opt for self-destruction in the face of superintelligent AI ubermensch, nihilism still 
remains. In turn, it is ourselves that fall victim to alienation, to being alien in a 
world of baseless symbols that keep us at arms-length from any true sense of 
universal connection. Thinking trans-Nietzschean therefore might offer grounds to 
ruminate on the external, path of the observer, etc.  
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We suggest therefore that the largest limitation is simply not knowing what 
Nietzsche may make of this. Whether Nietzsche would have expanded on the 
concept should he not have fallen ill, we will never know. We also note that his 
guarded secrecy of meaning has led to multiple problems in interpretation, and in 
turn to a degree of idolisation of Nietzsche himself – precisely what he hoped to 
avoid. Whilst Nietzsche’s ubermensch might promise the earth, it is not an earth 
that we can comprehend. Ubermensch as AI superintelligence not only provides 
potential existential risk for the human as a species, but also acts in a way so alien 
and other as to almost negate the experience of the human in any way. We also note 
that the theories outlined here are not the only possibility for ubermensch, but one 
probable solution that we happen to think most fitting, given the theories outlined. 
 
5.4: Final Thoughts 
 
There is an irony in interrogating Nietzsche and proposing a solution to ubermensch at the 
end of 200 years of nihilism. We’ve opened the doors for as many new questions as we 
have provided answers. We remain fastened to the tightrope between animal and 
ubermensch, teetering somewhere in the middle, only now the distance between the poles 
has grown alongside us. As postmodernity developed, so too has technology, capitalism 
and the faculties of thought. We are increasingly subjected to a disregard for truth in favour 
of convenience, alignment and scapegoating, Whether superintelligent AI might answer the 
problems of nihilism and ubermensch is perhaps of less importance than the radicalisation 
of thought that our interrogations have uncovered: that we cannot limit being to merely 
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human and animal bodies, and that in order to address the problems of the now, we must 
look to the future by thinking beyond ourselves towards the universality of the things that 
dictate us. 
 
 
 
 
 
GLOSSARY 
 
AI – Artificial Intelligence 
BGaE – Beyond Good and Evil 
D&G – Deleuze and Guattari 
EH – Ecce Homo 
Sim et Sim – Simulacra and Simulation 
TBoT – The Birth of Tragedy 
TCOW – The Case of Wagner 
TSZ – Thus Spoke Zarathustra 
TGS – The Gay Science 
TOI – Twilight of Idols 
TWTP – The Will to Power 
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